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What is the nature of hybrid governance in the Global South? In the African context, a state-
centric conceptualisation of governance fails to capture the nuances and realities of governance 
where non-state actors often fulfil duties that are traditionally the responsibility of the 
Weberian state. It is against this background that this dissertation seeks to contribute to 
hybridity literature by exploring the relationships between the state and the construction 
industry through a case study of collusion in the South African construction industry to build 
the 2010 FIFA World Cup stadiums. The research goes beyond arguing for a plurality of 
governance actors and draws on the concept of hybridity to highlight the contestations that 
characterise the relationship between the different governance actors. The original contribution 
to hybridity literature made by this research lies in examining how the state and the construction 
industry enact authority in a setting of hybrid governance. To analyse the process of 
hybridisation I draw on the concepts of corruption, authority and governmentality as lenses 
through which to analyse the rationalities, strategies and practices used in the enactment of 
authority. The research findings reveal that the process of hybridisation as the state and 
construction industry articulate authority is characterised by contradictions, blurring and 
boundary-making. The findings suggest that the manifestations of these characteristics during 
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This dissertation examines hybrid governance in the Global South through a case study of 
collusion within the South African construction industry to build the 2010 FIFA1 World Cup 
football stadiums. The tender process for construction firms to win contracts to build the FIFA 
World Cup stadiums was characterised by massive collusion, implicating politically connected 
individuals, blurring the distinction between the state and the construction industry in a way 
captured by hybridity. To understand how the collusion of this scale was possible, this 
dissertation examines the question of how the state and the construction industry enacted 
authority in this hybrid governance setting. 
In this chapter I introduce the concept of hybridity, touching briefly on the insights it might 
provide into governance in the African context, before moving on to discuss the objectives and 
research contributions of this research. To conclude, the chapter provides an outline of the 
remainder of the chapters in the dissertation.  
 
1.2 The state, governance and hybridity 
 
Jessop (1990:341) defines the state as comprising of “a distinct ensemble of institutions and 
organisations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding 
decisions on the members of a society in the name of their common interest or general will”. 
Lund (2006:685), building on the work of Abrams (1988), makes a distinction between the 
state as a system and the state as an idea. The state system comprises of the distinct institutions 
described by Jessop (1990), while the idea of the state is symbolic, referring to the expectations 
of what a state should be. According to Brandt (2017:4) “the state is not a homogenous entity” 
but rather, as Jessop (2015) notes, a result of complex fluid interactions between state/non-sate 
actors. Lund (2006:697) argues that state institutions are continuously in the process of 
                                                                
1 Founded in 1904, FIFA is an international football governing organisation with 211 member states. It is most 
popular for its FIFA World Cup, which is a competition held every four years between the men’s national teams 




formation, as such, there is “not a straightforward institutionalization and homogenization of 
authority”. For Foucault (2007:277) the “state is a practice… a set  of practices by which the 
state actually became a way of governing, a way of doing things, and a way too of relating to 
government”. 
There are myriad definitions of governance. The political scientist and international relations 
scholar James Rosenau (2000:171) defines it as “systems of rule, as the purposive activities of 
any collectivity, that sustain mechanisms designed to ensure its safety, prosperity, coherence, 
stability, and continuance”, while Renate Mayntz (2004:66) suggests that it is “the entirety of 
all co-existing modes of collectively regulating social matters”. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, I will use the definition proposed by Burris et al. (2008:3) that governance is 
“organized efforts to manage the course of events in a social system”. Governance literature 
typically takes a state-centric perspective (see Shearing 2006; Backer 2016). This state-centric 
perspective on governance can be traced back to the enduring Hobbesian worldview supporting 
a strong central government as a prerequisite to governance. According to Burris et al. (2008:5), 
the debates about governance tend to centre around the role of the state in governance; the 
extent to which the state is viewed as either “too weak, and needing to be strengthened” or “the 
state remains too strong, too undemocratic, and therefore needs to be better constrained or 
stripped of some of its jurisdiction”. Shearing (2006:13) argues that a state-centric 
conceptualisation of governance fails to articulate adequately the reality of governance in 
contemporary society and limits “normative thinking”. To address this state-centric worldview, 
nodal governance scholars such as Johnston and Shearing (2003) and others have advocated an 
approach to governance that is empirically determined, not giving a conceptual priority to the 
state. The dissertation draws on the nodal governance understanding of the need for empirical 
investigations to determine how governance in a social system functions. 
 
In the African context, governance has never been a state-centred exercise. Max Weber’s 
(1948:78) definition of the state as having “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory” is not applicable in African states. This is because governance has 
been an exercise of plural actors encompassing both state and non-state actors. Non-state 
governance actors in Africa take on responsibilities traditionally attributed to the Weberian 
state and provide a wide range of social services using different mechanisms. As Börzel and 
Risse (2016) have noted, areas of limited statehood are not ungoverned spaces but governed 




understanding of governance. Plurality of governance actors in Africa was evident during the 
colonial era, where the colonial state did not have the institutional capacity to support a central 
government. Therefore, it practiced indirect rule by governing through local traditional 
authorities (see Mamdani 1996; Hindess 2005; Hansen & Stepputat 2006). As scholars such as 
Azarya and Chazan (1987), Engelbert (2000) and Young (2004) have noted, these governance 
structures from the colonial period are still evident in post-colonial Africa. The dissertation 
goes  beyond plurality of governance actors in the African context by using hybridity as a lens 
to understand how these actors interact in the governance arrangements. 
 
The concept of hybridity has been used in a wide range of fields, such as anthropology, 
linguistics, political science, international relations and post-colonial studies to bring insights 
into the nature of governance. Colona and Jaffe (2016:176) tell us that “hybrid governance 
arrangements refer explicitly to those contexts in which state and non-state actors are highly 
intertwined or merged”. Goodfellow and Lindemann (2013) argue that hybridity has been 
erroneously used to describe institutional arrangements in which state and non-state institutions 
interact, arguing that, in the absence of synthesis of these institutions, these arrangements are 
“better described as ‘institutional multiplicity’ than as hybridity” (Goodfellow & Lindemann 
2013:7). Colona and Jaffe (2016) note that, although Goodfellow and Lindemann (2013) make 
a valid argument, the challenge is that “through everyday practices of interaction, any 
governance arrangement is likely to eventually become hybridised, with actors, logics and 
interests merging” (Colona & Jaffe 2016:179). Thus, Colona and Jaffe (2016) argue for an 
analytical approach to hybrid governance that views it as a process instead of an end product, 
enabling exploration of the evolving and changing dynamics in a hybrid governance 
arrangement. As Hutnyk (2005:81) point out, “hybridity is better conceived of as a process”. 
Similarly, Luckham and Kirk (2013:8) suggest that “governance should be empirically 
investigated as a collection of loosely coordinated and constantly changing processes”. 
 
1.3 Aims, scope of study and research questions 
 
Ackermann (2012:17) has called for empirical research to reveal the “analytical usefulness” of 
the concept of hybridity. This dissertation seeks to answer this call through analysing the 
relationship between the construction industry and the South African state as both actors enact 




World Cup football stadiums. I use the concepts of authority and corruption as analytical tools 
to improve conceptual understanding of hybridity. The dissertation draws from Albrecht 
(2018a) who argues that examining the strategies and practices used by actors in hybrid 
structures to enact authority reveals how the contestations within process of hybridisation 
transpires (see Albrecht & Moe 2015) and Lund (2006:676), who asserts that “[i]n order to 
understand how political power is exercised, we therefore need to have an eye for the processual 
aspects of the formation of public authority”. Building from Lund’s (2006) observations, I 
examine how strategies and practices that both shape and undermine the enactment of authority 
as the state and construction industry interact with each other improves conceptual 
understanding of hybrid governance processes.    
 
The research question I address in this dissertation is: How is authority enacted in hybrid 
governance processes? This question is addressed through the following sub-questions: 
 How did the strategies used by the South African state to enact authority during the 
construction of stadiums for the 2010 FIFA World Cup shape the process of 
hybridisation? 
 How did state policies shape relations between the state and the construction industry 
during the process of hybridisation? 
 What were the state and construction firms’ responses to boundary-making during 
hybridisation? 
 
1.4 Contribution to literature 
The contribution to literature made by this dissertation is furthering understanding of the 
workings of hybrid governance structures by exploring the dynamic relationship between the 
construction industry and the South African government through examining the strategies, 
practices and rationales used to enact authority by both actors. This undertaking seeks to 
contribute to hybridity literature in broadly three ways. First, I examine what the contestations 
surrounding allocation of resources ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup reveal about the 
process of hybridisation. Scholars have suggested that resource distribution during the process 
of hybridisation is an outcome of negotiations between different actors with heterogeneous 
interests (see Baker  2011, 2013; and Albrecht 2017). The literature does not specify the 
conditions necessary for one actor to impose its interests in resource allocation thereby enabling 




between different actors determine resource allocation, I seek to bring greater understanding of 
the power dynamics within hybrid governance structures. Second, I discuss how 
implementation of state policy by the construction industry through corrupt practices shed 
insights into the contradictions within the process of hybridisation. Although, it is widely 
accepted in hybridity literature that the process of hybridisation is characterised by 
contradictions, the factors that exacerbate or undermine these contradictions are not adequately 
explored. Therefore, the dissertation provides further insights into how corruption impacts the 
contradictions between the different actors in hybrid governance structures. Lastly, I examine 
the construction industry’s response to the state’s use of legislation as a boundary-making 
measure to separate itself from corporate South Africa, to highlight the factors that trigger 
challenges to boundary-making during hybridisation. Kyed (2017) makes the argument that 
boundary-making is challenged during the process of hybridisation. The point of departure for 
the dissertation is that boundary-making is empirically determined whether challenged or not 
challenged during the process of hybridisation. Therefore, examining the responses of the 
construction industry to state legislation bring greater understanding to the factors that 
determine challenges to boundary-making during the process of hybridisation.  
Furthermore, Shin (2009) and Greene (2003) point out that most of the research on mega-events 
has been from the experiences of Western countries, with a focus on the economic impact of 
the mega-events of the hosting city/state. This research, by exploring the infrastructural aspects 
of hosting the first FIFA World Cup in Africa, contributes an African perspective to the mega-
events literature.  
 
1.5 Outline of dissertation chapters 
 
Chapter two reviews hybridity literature from different fields to give context to the theoretical 
contribution the dissertation seeks to make. This chapter explores the theoretical lenses through 
which the case study examined in this dissertation can be conceptualised. The chapter also 
discusses the concept of corruption and authority used as analytical frameworks to examine the 
relationship between the state and the construction industry in the case study. The chapter 
highlights literature relating to mega-events to discuss how these events are hybrid in character, 





Chapter three outlines the methodology used for acquiring data for the dissertation. I utilised 
a qualitative social constructivism/interpretivism research approach for this dissertation 
because of the nature of the research question. Specifically, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with different individuals who have the necessary expertise to enable me to answer 
the research question. To gain further insights into the case study, I thematically examined 
media coverage of collusive tendering in the construction industry during the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup to analyse the way in which corruption was portrayed by the print media. 
 
Chapter four sets out the context to facilitate the discussion about the case study. The chapter 
gives a historical overview of the South African political economy and examines the 
relationship between the business sector and political elites in negotiating the transformation 
of the South African economy. The chapter also provides an overview of the South African 
construction industry. 
 
The empirical chapters are Chapter five, Chapter six and Chapter seven. Chapter five 
addresses the sub-question: How did the strategies used by the South African state to enact 
authority during the construction of stadiums for the 2010 FIFA World Cup shape the process 
of hybridisation? This chapter examines the strategies used by the state to gain support to host 
the 2010 FIFA World Cup. It argues that the gaps between state policies and strategies and 
state practices to implement these policies provide insights into how the distribution of 
resources occurs during the process of hybridisation. 
 
Chapter six addresses the sub-question: How did state policies shape relations between the 
state and the construction industry during the process of hybridisation? This chapter challenges 
the prevalent premise in hybridity literature that tensions and contradictions, arising within 
hybrid orders as the different actors seek to achieve different interests and objectives, are 
difficult to reconcile, by examining how the corruption objective can effectively overshadow 





Chapter seven addresses the sub-question: What are the state and construction firms’ 
responses to boundary-making during hybridisation? The chapter extends the argument made 
in Chapter 6 that corruption exercised by politically connected businesspersons blurred the 
distinction between the state and the construction industry, by arguing that, although blurring 
is evident in hybrid structures, so is boundary-making. The chapter explores how boundary-
making transpired in the hybridisation process, shaping the relationship between the state and 
the construction industry.  
 
Chapter eight concludes the dissertation and reverts back to the research question: How is 





CHAPTER 2: THE CONCEPT OF HYBRIDITY IN CONTEXT OF AUTHORITY, 
CORRUPTION & MEGA-EVENTS 
 
 
2 .1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines key themes and debates on the concept of hybridity, drawing, in 
particular, on the fields of post-colonial studies and post-conflict and peacebuilding, which 
have brought important insights into the concept of hybridity. It also examines the concepts 
of authority and corruption that are used in this dissertation as analytical tools to further 





The point of departure of this dissertation is that the concept of hybridity provides insights 
into the workings of plural forms of governance in contemporary society. Indeed, various 
disciplines have made use of the concept of hybridity in order to gain further knowledge into 
various scientific and social phenomena. The term “hybridity” can be traced back to the 
biological and botanical sciences to describe the mixing of different types of animals and 
plants respectively. It was in the nineteenth century that hybridity was used to describe the 
mixing of different races of people and this carried racist connotations, because mixing 
different races was considered impure. In the fields of sociology and anthropology, hybridity 
was used to explain the phenomenon of migration to urban areas. Leading sociologist, Robert 
Ezra Park (1928:892), in his article Human Migration and the Marginal Man, used the term 
“cultural hybrid” to describe a Jewish migrant as “a man living and sharing intimately in the 
cultural life and traditions of two distinct peoples”, with the two societies not merging. 
Ackermann (2012:7) describes this perception of cultural hybridity as having a “negative 
connotation”, as the migrant is essentially a stranger in the two societies. However, 
Ackermann (2012) pointed out that the Brazilian sociologist and historian Gilberto Freyre, 
writing about his homeland, Brazil, portrayed cultural hybridity in a positive light. For Freyre 




popular book The Masters and the Slaves (1946), Freyre put forward a positive 
conceptualisation of the relationship between race and culture in colonial Brazil by arguing 
that the mixing of both European, African, and American peoples and their cultures created 
a range of different racial varieties and mixed cultures that are difficult to differentiate. The 
conceptualisation of hybridity in the fields of sociology and anthropology highlights the 
challenges faced by different individuals and groups of people as they interact in the same 
social processes.  
 
2.2.1 Postcolonial studies: hybridity and the myth of purity 
 
Postcolonial literature adopted the concept of hybridity in order to frame the merging of 
linguistic, social, political and economic transcultural relations that has undermined a 
worldview perspective based on binaries and hierarchies. In other words, the concept of 
hybridity has been used to reject essentialist identities based on the purity of race and 
cultures; and supports the heterogeneous mixture of the pure and impure (see Rushdie 1991; 
Guignery 2011; Gilroy 2000; Werbner 2004). Edward Said (1978) and Homi Bhabha’s 
(1983) work on hybridity has shaped postcolonial studies. Edward Said’s ground-breaking 
book, Orientalism (1978), made the argument that the European coloniser’s culture shaped 
and controlled how the “Orient” was perceived and portrayed in different socio-economic and 
political spheres. For Said, orientalism discourse centred on the European subject as the 
source of knowledge and the ‘Orient’ as an object of knowledge. Hall (2004:236) argues that 
the European subject’s knowledge of the ‘Orient’ was based on unequal power relations 
hugely determined by the Europeans, who placed the ‘Orient’ at a disadvantage. Homi 
Bhabha (1983) highlights a flaw in Said’s orientalism as failing to address the issue of 
resistance by the ‘Orient’. Bhabha (1983:200) notes that Said’s argument is flawed because 
the coloniser is portrayed as exercising unquestionable power over the ‘Orient’. It fails to 
acknowledge that the process of orientalism was undermined because the colonial subject is 
assembled in “a repertoire of conflictual positions” and is thus a “site of both fixity and 
fantasy” (Bhabha 1983:204). Bhabha’s observation is useful for examining how actors within 
hybrid structures challenge authority, as reflected in the chapters that follow. The next 





2.2.2 Hybridity, Post-conflict and Peacebuilding  
 
In the 2000s, hybrid governance literature gained prominence and became an influential 
critique to the dominant liberal state-centric approach to state building in post-conflict 
fragile/weak states. Eric Herring (2008:48) has defined liberalism as “a formal and informal 
commitment to principles and practices of individual rights and responsibility in the context 
of equality of opportunity, the rule of law, freedom of expression and association, a mainly 
market economy and governments chosen in multi-party free elections”. The main criticism 
levelled against liberalism is that it is based on western values that are assumed to be 
universally applicable, irrespective of the different historical, social and economic contexts 
of non-western states (MacGinty 2010:394; see Peterson 2012). Moreover, Wendy Brown 
(2006) has drawn attention to the contradictions of liberalism by pointing out that liberalism 
in practice is compatible with non-liberal values and assumptions. 
 
Traditional literature on development and state building tends to take a critical approach to 
the role of non-state actors in fragile and failed states as these actors are viewed as the 
antithesis to building strong, bureaucratic institutions. One reason for this is the assumption 
pointed out by Heathershaw (2013:277) in the state building literature, that local and 
indigenous governance actors are non-liberal, while international governance actors are 
liberal. However, hybrid governance scholars have reframed the narrative of non-state actors 
to be viewed in a more constructive manner (see Boege et al. 2009; MacGinty 2011). As 
highlighted by MacGinty (2011) the concept of hybridity provides an alternative to the 
hegemonic liberal policy from international actors operating in post-conflict states. In post-
conflict and peacebuilding literature, hybrid governance is used to explain and capture how 
state and non-state actors are both responsible for the provision of public services in fragile 
states. In other words, the concept of hybridity has been used to show how different forms 
of non-state governance structures operate alongside the state. Acknowledgement of the 
roles of both the state and non-state actors facilitates a more grounded and nuanced 
understanding of the interlinked nature of governance actors in the African context. The next 
section addresses the key gaps identified from different hybridity literature this dissertation 





2.3 The contested concept of hybridity 
 
An important criticism is that hybridity reinforces and gives effect to the binaries that it aims 
to dispel. As Jenny Peterson (2012:13) points out: 
[H]ybridity in the post-colonial sense reflects on the meetings of two defined 
subjects – the colonial power and the colonised subject. Thus, although hybridity 
attempts to move the analysis away from homogenous forms, these two subjects 
are, paradoxically, themselves homogenised, treated as pure definable entities. 
 
Indeed, critics have questioned the utility of the concept of hybridity because it is based on the 
premise of duality - as two distinct parts coming together to form one structure - which ends 
up recreating the binary distinctions it seeks to undermine (see Peterson 2012; Heathershaw 
2013; Stepputat 2013; Albrecht & Moe 2015; Hameiri & Jones 2017). Furthermore, as noted by 
Finn Stepputat (2013), although the conceptualisation of hybridity as the mixing of two pure 
forms has been rejected, in state-building literature the state is nonetheless often  portrayed as 
the inevitable governance actor in the binary relationship with a non-state governance actor. In 
response to criticism, hybrid governance scholars such as MacGinty and Richmond (2016:223) 
have noted that, although it is possible to view the concept of hybridity through binaries such 
as local/international or west/non-west, it is also possible to use the concept as a tool to move 
beyond “the static thinking of binaries”. Colona and Jaffe (2016:182) argue for an analytical 
approach to viewing hybridity as a process, thus enabling an exploration of the evolving and 
changing dynamics in a hybrid governance arrangement. Such an approach would anticipate 
and “acknowledge the diversity of outcomes of these practices and the difficulty of predicting 
or maintaining positive effects” (Colona & Jaffe 2016:182). However, Albrecht and Moe (2015) 
point out that researching the nature of these hybridisation processes faces challenges with 
limitations of language, which makes use of binaries and categories to make sense of a social 
phenomenon.  
 
Responding to criticisms about the use of binaries to conceptualise hybridity, Roger MacGinty 
(2011:8) advances the notion of “prior hybridity”, arguing that hybrid governance systems 
have “a long history of interaction, fusion, competition, resistance and coalescence” 
(MacGinty 2011:8), characterised by fluidity. Pieterse (2001:231) points out that, “[w]e can 
think of hybridity as layered in history, including pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial 




and accordingly different pathos of difference”. García Canclini (2005:xxv) has also 
advocated for prior hybridisation by stating that: 
 
socio-cultural processes in which discrete structures or practices, previously 
existing in separate form, are combined to generate new structures, objects and 
practices. In turn, it bears noting that the so-called discrete structures were a result 
of prior hybridization and therefore cannot be considered pure points of origin. 
 
Albrecht (2018b) has argued, in similar vein, that hybridisation should be conceptualised as a 
historical process that is empirically determined, constituted of different actors interacting and 
navigating the tensions of sameness and differences in enacting authority to access resources 
(see Albrecht 2017). The process of hybridisation is complex and characterised by 
contradictory elements, which are discussed further below. 
 
2.3.1 Contradictions between nodes during the process of hybridization 
 
The concept of hybridity has been criticised for being overly broad in a way that adversely 
affects its analytical usefulness. In other words, the concept of hybridity has faced criticism for 
lacking depth and analytical rigour, resulting in an analysis that views everything as stemming 
from hybridity (see Thomas 1996; Sahlins 1999; Burke 2009; Albrecht & Moe 2015). As 
Ackermann (2012:5) has noted, hybridity is an ambiguous term that can be used in a literal 
sense, as well as to describe and explain a social phenomenon. Therefore, the concept of 
hybridity faces the challenge of having limited analytical value through “overemphasising the 
potential for positive accommodation” (Albrecht 2018a:568; Albrecht & Moe 2015). Albrecht 
(2018a:568) states that in peace and conflict studies the concept of hybridity has been used in 
a way that fails to acknowledge the different power and authority dynamics between the 
different actors, resulting in “the potential to overemphasise positive accommodation”. This, 
in turn, leads to skimming over the differences in the hybrid structures resulting from the 
different contexts and historical backgrounds shaping the various constituents of the hybrid 
structures. Albrecht (2018a:575) makes the argument that the process of hybridisation is 
characterised by tension with “positive accommodation and separation”. However, this tension 
is often overlooked. These criticisms show the importance of taking a nuanced approach to the 
study of hybrid political orders. In order to address criticism, scholars have advocated focusing 
on the dynamics and the nature of the relationship between the different actors in the hybrid 





In order to capture the contested processes of hybridisation, Albrecht and Moe (2015:2) have 
suggested focusing on processes of similarities and differences shaping the enactment of 
authority in hybrid structures. Albrecht’s (2017:570) research on police reform in Sierra 
Leone reveals that the relationship between state representatives and traditional leaders, is on 
one hand, based on cooperation and, on the other hand, based on competition, as the parties 
contend for access to resources. For Albrecht (2017:569) “[b]oth the design and initial 
implementation” of the Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP)2 “reflect how 
heterogenisation may occur in hybridisation, a relentless process that runs to the very core of 
how authority is manifested in the pursuit of resources”. Albrecht (2018a) argues that 
examining the strategies and practices used by actors in hybrid structures to enact authority 
reveals how the contestations within processes of hybridisation transpires (see Albrecht & 
Moe 2015). These contestations become apparent in Chapters five, six and seven of this 
dissertation, which analyse what the strategies and practices used by state and non-state actors 
in the case study reveals about the relationship between the process of hybridisation and 
distribution of resources. 
 
To illustrate that homogenisation and heterogenisation are foundational to the process of 
hybridisation, Albrecht and Moe (2015) draw on the work of Mae Henderson (2000). 
Henderson developed the notion of “simultaneity of discourse” from Barbara Smith’s (1983) 
work in the field of  black feminist criticism. Henderson (2000) used the notion of simultaneity 
of discourse to highlight and overcome limitations faced by black female writers because of 
race and gender and the way in which the interrelationship between these two concepts shapes 
discourse. In other words, the notion of simultaneity of discourse seeks to overcome 
homogeneous and heterogeneous assumptions based on race and gender facing the work of 
black female writers (Henderson 2000:2). Henderson (2000:3) asserts that the plural aspects of 
black women writers are a matrix of subjectivity informing the relationship of sameness and 
difference with “other(s)”. A matrix of subjectivity refers to the black women writers being 
                                                                
2 The Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP) ran between 2011-2016 was funded by the United 
Kingdom Department for International Development to increase security and justice services for marginalised 
groups in Sierra Leone. The ASJP worked in partnership with the government of Sierra Leone and emphasised 






positionally shaped by different social, cultural and historical perspectives (Henderson 
2000:4). “Other(s)” is a term used “to account for both race and gender, and how they 
interrelate, in an attempt to move away from a reductive paradigm” (Albrecht & Moe 2015:8). 
Through their work, black women writers simultaneously enter into a discourse of difference 
and identity, for example, by identifying “with black men as blacks, with white women as 
women, and with black women as black women. At the same time, they enter into a 
competitive discourse with black men as women, with white women as blacks, and with white 
men as black women” (Henderson 2000:4). Albrecht and Moe (2015:8) argue that although 
Henderson’s work is within a feminist discipline, it nonetheless is applicable to post-colonial 
characterisations of the concept of hybridity. As such, the notion of simultaneity of discourse 
provides a useful framework to develop the concept of hybridity by exploring how the 
processes in which homogeneous and heterogeneous sources of authority are simultaneously 
enacted (Ibid). For Albrecht and Moe (2015:8), the post-colonial subject is “the basic unit of 
relationships” whose enactment of authority demonstrates the workings of the hybridisation 
process. Put differently, the hybridisation process is revealed by an analysis of the subject’s 
strategies and practices as it enacts and articulates authority (Albrecht 2018a:568). The post-
colonial subject’s sources of authority are both internal and external, intertwining with each 
other in the creation of the hybrid order (Albrecht & Moe 2015:8). Building on this work, the 
case study examined in this dissertation will analyse the strategies different authorities used 
to enact authority during the process of hybridisation.  
 
For Baker (2013:297-298) a key feature of hybridity is the integration of different and 
contradictory elements from different political systems. Baker (2013:298) argues that a useful 
point of departure is to conceptualise hybridity as being “driven by governments”. Baker 
(2013:300) argues that the state police predominately has economic capital that leads it to have 
asymmetrical power relationships with non-state policing actors. According to Baker 
(2013:299) the central role of the state in hybrid policing arrangement is revealed “both in its 
formal policies and in the informal arrangements of state actors”. However, Baker (2011:27) 
also notes that in the African context non-state actors such as chiefs have symbolic capital and 
enjoy “unchallenged local legitimate authority”. The state and non-state policing actors have 
different resources that determine how they interact with each other. Baker’s (2013:303) 
empirical research in Ethiopia reveals that the state has been the main driver implementing 




policing agencies have been opposed to sharing their responsibilities with non-state actors, they 
have had to work with non-state policing actors for reasons that include economic and political 
considerations. However, Baker (2013) acknowledges that a state-centric conceptualisation, 
giving pre-eminence to the state, fails to consider that hybridity is in fact centred around 
relationships between the various nodes in the hybrid structure whose “ties may be transactions 
(transfers of resources) or interactions (relationships between personnel) and are repeatedly 
negotiated and revised” (Baker 2013:300; Baker 2011). As such, Baker (2013:298) points out 
that a difficulty with defining hybridity is that it entails bringing together actors with 
contradictory components. Similarly, Albrecht’s (2017:570) research on police reform in Sierra 
Leone  reveal that state actors and traditional leaders “may fully recognise one another and 
collaborate closely, while they also compete with and fight each other”. Albrecht (2017:570) 
makes the important point that the homogenisation and heterogenisation between different 
actors in the process of hybridisation “allows for a contradictory conclusion”. Drawing from 
the work of Albrecht (2018b) and (Baker 2011) this dissertation extends our understanding of 
how the contradictory elements in the different nodes interact in the processes of hybridisation. 
 
2.3.2 Boundaries and blurring during the hybridisation process 
 
Dupont’s (2004; 2006) work on security governance networks provides insights into hybrid 
governance; security provision is not state centric as both state and non-state nodes can be 
responsible for security provision. Dupont (2004:78) defines a security network as a “set of 
institutional, organisational, communal or individual agents or nodes that are interconnected in 
order to authorise and/or provide security to the benefit of internal or external stakeholders”. 
For Dupont (2006:167) nodes that make up security networks “consist of organizations and 
individuals that operate as discrete entities and are viewed as such by the overall membership 
of the security field”. Furthermore, Dupont (2006:167) notes that networks consist of a complex 
set of fluid interconnections linking “these nodes together on a voluntary, contractual, or 
regulatory basis”. Whelan and Dupont (2017:675) note further that the relationships between 
the different actors could be formal or informal. Dupont (2006:167) highlights a weakness in 
the security network literature because of the “failure to recognize the importance of 
determining node identities, thereby blurring the boundaries between nodes and their links”. 
Similarly, Whelan and Dupont (2017:675) assert that “[i]n defining networks and nodes, 




potentially meaningless webs of connections”. According to Baker (2011:28), the different 
policing actors may exchange resources amongst themselves in a way that blurs the boundaries 
between them. These scholars highlights the important role of boundaries in plural and hybrid 
forms of governance. Pieterse (2001:220) makes the observation that hybridity is relevant to 
the extent “that it problematizes boundaries”. Albrecht (2017; 2018b) argues that the 
hybridisation process destroys the boundaries between the different sources of authority, as the 
different entities and actors simultaneously draw on the different sources of authority. This 
undermines the notion of pure sources of authority. However, Albrecht (2018b:220) points out 
that these sources of authority have distinguishable origins making it possible to analyse the 
historical processes in the enactment and articulations of authority (Albrecht 2018b:219). 
 
Baker (2011) notes that the complex interactions between the different policing nodes with 
contradictory components results in fluctuating hybrid structures. This suggests that the 
boundary between the different nodes in the hybrid structure becomes blurred, although the 
literature largely fails to specify how this blurring manifests. Lund’s (2006:673) research has 
shown that actors competing for authority place a huge emphasis on making distinctions 
between state and society, while their practices undermine these distinctions. Mitchell 
(1991:78) suggests that an understanding of boundaries can be gained through examining the 
political processes distinguishing the state and society. 
 
Using the lens of corruption to examine the relationship between how blurring and boundaries 
between state/non-state actors in hybrid structures plays out, this dissertation builds on the work 
of Kyed (2017), who examines the relationship between boundaries and hybridity. Kyed 
(2017:471) has noted that, “[b]oundaries are not natural, but actively produced, confirmed, 
disconfirmed, negotiated and redefined in everyday interactions”. Pieterse (2001:239) points 
out that “the meanings of boundaries are by no means constant”. For Kyed (2017:465) 
boundary making occurs in “acts and representations that convey distinctions, the purity of 
domains and hierarchies between orders, norms or groups”. As Pieterse (2001:228) notes, “the 
claim to purity has served as part of a claim to power”. Kyed (2017:466) points out that 
“[b]oundaries do not vanish as hybridisation occurs, nor vice versa”. For Kyed the relationship 
between boundary making and hybridisation is constituted in a productive tension, resulting in 
new forms of hybridity (Kyed 2017:472). In other words, the process of hybridisation, as 




boundary crossing, underlying the politics inherent in the process of hybridisation. Paying 
attention to power and inequality is a central feature of critical hybridity (Pieterse 2001:239). 
As articulated by Forsyth et al. (2017:411) a critical approach to hybridity: 
 
requires specific attention to the underlying power dynamics that animate hybridisation and shape its 
outcomes, whether arising from political, economic, or other forms of asymmetry and contestation. It 
also calls for scholars and practitioners to drill below amorphous categories such as ‘communities’ and 
interrogate power dynamics at a range of different scales, paying particular attention to generational, 
ethnic, class, religious, and gendered divides. 
 
This critical approach to hybridity is based on the premise that hybridisation is a political 
process, characterised by contested asymmetry power relations. Since power relations have 
implications for the allocation of authority and access to resources (Albrecht & Moe 2015:12-
13), critical hybridity is useful in exploring how authority relations between the state and the 
top construction firms in South Africa determined access to resources during the run-up to the 
2010 FIFA World Cup.  
 
2.3.3 Formation of a hybrid  governance structure 
 
The concept of hybridity has been useful to understand the nature of relationships in studies of 
security governance. For Luckham and Kirk (2012:12) hybrid security arrangements reveal 
complex interactions between different actors. However, Baker (2013:297) goes further by 
arguing that hybridity is a useful analytical tool to reveal not only the interactions but also 
integration of the different state and non-state policing providers in the Global South. Scholars 
from the fields of post-conflict and peacebuilding differ on the issue of whether hybridisation 
results in a new governance structure. For Colona and Jaffe (2016:176), “hybrid governance 
arrangements refer explicitly to those contexts in which state and non-state actors are highly 
intertwined or merged, often to the extent that we can speak of a new or emergent political 
formation that is neither state nor non-state”. In contrast, Albrecht (2018a:574) argues that 
sources of authority constituting hybridisation are interconnected, but “do not merge into an 
even or stable (permanent) hybrid order”.  
 
To advance knowledge on security networks, Whelan and Dupont (2017:683) suggest that 
research should focus on the structural and relational properties between the different nodes in 




security network over time”. Put differently, Dupont’s research on security networks, focusing 
on the relationship of the different nodes within the network, brings insights into the nature of 
governance structures emerging out of these relationships (see Dupont 2006; Whelan 2012; 
Whelan and Dupont 2017). As noted by Castells (2000), networks are shaped by the 
heterogeneous nature of the different nodes, which has an impact on the power dynamics.  
 
From the field of postcolonial studies, Bhabha (1994) puts forward the notion of cultural 
hybridity, which rejects hierarchies and fixity in conceptualising the postcolonial subject. In his 
collection of essays, The Location of Culture, Bhabha (1994:4) argues that spaces “in-between 
the designations of identity” can be conceptualised from a perspective of cultural hybridity 
that acknowledges differences without being hierarchal. The result, as articulated by Bhabha 
in an interview with Jonathan Rutherford (1990:211), is that the “process of cultural hybridity 
gives rise to something different, something new and unrecognisable, a new area of 
negotiation of meaning and representation”. To unpack the complexity of hybridity further, 
Bhabha draws from the work of the Russian philosopher and linguist, Mikhail Bakhtin (1981), 
who saw hybridity as a useful tool in studying language, capturing the complexity and 
diversity of voices within a text. Bakhtin’s (1981) work on organic and intentional 
hybridisation brings nuance and important insights into the concept of cultural hybridity, which 
is often portrayed and conceptualised as a simple, straightforward concept. Organic hybridity 
also referred to as unconscious hybridity, results from the natural process of evolution, where 
cultures develop through unreflective adopting of practices from different cultures. Intentional 
hybridity is a product of clashing between different worldviews. Building on the work of 
Bakhtin, Robert Young (1995) notes that the two different forms of hybridity offer a useful 
model to the analysis of cultural interactions. For Young (1995:21) unconscious hybridity is 
the process where different cultures come together to create a new form of culture.  
 
However, unconscious hybridity has been criticised for lacking rigour. For example, Loretta 
Mijares’s (2003:128) work on the contested term “Anglo-Indians”, used to describe 
individuals who are a mixture of British and Indian descent, undermines unconscious hybridity 
by highlighting that the Anglo-Indian is not a result of two different cultures merging, but is a 
product of a set of complex, evolving, political and cultural circumstances. However, unlike 
unconscious hybridity, intentional hybridity enables for greater analytical rigour because, as 




cultural differences against each other dialogically”. Examining collusion and corruption 
during the 2010 World Cup highlights the contestations and complexities that shape 
relationships between the different actors in a way captured by intentional hybridity. Building 
from an intentional hybridity worldview to answer the research question, the empirical 
chapters analyse how competing interests between authorities shape hybrid structures. The 
dissertation uses the concepts of authority and corruption to improve conceptual 
understanding of hybridity. The following sections discuss these concepts in detail.  
 
2.4 UNDERSTANDING POWER AND AUTHORITY  
 
Michel Foucault (1978) famously tells us that power is everywhere and exercised by everyone. 
For Foucault (1998:93) “[p]ower is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but 
because it comes from everywhere”. This view departed from the traditional viewpoint that 
power is concentrated in powerful institutions, groups, and individuals, who use it to dominate 
the less powerful. Building on Foucault’s work, Tim Berard (2001) has argued that if power is 
everywhere, then resistance to power is also everywhere. Put differently, the exercise of power 
by different actors in society is contested and continuously undergoing negotiation. Similarly, 
Bălan Sergiu (2010:61) has described power as a “volatile, unstable element, which can be 
always contested, so power relations must be permanently renewed and reaffirmed”. Although 
power “is a ubiquitous feature of social life” (Hindess 2006:116), the concept of power has 
been described as “essentially contested” (Haugaard 2010:419; see Lukes 2005; Connolly 
1983). In most scholarship, power has been conceptualised as the ability of an individual, 
group, or institution to enforce its will against others (see Weber 1946; Bahcrach and Baratz 
1962; and Steven Lukes 1974; 2005). This characteristic of power distinguishes it from 
authority, which Weber (1968) has described as legitimate power (see Haugaard 2012; 2018), 
albeit that power and authority often tend to be used interchangeably. The distinction between 
authority and power is that authority is conceptualised as the legitimate exercise of power, 
which is accepted by people who are subject to it, and who are obligated to comply with the 
directives given under that authority. In the sections that follow, I discuss the characteristics of 
authority, Weber’s three types of legitimate authority and the five sources of authority 





2.4.1 What is authority: the characteristics? 
 
Authority relations are marked by recognition and voluntary deference. Avant et al. (2010:10) 
state that, “[a]uthority is created by the recognition, even if only tacit or informal, of others”. 
Weber (1978:212) noted that authority commands comprise of a “certain minimum of 
voluntary submission; thus an interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in 
obedience”. Similarly, Lund (2006:678) asserts that authority is “power which seeks at least a 
minimum of voluntary compliance and thus is legitimated in some way”. For Katsikas 
(2010:116) an element of authority is the “surrender of private judgment”, albeit he 
acknowledges that the scholarship does not provide clarity “on exactly how much judgment 
people are supposed to surrender”. It is important to note for the purposes of the dissertation 
that while authority relations are hierarchical, in the sense that there is an actor with authority 
over a subject, these relationships are contested and dynamic. Therefore, an aspect of 
understanding authority relations lies in examining the role of legitimacy in authority relations. 
Lund suggests that it is useful “to investigate the processes through which various actors and 
institutions attempt to legitimate actions and vindications”. This is because the concept of 
legitimacy is context specific and, as Lund (2006:693) argues, “is continuously (re-) established 
through conflict and negotiation”. Chapter seven of this dissertation explores how the state 
seeks to achieve legitimacy in the face of grand corruption. 
 
Haugaard (2012:78–79) takes the position that authority is not only found in institutions, but is 
dispersed between different social relations in a society where individuals enjoy a myriad 
different authority roles. Knörr and Anita Schroven (2019:63) argue that the authority of an 
entity or an individual “is embedded in a tight network of social and institutional interaction, 
by which it is socially and politically contextualised, enforced, or weakened”. Lake (2009:28-
31) takes a social contract approach to authority, in which authority relations are determined 
by the public goods that the ruler is able to provide to the ruled to secure their deference. In 
other words, the relationship is cemented by incentives for the subordinates to defer to the ruler. 
Sending (2017:312) makes the point that a conceptualisation of authority that views it as a 
feature of an actor, instead of viewing authority as relational, makes it difficult to capture “why 
some actors rather than others emerged in a position of authority or how such authority may be 
transformed over time”. To understand how authority unfolds and transforms over time “we 




pre-defined categories of particular actors” (Sending 2017:313). Drawing on this work, I treat 
authority as relational, and argue that there are important conceptual insights to be gained from 
examining how the practices and strategies used by the various actors, involved in the building 
of stadiums for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, to enact different types of authority - derived from 
different sources - shaped relations. The next sections will discuss the Weberian types of 
legitimate authority and the Avant et al. (2010:11) typology of different sources of authority.   
 
2.4.1 Max Weber’s types of authority 
 
Max Weber identified three pure types of legitimate authority: rational-legal authority, 
traditional, and charismatic authority. Constitutes of rational-legal authority include clearly 
articulated and rational public laws and administrative acts that are created and administered 
by  competent public officials and bureaucratic staff. Rational-legal authority is centred on “the 
legally established impersonal order” (Weber 1978:215). Individuals with rational-legal 
authority are bound to the impersonal order. The modern state has been shaped by the 
impersonal formal administrative system of governance.  
 
Traditional authority is based on deference to customs centred on personal relations of loyalty 
between the individual in authority and the ruled. For Weber, obedience to traditional authority 
“is owed not to enacted rules but to the person who occupies a position of authority by tradition” 
(Weber 1978:227). In turn, the traditional authority is constrained by traditional and cultural 
norms as opposed to formal rules (Weber 1978:227). As such, there is no distinction between 
the private and public realms found with rational-legal authority. 
 
Weber defined charismatic authority as “resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional 
sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of normative patterns 
revealed or ordained by him” (Weber 1978: 215). Therefore, the charismatic authority: 
 
 gains and maintains authority solely by proving his strength in life. If he wants to be a prophet, he must 
perform miracles; if he wants to be a warlord, he must perform heroic deeds. Above all, however, his 
divine mission must ‘prove’ itself in that those who faithfully surrender to him must fare well. If they do 
not fare well, he is obviously not the master sent by the gods. (Weber 1948:249) 
 
For Weber, as time progresses, charismatic authority inevitably “becomes either traditionalized 
or rationalized, or a combination of both” (Weber 1968:54). An example of this, as highlighted 




case of a Weberian ideal-typical charismatic leader” (Eckstein 1994:20) that “turned to 
traditional and especially to rational-legal bureaucratic forms of legitimation and authority as 
well” (Eckstein 1994:20). Weber conceded that these different types of authorities are not 
“usually to be found in historical cases in ‘pure’ form” (Weber 1968:216). In other words, 
empirical observations reveal that the pure types of legitimate authority are blurred. The 
dissertation draws on Weber’s typology of authority to examine how the different actors in the 
case study used different types of authority to shape relations during the process of 
hybridisation.  
 
2.4.2 Sources of Authority 
 
Avant et al. (2010:11) identify five sources of authority for global governors: institutional, 
delegated, expert, principled, and capacity-based authority. Institutional authority is authority 
derived from rules and objectives of an institution. As Avant et al. (2010:11) note, heads of 
international corporations acquire authority through their positions within these institutions. 
For example, the legitimacy and competency of the managing director of an institution, such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), would be questioned if they ventured into the area 
of nuclear proliferation policy. Similarly, the legitimacy of the IMF would be questioned if 
viewed to be giving into pressure from powerful states to make decisions outside of its rules 
and mandate (Ibid).   
 
Delegated authority is “authority on loan from some other set of authoritative actors” (Avant 
et al. 2010:11). According to Avant et al. (2010:11-12) outcomes from the delegated 
arrangements can differ “between preferences (or intensions) of the delegators and governance 
outcomes on the ground”, which have implications for issues of legitimacy and accountability. 
This is particularly the case when there is a conflict of interest between delegators and 
implementers on the ground. 
  
Expert authority, according to Avant et al. (2010:12), is authority existing in the actor’s 
specialised knowledge, meaning that the authority is limited to a specific type of expertise. 
However, this type of authority is often paired with other sources of authority. Avant et al. 
(2012:12-13) make the point that experts tend to believe that applying their expertise “is a 
social good and furthers goals of the larger community”. Indeed, the traditional understanding 




providing a service for the public good. Steven Brint (1994:5) uses the term “social trustee 
professionalism” to explain how professionals can further the public good. In other words, as 
Noordegraaf and Schinkel (2011:118) suggest, “the professional is an instrinsically motivated 
altruistic citizen”. However, the notion of public good is highly subjective and some 
stakeholders affected by the practical outcomes of the expert’s knowledge might not agree that 
it furthered the goals of the larger community.  
 
Principled authority is subjective and can exist in both the actors and institutions “legitimated 
by service to some widely accepted set of principles, morals, or values”; therefore profit-driven 
corporations generally have difficulty obtaining principled authority, unlike NGOs, which tend 
to portray themselves as seeking to attain altruistic objectives (Avant et al. 2010:13).  
 
Avant et al. (2010:13) see capacity-based authority as deference to a governor “based on 
perceived competence” to perform a task or solve a problem. However, Avant et al. (2010:14) 
noted that governors who are successful problem solvers also derive authority from different 
sources of authority. In this dissertation, I draw on the different sources of authority identified 
by Avant et al. (2010) to examine the relationships between actors. These authority 
relationships occur against the backdrop of hybrid governance. The dissertation will also utilise 
the concept of corruption to better understand the nature of hybridity. The next section will 
discuss the concept of corruption and its different manifestations. 
 
2.5. The many definitions of corruption 
 
Although corruption is a widely-used term, there is no conceptual clarity on its exact 
meaning. Corruption is a “value-laden” and normative concept and has been criticised as “a 
meaningless term insofar as it describes any transaction or exchange that is viewed as 
normatively ‘bad’ by the observer” (Robbins 2000:425). However, a concept can be both 
value laden and still be “analytically viable” (Robbins 2000:425). Corruption is not a static 
concept, but a dynamic, multifaceted and adaptive social phenomenon (Andvig & 
Fjeldstad 2001; Habtemichael & Cloete 2010). In this dissertation I am particularly 
interested in how the adaptiveness and multifaceted nature of corruption shapes the 





Scholarship on corruption has tended to treat it as a public-sector phenomenon, with the 
World Bank’s (1997) definition of corruption as “abuse of public office for private gain” being 
widely used. Another influential definition, by Nye (1967:417), defines corruption as 
“behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-
regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules 
against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence”. The traditional narrative 
on corruption in Africa, as the acts of selfish and greedy public officials who are interested 
in private gain at the expense of public interest, fails to capture the role of other actors. 
Indeed, various actors in both the public and private sectors exercise corruption to pursue 
and achieve different objectives. My point of departure in this research is that a normative 
judgement should be context specific, which requires empirical investigation (see 
Heidenheimer 1989; Olivier de Sardan 1999). Corruption can be categorised into three types: 
incidental corruption, which transpires at the individual level; institutional corruption, which 
occurs at an organisational level; and systemic corruption, which is broad and entrenched at 
a societal level. In this dissertation I examine a form of institutional corruption linked to the 
economy of the state: political corruption. Political corruption is sometimes labelled grand 
corruption because it involves manipulation of state institutions by high-level officials for 
personal benefit, characterised by the blurring between the public and private sectors (see 
Amundsen 1999; Andvig & Fjeldstad 2001). Amundsen (1999:4) makes an important 
observation that variations of political corruption are found in all political systems. Indeed, 
the empirical realities of democratic countries in Africa such as Nigeria and South Africa 
reveal the endemic nature of political corruption. Dumbili and Sofadekan (2016:1) point out 
that corruption in Nigeria is “not only a part of the government, but it is the object of 
government”. Adebanwi and Obadare (2011:198) argue that systems of corruption in Nigeria 
produce and sustain the power dynamics among the ruling elite. In other words, corruption 
in Nigeria “is best seen as an example of elite struggles for power and resources” (Adebanwi 
& Obadare 2011:191).  
 
Within institutional forms of corruption, Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001:11) distinguish 
political corruption from bureaucratic corruption, which is described as low level “at the 
implementation end of politics”. This low-level corruption is experienced by citizens seeking 
access to public services and typically involves paying a small sum to receive the services. 




corruption is analytically useful, it is, on the other hand, an arbitrary distinction (Andvig & 
Fjeldstad 2001). The distinction is based on “the Weberian separation of politics from 
administration”, which is not applicable in most African states (Andvig & Fjeldstad 
2001:11). For this reason, Adebanwi and Obadare (2011:207) argue that a political economy 
approach to the study of corruption will show that it is not  
a mere – or blatant – violation of the rules, but, more important, as a ‘component 
(of) how power is manipulated in order to maintain social (political) and economic 
advantage’; thus, corruption, particularly in Africa, must be linked to our 
conceptualisation and understanding of the state, inequality, injustice and social 
division – a system-wide understanding. 
 
Giving a different perspective to the corruption debate, Gupta (1995:389) argues that because 
the conceptualisation of corruption shifts according to historical, political and social contexts, 
the discourse of corruption reveals the nature of the relationship between the state and its 
citizens across different time periods. As Gupta (1995:388) noted, practices “considered as 
legitimate under colonial rule may be classified as “corrupt” by the rule-making apparatuses of the 
independent nation-state because an electoral democracy is deemed accountable to “the people.” 
Although the South African authorities addressed the collusive tendering in the construction 
industry to build the 2010 FIFA World Cup stadiums as a violation of competition law, the 
point of departure of this dissertation is that it is a form of corruption. Chapter seven discusses 
the debate emerging from media coverage of the collusive tendering in the construction 
industry ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, which coverage suggested that public sentiment 
viewed it as corruption. Chapter seven examines how the state responded to this public debate 
and what the response revealed about enactment of authority in hybrid structures. 
 
2.5.1 Practices of corruption: corruption as social exchange vs corruption as a collective 
action problem 
 
In an influential paper on the nature of corruption in Africa, Olivier de Sardan (1999:26) 
highlights social norms in contemporary Africa that inform what he refers to “as ‘corruption’ 
type practices, but are not in themselves corruption”. Olivier de Sardan outlines six logics that 
are found in contemporary Africa’s social life that illuminate the corruption phenomenon: the 
logics of negotiation, the logics of gift-giving, the logics of solidarity network, the logics of 





The logics of negotiation refers to the idea that corruption is widely understood as a transaction, 
and that bargaining enables the transaction (Olivier de Sardan 1999:36). Bargaining is a vital 
part of social exchange in everyday transactions (Ibid). The logics of gift-giving, like the logics 
of negotiation, is part of everyday social transactions in contemporary Africa. Olivier de Sardan 
(1999:38) notes that, particularly in Sahelian countries, giving gifts is a moral duty; the 
beneficiary of a service is obligated to give a gift as a token of appreciation for the service 
rendered. For historical and socio-political reasons, the logics of solidarity networks are 
pronounced in Africa in comparison to Europe (Olivier de Sardan 1999:41). An individual’s 
networks tend to be extensive and, particularly in urban areas, members of a network are 
expected and have an obligation to help each other (Ibid). The logics of predatory authority 
refers to individuals in positions of power engaging in “various types of extortion, to the 
detriment of their ‘subjects’”, such as when a policeman performing public duties demands 
bribes from private citizens as his due (Olivier de Sardan 1999:41-42). The logics of 
redistributive accumulation refers to expectations that an individual who is in a position to 
accumulate wealth redistributes their good fortunes to extended family (Olivier de Sardan 
1999:43). Olivier de Sardan (1999:43) notes that it is important to acknowledge that some of 
these practices are derived from pre-colonial culture that has evolved and been shaped by 
colonialism. I use Olivier de Sardan’s six logics to explain how corruption shapes relationships 
in my case study and impacts hybrid governance structures. 
 
Persson et al’s (2010:11-12) empirical research findings from East Africa dispute the social 
exchange understanding of corruption and reveals that, although most Africans morally 
disapprove of corruption they nonetheless continue to maintain the system of corruption. In 
order to understand why this is so, Persson et al (2010:12) put forward the collection action 
problem model as a useful conceptual framework to understand the reasons for the discrepancy 
between moral disapproval and action. The collective action problem model asserts that 
individuals partake of corrupt activities of which they disapprove because corruption is widely 
practiced in their society “making the short-term benefits of engaging in corrupt behavior 
greater than the costs” (Persson et al 2010:12). To test this collective action model, Persson et 
al (2010) conducted empirical research in Uganda and Kenya. The findings from the empirical 
research confirmed the basic tenets of the collective action model. Persson et al (2010:12) found 
that individuals engaged in corruption because it was widely practiced and there were negative 





2.5.2 White-collar crime as a form of corruption 
 
In the corruption literature, emphasis is often placed on the public sector. While the public 
sector is particularly vulnerable to corruption, the argument in this dissertation is that private 
sector corruption should be taken as seriously. Private sector corruption is normally 
conceptualised as white-collar crime. Sutherland has been credited as having introduced the 
concept of white-collar crime to challenge mainstream scholarship that focused on street crimes 
committed by disadvantaged members of society. Sutherland (1949:9) defined white-collar 
crime as “a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course 
of his occupation”. Although Sutherland successfully raised awareness of criminal activity 
conducted by the elite group of society, the notion of white-collar crime has been controversial. 
Pontell and Calamite (1993:520) point out that the concept of white-collar crime suggests that 
“criminal behaviour on the part of white-collar offenders is qualitatively distinct from other 
types of crime, or at least distinct enough to merit a qualifying label”. The next section 
examines the issue of regulating white collar crime. This provides context to the role of law in 
shaping the relationship between the state and the construction industry, explored in Chapter 
seven. 
 
2.5.3 Regulating white collar crime 
 
Two schools of thought dominate the debate on the regulation of white-collar crime: the 
punishment model and the compliance school. The punishment model takes a punitive stance 
on law enforcement (Lee 2015), while the compliance school seeks to avoid prosecution in 
favour of a more cooperative relationship between law enforcement and co-operations (Ibid). 
In general terms, the underlying ideological differences between the two schools of thought 
is based on the nature of the offender, with the compliance school assuming that corporate 
offenders are productive members of society and different from traditional offenders. 
 
Gray points out that terminology perpetuates the different ideologies; for example, scholars 
from the punishment model regard corporate offending as “corporate crime”, while the 
compliance school scholars use the term “corporate non-compliance” (Gray 2006:877). Croall 
(2001:121) argues that “compliance strategies are therefore related to cultural values about the 




agencies are biased as a result of their being captured, because “people in regulatory industries 
come from industry and commerce, and they regulate with a light touch in anticipation of 
lucrative jobs with the private sector after public service” (Leighton 2013:42). Similarly, 
Pearce and Tombs (1991) argue that compliance enforcement strategies that “stress 
consultation and conciliation typically end up with agencies endorsing the industry’s own 
evaluations of what is reasonable and usually allow companies to negotiate their way out of 
penalties for violating even these agreements” (Pearce & Tombs 1991:419). 
 
There is a tendency to view business activity as “a good end in itself” (Tombs 2001:23) and 
when business organisations employ criminal activity to achieve their objectives, this is often 
explained as a diversion from its core legitimate activities (Ibid:24). The implication of this 
belief is that regulatory measures are viewed as appropriate to curb the excesses of capitalism: 
“[b]ad capitalists rather than capitalism are identified as the evil” (Lebowitz 2010:46). 
However, the idea that the markets are self-regulating is undermined by research that shows 
that some industries, such as the construction industry, are more prone to criminal activity. The 
numerous examples of the corruption and criminality, exhibited particularly by international 
financial institutions that result in massive losses affecting the world economy, further 
undermine the self-regulating ability of the markets. 
 
Fischel and Sykes (1996:322) argue that corporate liability is preferable to criminalising 
individuals because it not only reduces the costs incurred by the state as it goes through the 
criminal justice system, but fining the corporations benefits the state coffers. Notwithstanding 
the difficulties of using the criminal justice system, I agree with Snider’s (2000:170) important 
critique of the arguments against the criminalisation of white-collar crime. Snider highlights 
the different standards applied to traditional criminal offenders and white-collar offenders; the 
former offenders have seen an increase in criminal statutes in order to impede criminal 
behaviour; while for the latter offenders, criminal law has been described as being “expensive, 
inefficient, and ineffective” (Snider 2000:170). This would suggest that “[i]ncreased 
punitiveness only ‘works’, it appears, for the impoverished, non-white, individual criminals 
who fill and overfill the prisons of modern democratic states” (Snider 2000:170). However, 
although Snider (2000) makes a compelling argument for criminalising white-collar 
offenders, I think that Alvesalo and Tombs (2002:31) highlight an important point relating to 




(2002:31) using the criminal justice system to address white-collar crime is counterproductive 
and causes positive harm to the critical criminologists’ position. This is because criminalising 
white-collar crime would inadvertently support the existing biased criminal justice system and 
reinforce the skewed social structure by providing: 
an appearance that even the wealthiest and most powerful actors can be subject to 
state control, giving substance to claims regarding an equality of criminal policy 
and thereby both legitimating criminalization of “traditional” offenders while also 
supporting claims regarding the neutrality of the rule of law and the liberal state. 
(Alvesalo & Tombs 2002:31) 
 
Furthermore, as noted by Alvesalo and Tombs (2002) small business owners and low-level 
white-collar crime offenders will be disproportionally affected by the implementation of the 
legislation (see Alvesalo et al. 2006). The next section discusses the leniency programme used 
by the South African authorities to address the collusion in the construction industry, which is 
an example of the compliance model of regulating white-collar crime.  
 
2.5.4 Deterring anti-competitive conduct: the role of leniency programmes 
 
Collusive tendering, as a type of white-collar crime, is pervasive in the construction industry. 
Corruption Watch (2013) has labelled collusive tendering in the South African construction 
industry as corruption, which is also the position taken in this dissertation. Allen defines 
collusion as “a secret understanding, especially for a fraudulent purpose” (Allen 1990:222). 
Collusion undermines the principles of the free market by restricting competition, and benefits 
parties privy to the collusion arrangement, to the detriment of the excluded parties. During a 
parliamentary session of the Public Works and Infrastructure Committee (2013), the 
Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) acknowledged that the construction 
industry in South Africa has a long history of anti-competitive behaviour (Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group 2013). It is difficult to get accurate data on collusion, owing to the secretive 
nature of the practice; therefore, information about collusive behaviour is often acquired 
through whistleblowing (Buccirossi and Spagnolo 2005; Aubert et al. 2006). Typically, the 
whistleblowing party would have been part of the collusion and is exempted from penalties 
(Ibid). Competition authorities typically have various leniency programmes to encourage 
whistleblowing. For example, the United States has been the leading country on anti-
competition law and its Department of Justice set up the first corporate leniency program in 




make full disclosure about its involvement in collusive arrangements if  specific conditions are 
met. These conditions include: the Antitrust Division was not already investigating the illegal 
activity; the corporation provides full details of its involvement and was not the instigator of 
the illegal activity; where possible the corporation compensated injured parties; when the 
illegal activity was discovered, the corporation took action to terminate its involvement in the 
activities (The United States Department of Justice 2020).  
 
Collusion often operates through a cartel, which  is defined as “a group of independent firms 
which collectively agree to coordinate their supply, pricing or other policies in order to make 
larger profits than they would in a market where “natural competition” prevails” (Allain et al. 
2011:2). Cartel formations are difficult to identify because of the secretive nature of cartels. To 
create and sustain a cartel that engages in collusive conduct, a wide range of interlinked 
variables have to be in place. Woodall (1993:297) noted the different elements needed in the 
operation of cartels. First, the participants of the cartel must be identified; second, barriers to 
entry to prevent new competition entering the market must be detected; third, mechanisms to 
monitor and enforce the cartel are needed; and last, strategies to evade detection by the 
authorities are important for cartel survival. Competition authorities tasked with deterring 
cartels seek to remove the incentives of the firms to want to enter cartel agreements. The use 
of penalties is an important incentive tool; a firm weighs the profits of entering into a cartel 
agreement “against the likelihood of getting caught and the penalty they expect to receive if 
they are caught” (Vilakazi 2015:2). A combination of high penalties and high risk of detection 
is the ideal scenario to deter cartel formation. However, in developing countries with 
constraints around resources, the detection rate is relatively low (Ibid). Therefore, initiatives 
such as leniency programmes have been used to incentivise firms to break away from a cartel 
and report it to the authorities. Research on the effect of the European Union leniency 
programmes shows that in the short term, “more information is revealed and legal costs related 
to investigation and prosecution are saved” (Brenner 2009:644). Leniency programmes 
typically eliminate penalties for the first firm to expose a cartel and have various other 
reductions of penalties for cooperating firms. In other words, leniency programmes make 
enforcement against anti-competitive practices more effective. 
 
However, leniency programmes have been criticised for enabling the big corporates to get away 




poor and another for the rich, who do not have to face the criminal justice system. On one hand, 
it is arguable that a firm will apply to take part in a leniency programme because the cartel no 
longer serves the firm’s interests. Harrington and Chang (2015) argue that leniency 
programmes are appealing to firms that are part of a dying cartel. On the other hand, as noted 
by Allain et al. (2011:23), leniency programmes may arguably incentivise firms to form cartels 
as they decrease the costs of participating in cartels. As such, it is important to design a leniency 
programme with reduced loopholes, which can be manipulated. Empirical research by 
Spagnolo (2004) has shown that well-designed leniency programmes play an important 
deterrence role in the formation of cartels. It is important to note that scholars such as 
Harrington and Chang (2015) have argued that leniency programmes should neither be an end 
in themselves nor a replacement of non-leniency programmes. Instead, competition authorities 
should focus on enforcing competition law and use leniency programmes as one of the tools to 
do so and not as a substitute for enforcement (Ibid). 
 
Considering the success of leniency programmes, some scholars have suggested that 
competition authorities should consider offering rewards as part of their deterrence efforts; a 
reward may incentivise a cartel member to come forward to the authorities (see Aubert et al. 
2006:1249). The notion of rewarding guilty corporates for revealing their illegal activity may, 
however, lack legitimacy in society. Questions around the value of the reward and who pays 
for the reward would need to be considered. Competition authorities may potentially use 
monies they receive from penalties to raise the rewards, but arguably, as suggested by Aubert 
et al. (2006:1249), the monies would be better spent on building the resource capacities of the 
competition authorities in order for them to be more effective in their work. Alternatively, 
according to Aubert et al. (2006:1250), competition authorities may negotiate with firms that 
come forward to report a cartel and give the rewards in secret. Such a strategy would again lack 
legitimacy and undermine the principles of transparency and fairness that are the cornerstones 
of competition policy (Ibid). Another objection to the rewards policy noted by Aubert et al. 
(2006:1250) is similar to the one raised by some scholars as a disadvantage of leniency 
programmes: rewards may encourage collusion; firms may find it profitable “to collude and 
report or to ‘take turns’ for reporting collusion”. Although this is theoretically possible, it is, 
however, unlikely, as colluding firms do not want to be on the radar of the authorities, which 





This section has outlined the analytical framework used to analyse the case study of collusion 
within the construction industry ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in order to answer the 
research question: How is authority enacted in hybrid governance processes? Considering that 
the FIFA World Cup is an important sporting mega-event, the next section provides a brief 
overview of mega-events literature. 
 
2.6 Hybridity in the context of a mega-event 
 
Mega-events have become topical across different academic disciplines, providing important 
insights into governance in contemporary society. Horne and Manzenreiter (2006:1) have 
pointed out that mega-events are a key feature in the global capitalist society (see Roche 
2000). Roche’s (2000:1) commonly used definition of mega-events is “large-scale cultural 
(including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular 
appeal and international significance”. Müller (2015:634) defines mega-events as 
“ambulatory occasions of a fixed duration that (1) attract a large number of visitors, (2) have 
a large mediated reach, (3) come with large costs, and (4) have large impacts on the built 
environment and the population”. Horne (2007:82) asserts that media coverage is key for an 
event to be classified as a mega-event. Based on the above definitions, the key characteristics 
of mega-events are: size, large costs, prestige, extensive media coverage and a substantial 
impact on the host nation.  
 
Research by Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter (2003) into mega-events shows how 
difficult it is to ascertain accurate information pertaining to costs and benefits, as various 
experts provide different and contradictory facts, albeit that it is agreed that hosting such an 
event is an expensive undertaking. One reason for the high costs of hosting mega-events, 
relevant for this dissertation, is the cost of infrastructure development. For example, in the 
case of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the infrastructure development was extensive, with new 
football stadiums built, in addition to other infrastructural projects needed to support the event, 
such as roads and railway links. Some of the infrastructural development projects built to 
support mega-events have to conform to specific requirements, which might not necessarily 
be appropriate for local needs (Coakley & Souza 2013). Indeed, the main critique of mega-




corporations who have lucrative contracts in exchange for their sponsorship. In chapters five 
and six, I explore this criticism in relation to the research findings, in order to gain new 
understanding into the dynamics shaping the process of hybridisation.  
 
Despite the high costs of staging a mega-event and the difficulty in measuring the returns from 
the event, mega-events remain popular. One of the reasons for the popularity of mega-events 
is that they foster national unity. Mega-events are seen as a “seminal moment” in the history 
of a nation because they “represen[t] the possibility of a natural break point in its collective 
trajectory – even if in practice the durability of this break point is inconsistent and the 
repercussions uncertain” (Black 2007:264). Therefore, mega-events tend to increase 
nationalism among citizens, as the events promote an atmosphere of “local identification, 
vision and motivation” (Gratton & Preuss 2008:1928). However, an important consideration 
in the discussion about national unity and national identity in relation to hosting a mega-event 
is that it tends to conflate the issue of support of the mega-event and support for the sport. In 
other words, notwithstanding “the value of sport to increase national identity and potentially 
drive social capital, there is a flaw in the reasoning that an increased sense of national identity 
results from mega event hosting” (Heere et al. 2013:452). Furthermore, the extent to which 
the increase in national identity is a positive development is not clear (Ibid). Notwithstanding 
the problematic reasons for supporting mega-events, states are prepared to go through a 
rigorous bidding process to win the right to host the mega-event. An important reason for this is 
that mega-events enable the state to exercise soft power; a point which is discussed further in the next 
section.  
 
2.6.1 Mega-events as a state strategy to exercise soft power in hybrid structures 
 
 Joseph Nye’s (1990) coined the concept of soft power, where the state practices diplomacy 
without the use or threat of force. Public diplomacy is a state-centric diplomatic exercise that 
aims to engage with the citizens of other states in order to facilitate “a more receptive 
environment for the foreign policies and economic interests of that given state using positive 
messages and image” (Grix & Lee 2013:529). However, in precise terms, the state does not 
have a monopoly on soft power. As Bially Mattern (2007:102) noted: “Soft power is available 
to any actor that can render itself attractive to another”. However, soft power in the context 




public funds and resources, is best positioned to undertake the huge investments associated 
with the event. Soft power has been accused of being a concept that is relevant to developed 
countries and not necessarily appropriate for the Global South (see Grix, Brannagan & 
Houlihan 2015; Grix & Brannagan 2016). For example, the structure of the global economy 
disadvantages non-Western countries, which may have an impact on their use of soft power. 
The point of departure for this dissertation is that the South African state sought to exercise 
soft power through hosting a mega-event. Cornelissen (2004a:42) argues that the South 
African government has sought to host mega-events since attaining democracy in 1994. After 
years of isolation under apartheid, hosting mega-events has been viewed as an important 
means to engage with the international community. Examining the strategies used by the 
South African state to gain legitimacy for the 2010 FIFA World Cup provides further insights 
into how authority is enacted and shapes the process of hybridisation. The next section 
discusses the financial reasons explaining why states in the Global South are increasingly 
interested in hosting mega-events. 
 
2.6.2 Mega-events as a means to enter the global financial system 
 
According to Horne and Manzenreiter (2006), sporting mega-events are interwoven into the 
different processes of the global capitalist economy. Therefore, developing countries that 
have been excluded from fully participating in the global economy increasingly view mega-
events as an important vehicle into the “global configuration of production, finances and 
commerce, and tourism is an important aspect of this” (Cornelissen 2004a:43). In the 
contemporary era, mega sporting events are usually conceptualised within the context of 
globalisation as states seek to use these events to access the global economy and attract 
foreign investors (see Hiller 2000; Roche 2000). Indeed, mega-events have become an 
important vehicle for African states to gain competitiveness in an increasingly tough and 
competitive global economy. As Scarlett Cornelissen (2004a:51) argues: 
The African continent, perhaps more than any other developing region, finds itself 
in a paradoxical situation where mega-events pose a means of entry to other 
structures of production, finances, and technology that configure the global 
economy, but it is largely lacking the resources to access it. Despite the cogency and 
parsimony of globalization as an explanatory framework for mega-events, 
therefore, a great deal of this framework is structured from a position that does not 





2.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has outlined the key debates and gaps in hybridity literature from across different 
disciplines. It has highlighted two criticisms levelled against the concept of hybridity. The 
first criticism is that although hybridity is mostly used by scholars to reject a binary 
worldview, the term inadvertently reinforces binaries. The second criticism is that the concept 
of hybridity is overly broad, undermining its analytical rigour. These criticisms reveal a need 
for a nuanced approach to the study of hybridity. The argument made in this dissertation is 
that viewing hybridity as a process overcomes these challenges. This is because it captures 
the different contradictory outcomes and processes constituting hybrid governance. 
Responding to scholars that have advocated that hybridisation should be conceptualised as a 
historical process that is empirically determined, this dissertation explores the historical 
processes of hybridisation shaping the relationships between the state and the construction 
industry.  
 
The process of hybridisation blurs the boundaries between the different actors within the hybrid 
structures. Blurring is a characteristic of hybridisation. As such, a useful approach to capture 
how this blurring manifests is to study the tension between boundary making and boundary 
crossing inherent in the processes of hybridisation. The chapter outlined the concepts of 
authority and corruption used in the dissertation to improve conceptual understanding of 
hybridity. The dissertation’s point of departure is that authority relations are hierarchical, albeit 
contested and undergoing continuous negotiations.  The chapter discusses the work of Avant 
et al. (2010:11), which identifies five sources of authority for global governors: institutional, 
delegated, expert, principled, and capacity-based authority explored in Chapter five, six and 
seven.  
 
The dissertation goes beyond the traditional conceptualisation of corruption as a phenomenon 
where the public official unduly uses their position to attain private gain, by acknowledging 
that corruption is utilised by different actors in both public and private spheres. Scholars have 
argued that corruption is the objective of powerful elites in the struggle to access resources. 
The dissertation explores the role of corruption in enabling the different actors identified in the case 
study to access resources and shape hybrid governance structures. The chapter points out that the 




the topic of regulation and the role of law in shaping hybrid relationships, addressed in Chapter 









Ackermann (2012:17) has called for further empirical research to examine the “analytical 
usefulness” of the concept of hybridity. The dissertation sought to answer this call by 
examining how the South African state and the construction industry relate to each other as 
both actors enact authority in a hybrid governance setting of collusion to build football stadiums 
ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup stadiums. Scholars have suggested that a useful approach 
to researching the nature of hybridity is to approach it as a process (Hutnyk 2005; Colona and 
Jaffe 2016). In light of this, I examined how the strategies and practices used by both actors in 
the enactment of authority shaped the process of hybridisation. To analyse the authority 
relations between the state and the construction industry, I employed the governmentality 
framework, which will be discussed later in the chapter. A governmentality analysis is useful 
to give insights into relations between the state and the construction industry because it 
advocates moving beyond a binary worldview by “focusing primarily on actual practices and 
rationalities of power” (Hoffman and Verweijen 2018:373). This governmentality approach   
compliments the approach adopted in the dissertation to unpack the workings of hybrid 
governance structures. In this chapter I set out and justify the qualitative research methods I 
adopted to gather and analyse data for the research. The following section outlines the research 
theory that underpin the approach  I adopted to address the research question.  
 
3.2 Research approach 
 
Denzin and Lincoln (2000) make the point that a researcher brings a worldview or paradigm 
into their work. Meadows (2008:162–163) defines a paradigm as a belief system that guides an 
individual’s worldview. Egon Guba (1990:17) defined a paradigm as a “basic set of beliefs that 
guides action”. William Chambliss (1974:152) stated that paradigms not only serve as 
explanatory tools but provide a lens through which to make sense of the world by either 
highlighting, ignoring or understating certain elements of the world. Therefore, it is arguable 
that all research is subjective and influenced by the researcher’s worldview and belief system 
(see Denzin & Lincoln 2000:22; Wimmer & Dominick 2014:117). This understanding of the 




researcher as a neutral and objective observer in the research process. Below is an overview of 
the different theoretical approaches to research methods. There are broadly three 
methodological approaches to research in social science: positivism, interpretivism and critical 
approach. These approaches represent a paradigm about the researcher’s worldview. 
 
Snape and Spencer (2003:5–6) argue that positivism goes far back, as René Descartes’ work 
Discourse on Methodology (1637) emphasised the “importance of objectivity and evidence in 
the search for truth”. Descartes, quote in Snape and Spencer (2003:6), assumed that researchers 
can separate themselves from influences that undermine their objectivity. The concept that the 
social world can be understood through direct observation and objective interpretation of the 
observed data is identified with the positivist school of thought (Ibid). This approach is 
associated with the natural sciences and quantitative research methods where the researcher 
can test a hypothesis based on such observations.  
 
Second, the interpretivism approach differs from positivism in that it accepts that the researcher 
is subjective. The interpretivism school of thought is associated with the work of Kant, who 
argued in Critique of Pure Reason (1781) that the positivism emphasis on direct observation to 
understand the world fails to acknowledge other ways of knowing about the world (Snape & 
Spencer 2003:6). This approach views knowledge as a social construct of how people 
understand and make sense of the world. Therefore, a “researcher has to explore and understand 
the social world through the participants’ and their own perspectives; and explanations can only 
be offered at the level of meaning rather than cause” (Snape & Spencer 2003:23). Interpretivism 
is commonly associated with qualitative research methods. Qualitative research postulates that 
research is context based and as such is not a value-free exercise. Third, the critical approach 
questions the dominant understanding of the social and political structures. The result is that 
knowledge is constructed through a political lens, particularly the relationship between power 
and politics. 
 
For this research project, I applied the interpretivism paradigm. Interpretivism regards social 
reality as complex processes where social actors construe behaviour and events impacting them 
(Blaikie 1993:96). Although I used the interpretivism paradigm, I used a combination of the 




Strauss and Corbin (1998:3) defined methodology as “a way of thinking about and studying 
social reality”. 
 
As Miles and Huberman (1984:20) rightly observed: 
 
it is getting harder to find any methodologists solidly encamped in one epistemology 
or the other. More and more ‘quantitative’ methodologists ... are using naturalistic and 
phenomenological approaches to complement tests, surveys, and structured 
interviews. On the other side, an increasing number of ethnographers and qualitative 
researchers are using predesigned conceptual frameworks and prestructured 
instrumentation. 
 
The research question informed the research method. The nature of the research question 
needed research methods to be flexible and creative. Therefore, I found the multi-method 
research approach to be most suitable. According to Levi-Strauss (1966) in a multi-method 
research approach, the researcher has been described as a bricoleur whose research methods 
are bricolage. Avramidis and Wilde (2009:332) define bricolage as “a set of interconnected 
methods aimed at addressing specific research objectives, and as such it represents a coherent 
research design”. The multi-method approach allowed me to explore adequately the differing 
ideologies identified in the discussions about the different relationships between the state and 
the construction industry as they enacted their authority in the case study. 
 
Similarly, as Russel Hathaway (1995) has suggested, the situationalist perspective is an 
alternative to a dogmatic stance, supporting either the quantitative or qualitative research 
methods. A situationalist perspective views specific methods as suitable for particular 
situations (Rossman & Wilson 1985). As a result, the research question has a huge influence 
on the methods adopted. In other words, different research methods are suited to answer 
different questions, which in turn leads to certain advancements in knowledge (Hathaway 
1995). A qualitative approach was adopted to conduct the research because it allowed for a 
multi-method data collection technique: I conducted interviews, documentary analysis and 
thematic analysis of newspaper articles’ portrayal of the collusive tendering in the South 
African construction industry in the building of the FIFA 2010 World Cup stadiums. However, 
it should be noted that a multi-method research approach does not necessarily capture social 
reality with greater precision than other research approaches (see Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2004). 
The next section discusses qualitative research and provides detailed explanations as to why it 




3.2.1 Qualitative research 
 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011:3) define qualitative research as: 
 
a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of 
interpretive, material practices that makes the world visible. This means that 
qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense 
of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. 
 
Similarly, Alan Bryman (1988:46) states that qualitative research aims to get a portrayal of 
social relationships and human conduct from the perspective of the research subjects. As such, 
as noted by Denzin and Lincoln (2011:7–8) qualitative research is not value free but is an 
enterprise that is characterised by tensions and negotiates between different methods and 
explanations from the data findings. Morse et al. (2002:15) state that for the most part, 
qualitative findings are not viewed as well-grounded empirical research. This view of 
qualitative research is unfortunate because, as Mays and Pope (1995:109) rightly noted: 
 
[a]ll research is selective – there is no way that the researcher can in any sense capture 
the literal truth of events. All research depends on collecting particular sorts of 
evidence through the prism of particular methods, each of which has its strengths and 
weaknesses.  
 
Therefore, neither qualitative nor quantitative research can claim to be more solid in 
comparison to the other. I used qualitative research for this project because of the nature of the 
research question. Exploring the strategies, mentalities and rationalities that shape the 
enactment of authority in hybrid structures meant that a research method that recognises the 
tensions and contradictions inherent in how authority and power is manifested was important. 
Malterud (2001:486) makes the point that the subjective nature of qualitative research means 
that the results emanating from this form of research are often not viewed as relevant to the 
whole of society as qualitative research captures the empirical realities in a particular context. 
This is a challenge that can be levelled against this research project, which examines a temporal 
case study of collusion in a private sector industry in South Africa that occurred within a 
specified timeframe. The 2010 FIFA World Cup is a once-off event that occurred in a specific 
socio-political context that cannot be duplicated. I will develop a more detailed discussion 





3.2.2 Case study 
 
A case study “is a form of analysis where one or a few units are studied intensively with an 
aim to elucidate features of a broader class of – presumably similar but not identical – units” 
(Gerring & McDermott 2007:688). Defining the constituents of a case study is challenging 
because, as Ragin (1992) asserted, cases are arguably social constructs. However, Robert Stake 
(1995) has stated that case studies should have boundaries, for example, timeframe or size (see 
Miles & Huberman 1994). 
 
Case studies take a variety of forms: intrinsic, instrumental or collective (Stake 1995). An 
intrinsic case study is a case chosen on its own merit based on a desire to gain an understanding 
of that particular case: “[w]e study a case when it itself is of very special interest” (Stake 
1995:xi). Stake (2000a) argues that an instrumental case study entails selecting a case because 
it offers insights into the researcher’s project. As the term suggests, the collective case study 
refers to selecting more than one case to study a particular phenomenon (Ibid). As observed by 
Creswell (2013) identifying a suitable case study can be challenging. Indeed, Stake 
(2000b:446) asserts that when using the case study method, the right choice of cases is 
important. John Creswell (2013) suggests that cases should be selected based on their ability 
to answer the research question. Stake (2005:451) argues that the case should be selected on 
the basis that it is possible to learn a lot from it. Similarly, Stake (2000b:437) asserts that cases 
are chosen because they further understanding of theoretical concepts and other cases. 
 
Following the suggestion from Stake, I elected an instrumental case study from which I felt I 
could learn the most to enable me to answer the research question. To be more specific, the 
case study was chosen primarily for two reasons. First, the South African construction industry 
has been extensively investigated by the Competition Commission for allegations of collusion, 
and cases were settled in 2013. The Competition authorities in South Africa decided to pursue 
the fast-track process with cooperating construction companies as it was arguably the most 
effective and efficient option. This fast-track process entailed complicit companies agreeing to 
disclose information and cooperate with the authorities in exchange for paying a fine and 
gaining immunity from criminal prosecutions. The result of this investigation is that an 
enormous amount of privileged material that I could draw upon for my research was publicly 




secretive and difficult for researchers to access information. Second, this case study occurs 
against the background of a mega-event: the 2010 FIFA World Cup, which was shaped by 
different actors who were part of a complex and contested hybridisation process. It is a unique 
case study in the sense that the 2010 FIFA World Cup is the only first-order mega-event ever 
hosted in Africa. Taking into consideration that the actors involved in the collusion are political 
and business elites, I discuss some of the challenges faced in researching the elites. The next 
section explores this issue further. 
 
3.2.3 Researching powerful elites 
 
This research made use of William Harvey’s (2011) insightful definition of elites as those who 
exercise influence via their “social networks, social capital and strategic positions within social 
structures”, with the elite status liable to change over time through either loss or gain of status 
(Harvey 2011: 433). Moreover, it is possible for elites to be simultaneously part of different 
realms of social life (Mason-Bish 2018:3). In this research my point of departure has been that 
individuals involved in the collusive tendering ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup were 
political and business elites. This is because, as discussed in detail in Chapter six, only the top- 
level construction firms with their politically connected business partners where eligible to 
tender to build for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, since they were the only ones to meet the 
requirements. This means that the individuals I identified as elites are very narrow and 
specific.3 Furthermore, as Hannah Mason-Bish’s (2018) and Harvey’s (2011) observed, the 
status of being elite is fluid, as confirmed by the fact that some of the interview participants for 
this research had changed social positions and in the process had lost the influence they had 
previously enjoyed. For example, I interviewed the CEO of a consulting company working 
with small–medium construction firms who had previously been an influential senior director 
in the banking sector and tourism industry during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. This fluidity has 
resulted in Mason-Bish (2018:4) arguing for research to “move away from the elite/non-elite 
dichotomy”. Indeed, Conti and O’Neil (2007:79) observed that terminology used to study the 
powerful “obstructs an analysis of the complex agency and subject positions of all people 
involved in the research process”. The next section discusses the analytical frameworks used 
to answer the research question. 
                                                                
3 Not all interviewees or individuals examined in the dissertation are described as elites, a case in point is Chapter 





3.2.4 Governmentality: a framework to analysis power relations  
 
Foucault (2007:388) conceptualised governmentality as the manner “in which one conducts 
people’s conduct”. Similarly, Miller and Rose (2008:53) argue that “[p]ower is not so much a 
matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of “making up” citizens capable of bearing a 
kind of regulated freedom”. Although, governmentality literature generally makes a distinction 
between on one hand, power relations based on liberal rationalities, conducting people’s 
conduct through freedom and on the other hand, power relations based on illiberal rationalities 
that  work via coercion and violence, scholars are pointing out that this binary approach is not 
useful. An approach that enables governmentality to move beyond binary worldview is 
“focusing primarily on actual practices and rationalities of power” (Hoffman & Verweijen 
2018:373). According to Death (2013:764), the governmentality framework has three benefits. 
First, it allows for a focus on power practices as they are enacted, secondly, it goes beyond 
binaries such as public/private, national/international when examining power practices, and 
thirdly it emphasises the mutual interdependence of the practices that are normally contrasted 
against each other, such as violence and coercion/freedom (Death 2013:764). The dissertation 
draws on Death’s (2013:777) framework that examines governmental rationalities “through 
their regimes of knowledge, subjectivities, techniques, and fields of visibility”. Regimes of 
knowledge refers to the underlying rationalities and mentalities in the regime of government 
focusing on “power relations that are calculated, weighed up, planned and justified, rather than 
more arbitrary, subconscious or unconsidered power relations, and asserts that forms of 
verification, truth-making, legitimation, and relations of power/knowledge are central to the 
way in which contemporary regimes of government operate” (Death 2013:773). According to 
(Death 2013:773-774) subjectivities refers to the different multiple actors that constitute 
regimes of government that go beyond the state and encompass a range of non-state actors such 
as civil societies and international organisations and corporations. Techniques and technologies 
are identified empirically through “investigating manifestations of power relations at their point 
of application” (Death 2013:774). Fields of visibility refers to the gaps and differences between 
competing governmental rationalities. Death (2013:774) asserted that visibility of governed 
spaces operates “alongside other invisible, ungoverned spaces” that are potential sites of 
resistance. Drawing on the concept of governmentality the research project reveals that the 




study, which had different impacts on the hybrid governance structure. The next section 
discusses data collection and some of the challenges I encountered during the data collection 
process. 
 
3.3 Data collection 
 
Before discussing data collection, it is important to outline the challenges inherent in 
researching illicit activities. Von Lampe (2008a:2) stated that the main challenge relates to the 
issue of access; it is a challenge to identify and get cooperation for research purposes from 
participants in illicit markets, whose secrecy is important to avoid detection and punishment 
by authorities. As Mack and Kerner (1975:152) note, “successful substantial criminals are by 
definition inaccessible”. The result, using organised crime as an example, is that there is a 
paucity of knowledge on the nature and extent of both local and international organised crime. 
The United Nations (UN), through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
has attempted to collate information on organised crime derived by national databases from the 
criminal justice system. However, such efforts are undermined by the challenges inherent in 
collecting statistics: the hidden figure of crime is not represented; and statistics do not show 
the political and social contexts in which the crime statistics are generated as different countries 
have different crime-fighting priorities not captured in crime statistics. Furthermore, as Jan van 
Dijk notes (2007:39–40), organised crime statistics do not show the different measurements 
across different jurisdictions; nor do they consider impediments to fighting organised crime in 
different countries, such as corruption and the calibre of the criminal justice institutions that 
influence investigations and prosecutions. Another challenge to researching organised crime is 
that it tends to question if the crime 
 
is organized in a particular way, whereas the more sensible question is to ask what 
factors over time shape the ways in which crimes of certain types are organized and 
who [beyond just the perpetrators] gets involved in them? (Levi 2007:779) 
 
To combat some of these challenges, a strategy to access individuals who engage in illicit 
activities is needed. Michael Levi (2015) suggested that to access respectable businessmen who 
engage in illegal activity is to take an approach that is non-accusatory and indirect, focusing on 
what other people in their industry have done. The next section will outline the sources of data 





3.3.1 Media articles 
 
One of the methods I used to answer the research question was to conduct a thematic analysis 
on the media articles relevant to my case study in order to gain insights into the ways in which 
the various stakeholders perceived the collusion in the construction industry. To create the 
database required to conduct the analysis, I collected English and Afrikaans text media articles. 
I chose English and Afrikaans because, although South Africa has 11 official languages, the 
dominant languages in the media are English and Afrikaans. To collect the English text media 
articles, I searched for published articles in the South African national press on collusive 
tendering in the construction industry between 1 January 2011 and 31 December 2013. These 
dates were chosen because the Competition Commission invited construction companies to 
cooperate with their investigations in February 2011 and officially closed the cases and issued 
fines to contravening companies in 2013. The text media articles were obtained from SA Media 
via Sabinet Reference, accessed via my subscription through the University of Cape Town 
(UCT) electronic databases. I used the keywords ‘collusive tendering construction industry’ in 
the keywords search on SA Media. The articles were found in 20 media publishing houses (see 
Figure 3.1, below). A total of 209 online articles were collected and analysed. I conducted a 























3.3.2 Afrikaans articles 
 
Using the approach set out above, I also collected the Afrikaans text media articles published 
by the South African national press on the construction industry between the same dates. I used 
the keywords ‘konstruksie bedryf’ (construction industry) in the keywords search on SA 
Media. For the Afrikaans text media articles, I decided to employ a broad search of the 
construction industry, because when I narrowed the search to ‘sameswering konstruksie 
bedryf’ (collusion construction industry) and ‘sameswering tenderproses’ (collusion tendering) 
there were no results. I also searched for the term ‘sameswering’ (collusion) in the keywords 
search on SA Media. This term captured articles outside the construction industry which are 
beyond the scope of this research project. Therefore, I settled for articles derived from the 
keywords ‘konstruksie bedryf’ (construction industry) as those words would inadvertently 
capture all the articles that discussed important developments in the construction industry such 
as the collusive tendering, which was a topical issue in the industry during the period under 









3.3.3 Thematic analysis 
 
Thematic analysis has been defined as “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting 
patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organizes and describes your data set in (rich) 
detail” (Braun & Clarke 2006:79). Thus, “[a] theme captures something important about the 
data in relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned response or 
meaning within the data set” (Braun & Clarke 2006:82). Braun and Clarke (2006:83) identify 
two types of thematic analysis: inductive and theoretical thematic analysis. The former relates 
to themes derived from the data as opposed to the latter, in which themes are identified from 
the data in order to address the research question. Additionally, Braun and Clarke (2006:84) 
note that there are varying levels at which to conduct thematic analysis: semantic/explicit and 
latent/interpretative. The semantic level with regard to the identification of themes is at a 
surface level. In contrast, the latent level themes are identified beyond the surface level and 
seek “to identify or examine the underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualisations – and 
ideologies –  that are theorized as shaping or informing the semantic content of the data” (Braun 
& Clarke 2006:84). 
 





Table 3.1: Steps to conducting thematic analysis 
Step  Description of the process 
   
1. 
Familiarising yourself with 
Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-




   
2. Generating initial codes: 
Coding interesting features of the data in a 
systematic 
  
fashion across the entire data set, collating data 
relevant to each code. 
  
 
   
 Searching for themes: 
Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all 
data relevant to each potential theme. 
   
Source: Adapted from Braun and Clarke (2006:87) 
 
Drawing on Braun and Clarke’s (2006) suggested process to conducting thematic analysis, I 
first read the media articles to familiarise myself with the data. I manually coded the data by 
highlighting the data extracts relevant to my research question. Codes identify “the most basic 
segment, or element, of the raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way 
regarding the phenomenon” (Boyatzis 1998:63). I then analysed the coded extracts and 
searched for themes that answered the research question. To do this, I used the theoretical 
thematic analysis approach discussed above. I employed the assistance of visual aids, such as 
mind-maps, to map out the themes emerging from the coded data. 
 
I complemented Braun and Clarke’s (2006) process by drawing on Tuckett’s (2005) work to 











Box 3.1: Questioning coded data within a theme 
 
 
Who is saying it, and what is it about? 
What is being described (event, action, interaction) in the data? Why? 
How is what is being described understood (processes) – what does it mean? 
What are the consequences of the meaning (social context)? What is the context? 
What are the consequences in relation to truth-telling? 
How are elements in the theme under inspection linked to form a cohesive narrative? 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Tuckett (2005) 
 
It is important to highlight the two main criticisms of textual analysis that are relevant to the 
thematic analysis. First, an important criticism of textual analysis in researching media products 
is that it results in the researcher superimposing his or her beliefs and values on the text 
(Phillipov 2013:212). Although this is a valid concern, the alternative, empirical research 
advocated by the critics of textual analysis is not immune to the same criticism (Phillipov 
2013:213). I think what is important is that as a researcher, one is aware of one’s subjectivity 
and personal values that one brings to the research project. 
 
Second, text-based analysis has been criticised for a failure to acknowledge the influence that 
framing has on media articles. The framing of media text is based on the understanding that 
such texts represent a site that represents contestations and clashing of different ideologies and 
social realities of different social communities (Gurevitch & Levy 1985:19). Pan and Kosicki 
(1993:57) defined framing as “a strategy of constructing and processing news discourse or as 
a characteristic of the discourse itself”. Robert Entman (1993:52) advanced a popular definition 
that “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”. In 
response, Elfriede Fürsich (2009:247) argues that a lack of understanding of the objective of 
textual analysis informs criticism. Building on Richard Johnson’s (1986) work, in which he 




acknowledging that the text will have different subjective meanings inherent in the text 
(Johnson 1986:62), Fürsich (2009:247) argues that texts from media outlets are complex and 
dynamic. In other words, textual analysis of media text “is not seen as the rather passive or 
maybe reflective crop of media production; texts are the momentarily fixed form of an ongoing 
negotiation or even struggle over meaning and common sense” (Fürsich 2009:247). Therefore, 
while Fürsich (2009:250) acknowledges the importance of gaining the context of media text 
by understanding the process of production of the media text and the end users’ reception to 
the text, he reiterates the importance of the researcher’s appreciating the weaknesses and 
strengths of this method of data collection.  
 
3.3.4 Research assistant 
 
As mentioned earlier, to gain insights into the different perceptions of collusion in the South 
African construction industry, I conducted a thematic analysis of English and Afrikaans text 
media articles written during the period when the Competition Commission was conducting its 
investigations. As I cannot speak, read or write Afrikaans, a research assistant translated the 
Afrikaans news media articles into English. I utilised the services of a research assistant who 
is a native Afrikaans speaker and was at that time working as a researcher at the University of 
Cape Town. The research assistant translated the 90 Afrikaans articles into English word for 
word. I used the translated English articles to conduct the thematic analysis to answer the 




 According to Breakwell (2012:369) interviews are widely used in qualitative research because 
they are flexible and can be tailor-made to gather different forms of information that are 
suitable for different types of interpretation. This flexibility means that interviewing as a 
method is used across different research methodologies and is arguably a “universal mode of 
systematic inquiry” (Holstein & Gubrium 1995:1). Furthermore, interviewing was most 






It is widely accepted that a key challenge in conducting interviews, particularly with elites, is 
around access (see Ostrander 1993; Mikecz 2012). Elites tend to be private and busy individuals 
who are protected from prying eyes by a myriad gatekeepers (see Gearon & Kuusisto 2018; 
Berger 2015; Mikecz 2012; Gilding 2010). My initial attempts at setting up interviews in 2015 
with individuals from the top construction firms were not successful. I had attempted to contact 
the firms by phone and was getting a standard response, which was that the case was completed 
and all information publicly available. I was told that for further information I should take a 
look at their website.  
 
I was able to secure interview participants who were in a position to provide useful information 
to answer the research question through my Zimbabwean network. As a Zimbabwean who has 
been living in South Africa since 2013, I have access to a network of Zimbabweans (some of 
whom have become South African citizens and hold influential positions in different fields) 
who were able to introduce me to their network of people who were willing to help me. 
Education is highly respected in Zimbabwean culture; therefore, the credentials of being a PhD 
student were enough for the participants to agree to be interviewed. I also think because most 
of the people I reached out to had university degrees, there was a general understanding that 
the interviews for research are anonymous and not intended to harm participants. I also secured 
interviews through emailing individuals I identified as being able to provide me with useful 
information. Interview participants were selected through criterion sampling and snowball 
sampling. Criterion sampling involves the selection of participants who have expertise and can 
share useful insights pertaining to the research topic (Creswell 2013). Snowball sampling is 
defined as “a series of referrals that are made within a circle of people who know each other” 
(Biernacki & Waldorf 1981:151). A technique to sample selection “for every research method 
or statistical procedure” is lacking (Wimmer & Dominick 2014:104). Margarete Sandelowski 
(1995:179) rightly noted that underestimating the importance of numbers for an effectual 
sampling method is a common mistake. Notwithstanding that the sample size is determined by 
the research question, the general recommendation for qualitative research is that, unlike 
quantitative research, which is equipped to quantify large data sets, qualitative samples “should 
not be too large [so] that it is difficult to extract thick, rich data” although “the sample should 






This research made use of a non-probability sampling method to secure interviews that would 
enable me to answer the research question. A non-probability sample selects “to reflect 
particular features of or groups within the sampled population. The sample is not intended to 
be statistically representative; the chances of selection for each element are unknown but, 
instead, the characteristics of the population are used as the basis of selection” (Ritchie et al. 
2003:78). Similar to criterion sampling, non-probability sampling enabled me to select the 
interview participants based on their expertise and ability to provide insights into the research 
project as opposed to their representation in a population. A total of 25 individuals were 
interviewed (see Table 3.2 below) (see Appendix A for a complete list of the interview 
participants). The interview participants are identified by the sectors that they represented, the 
location where the interview took place and the date when the interview was conducted. 
 
Table 3.2: Interview participants included in the research 
Interview participants Number 
Activists4 4 
Government department (National Treasury; former 
employee 3 
in the Ministry of Tourism; and senior police official)  
Construction industry representatives5 4 
Competition and infrastructure lawyers 2 
White-collar experts 5 
Competition Commission representatives 1 
Journalists and editors 4 
Experts on mega-events 2 
   Total                                                                                                    25 
 
 
                                                                
4 These are the individuals who actively campaign to address the problems in the South African construction 
industry, which is structured in favour of big construction firms. These individuals include trade union 
officials, a representative of a political party and a representative of an association of small black-owned 
construction firms. 
5 After an unsuccessful attempt to get hold of representatives from the top construction firms that were 
implicated in collusive tendering, I decided to interview other actors in the construction industry such as 






Interviews can be “unstructured, semi-structured and structured” (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree 
2006:314). Semi-structured interviews were adopted because they are arguably more flexible 
than structured interviews. A semi-structured interview consists of open-ended questions that 
are both prepared before the interview as well as developed during the interview process 
(DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree 2006:315). When interviewing elites, thorough interview 
preparation is key to gaining useful information and showing the “seriousness of the 
interviewer” (Zuckerman 1972:164; see Mikecz 2012; Harvey 2011). Therefore, I tailor-made 
interview questions for each interview to complement the participant’s background and 
expertise, in order to ensure that I derived the most benefit from each interview. Although the 
interview questions were prepared ahead of time, in order to enable a more authentic interview, 
I made allowance for the interviewees’ responses to have some influence on the order of 
questioning. This approach was advocated by Steinar Kvale (1983) and it enables the 
interviewees to share their opinions and experiences without the constraints of a rigid and 
structured interview process with predetermined interview questions. As a result, I could ask 
probing questions to gain an understanding of the research question while also leaving room 
for the interview participant to share their opinions as well as give information on issues of 
which I might have been unaware. 
 
The interview location can have an impact on the research process when interviewing elites 
(Mikecz 2012). Therefore, it is best for the interview to be conducted in a neutral public space. 
Because it is important when interviewing elites for the researcher to be flexible (Mikecz 2012), 
I decided to conduct the interviews in venues that were suitable for the participants: mainly the 
office and public areas such as coffee shops. The interviews ran over a duration of 30 minutes 
to one hour. After consent and permission were granted, interviews were recorded. Although 
there is an argument that an interviewer should cover topics “that explore deviant or illegal 
activities, expose the vested interests of powerful persons or persons engaged in coercive or 
domineering behaviours”, ethical issues of not causing harm to the participant is important 
(Corbin & Morse 2003:337). Because of the sensitive nature of this research, bearing in mind 
that some of the construction firms potentially faced civil and criminal lawsuits, I informed 
participants that whatever information was shared would be kept confidential as the point of 
the interviews was not to cause the participants harm. This stance was also useful for building 




the possibility of civil and criminal lawsuits was very limited due to the agreement between the 
state and the construction industry. Chapter seven discusses this agreement in further detail.  
 
3.3.6 Positionality during the interview process 
 
Berger (2015:220) noted that positionality affects the research in three ways: first, in accessing 
the interview participants; second, it shapes the relationship between the researcher and 
participants; and third, the researcher’s background and ideology has an impact on how they 
frame research questions and filter information, which has an impact on the research findings. 
Therefore, the effects of positionality require that the researcher is reflective and engages in 
“internal dialogue and critical self-evaluation of the researcher’s positionality as well as active 
acknowledgement and explicit recognition that this position may affect the research process 
and outcome” (Berger 2015:220). My positionality as a black Zimbabwean woman undertaking 
research on collusion in the South African construction industry had a significant effect on the 
responses I received during the interview process. That the interviews were conducted several 
years after the Competition Commission had completed the investigations of a specific case of 
collusion also affected the responses I was able to secure. I think this is because the 
investigations and payment of fines by the construction industry had been completed, and as 
such, my interview questions were regarded non-threatening and I avoided taking a 
confrontational approach during the interview. Furthermore, the people I ended up interviewing 
where not directly involved in the construction industry collusion but were experts who had 
insights into the workings of the industry and where not going to be compromised by sharing 
their knowledge about corruption in the industry. 
 
Conti and O’Neil (2007:79) note that when interviewing the powerful, power relations between 
the researcher and interview participant need to be “strategically managed”. I was aware of the 
power dynamics during the course of the interviews, and the fact that I was interviewing some  
influential individuals was made implicit in subtle ways. For example, there was an instance 
when I went to interview a senior official at the National Treasury in Pretoria in his office, who 
decided that the interview should be conducted in one of the boardrooms. The interview I had 
with a senior editor of an influential business newspaper came to an abrupt end when the 
participant received a phone call about a development that was going to make national news 




most of the interviews were dynamic and constantly changing during the course of the 
interview. I think this is mostly because, as a PhD researcher, I was perceived by most of the 
participants as an expert. Similar to Mason-Bish (2018), I found that the approach I adopted 
was that of a knowledgeable researcher who is not threatening. This enabled me to build rapport 
with the participants until I could ask sensitive questions. 
 
The issue of my race was very important with regard to the type of information I was able to 
get from the interview participants. I found it interesting, especially with black participants, 
that they felt a camaraderie with me, especially when we were discussing an issue on which 
they thought we shared similar views. At this stage, they would ask for me not to record the 
interviews. On one hand, this was useful, and I gained important insights into the different 
perceptions on corruption which are highly racialised in South Africa, as the empirical chapters 
will reveal. On the other hand, it was challenging for me not to display my personal beliefs 
when I did not agree with some of the participants’ viewpoints that I felt were inaccurate. In 
general, as a young black female conducting the interviews, I found that particularly the black 
male professionals were very supportive and told me that they wanted to support a sister 
because they understood it was not easy. For example, I went to an organisation to conduct an 
interview and at the completion of the interview, the interviewee asked his colleague, a senior 
official in the organisation, who agreed to an interview on the spot. In turn, he phoned a 
colleague from another organisation who stated that he would be available for an interview 
after lunch. At this point, he insisted on taking me and the colleague I had interviewed earlier 
for lunch while I waited to conduct the interview. The reason was he wanted to make sure his 
colleague kept his word and did the interview. At the end of the day, I had three very useful 
interviews and a free lunch. 
 
At the time of agreeing to go for lunch, I did not reflect on the ethical implications of such a 
decision. An opportunity to conduct a useful interview had been presented to me unexpectedly 
and my instinct had been to assent to it. In hindsight, I think I felt safe because we had lunch 
in an open public space. What was interesting was that, inevitably, the issue of my tribe would 
come up after the interview. At this point, I revealed that I was Zimbabwean, which was always 
a surprise, because apparently I look and sound Zulu (which is a South African tribe). There is 
a perception in the literature that foreigners studying elites are at an advantage as they seem to 




2012). I am not sure if knowledge of my nationality prior to the interview would have changed 
the dynamics. My positionality during the interview process was that of “multiple overlapping 
identities” (Kezar 2002:96). My role was simultaneously that of a PhD student asking questions 
in a non-threatening way, knowledgeable researcher, and black female who could be trusted 
with sensitive information. To complement the data I gathered from the interviews, I consulted 




Throughout the research project, I collected, read and analysed documents in a variety of forms: 
transcripts from the Competition Commission hearings; academic journal articles; books; 
newspapers; legislation; court cases; government reports; and policy papers. For the most part, 
documents provide information. However, documents are not necessarily objective entities as 
they are produced from different methodological paradigms. Therefore, my role as a researcher 
analysing the documents is crucial. As a qualitative researcher, I believe that the researcher is 
not an objective neutral spectator in the research process, including the documentary analysis 
process. As discussed earlier in the section, I conducted a thematic analysis on the print media’s 
articles on collusive tendering in the South African construction industry. This analysis is an 
explicit example of how documents, such as newspaper articles, provide objective as well as 
social constructs of illicit activity by respectable businessmen. The analysis was informed by 
the interpretivism paradigm, which meant that I had to be aware that producers of the 
documentation had social constructs derived from ideologies and paradigms that might have 
influenced the product. Similarly, I had to become aware of my bias and worldviews that could 
potentially shape the way I approached and understood a document. This was particularly 
relevant when I was analysing the documentation of a transcribed interview. The next section 
discusses the measures I took to ensure the reliability and validity of the research process. 
 
3.3.8 Reliability and validity 
 
Morse et al. (2002:17) advocate for verification in qualitative research, with verification being 
defined as: “the mechanisms used during the process of research to incrementally contribute to 
ensuring reliability and validity and, thus, the rigor of a study”. Morse et al. (2002) identified 




reliable and valid. First, the research question should be compatible with the methods adopted. 
Second, the sample size must fit the research question. Third, the collection and analysis of 
data should be intertwined. The fourth stage, that of ensuring that research is reliable, is to think 
theoretically, which needs a macro-micro approach “inching forward without making cognitive 
leaps, constantly checking and rechecking, and building a solid foundation” (Morse et al. 
2002:18). The last stage is built on theory development by linking the data which is micro to 
the theory which is macro (Ibid). 
 
Morse et al. (2002:17) claim that the quality of research is based on the skills of the researcher, 
in particular, the researcher’s ability to ensure that the data is reliable, as the researcher has a 
huge influence on the research process, interpretation of data collected and subsequent findings. 
Malterud (2001) argues that the researcher should be conscious of reflexivity and identify any 
preconceptions they bring to the research project. This includes “previous personal and 
professional experiences, pre-study beliefs about how things are and what is to be investigated, 
motivation and qualifications for exploration of the field, and perspectives and theoretical 
foundations related to education and interests” (Malterud 2001:484). I kept a diary in which I 
made notes of my observations, thoughts and assumptions, preconceptions and ideological 
beliefs that might have an impact on how I interpreted information that I came across. For this 
research project, I examined multiple varied documents such as academic articles and 
government reports as well as conducted interviews. In conducting the interviews, I was aware 
that I am not a neutral participant but an active participant (Bryman 1988); therefore I identified 
and was aware of factors that affect the authenticity of the interview process; for example, how 
I interpreted the information from the interview. Therefore, I made sure I took detailed notes 
in addition to recording the interview. I was aware that note taking can reinforce biases and 
“lose significant information from the interview” (Breakwell 2012:378). To minimise such 
biases, I opted for the time-consuming complete transcription of the recorded interviews (Ibid). 
This was manageable as I had only 25 interviews to transcribe. 
 
To increase the validity and reliability of the qualitative research approach, I made use of 
triangulation. Norman Denzin (1978:291) define triangulation as “the combination of 
methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon”. Triangulation is used to “summarize; 
methodological triangulation involves a complex process of playing each method off against 




project, I used both triangulation and reflexivity to address the criticism levelled against the 
use of a case study approach as a research method. A case study research method has been 
criticised in that, because it occurs in a specific context, it might not be appropriate to generalise 
the findings to other contexts, although theoretical generalisations are possible. However, the 
purpose of a case study research method is not limited to the purpose of making generalisations. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the intrinsic case study is chosen precisely because it is 
unique and valid to study as an end in itself. Stake (2000a:128) makes a similar point and 
asserts that: 
 
[t]he bulk of case study work, however, is done by people who have intrinsic interest 
in the case. Their intrinsic case study designs draw these researchers toward 
understandings of what is important about that case within its own world, which is not 
the same as the world of researchers and theorists. 
 
Nonetheless, the criticism levelled against case study research needs to be addressed in order 
to produce rigorous scholarship. Triangulation enabled me to address these challenges. 
Triangulation has been described as “a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify 
meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation” (Stake 2005:454). In 
other words, this research project made use of data triangulation by first, collecting data from 
multiple sources, such as academic literature and interviews with selected participants; and 
second, acquiring information using different research methods, such as interviews, discourse 
analysis of media portrayal of the collusive tendering and document analysis of different 
documentation that included Competition Commission hearing transcripts. 
 
However, Fielding and Fielding (1986:33) criticise Denzin’s conception of triangulation by 
pointing out that triangulation does not “necessarily increase validity ... different methods have 
emerged as a product of different theoretical traditions, and therefore combining them can add 
range and depth, but not accuracy”. The case for triangulation is based on the “intention of 
adding breadth or depth to our analysis but not for [the] purpose of pursuing ‘objective’ truth” 
(Fielding & Fielding 1986:33). This point is important, because I feel that the use of 
triangulation in conducting the research for the case study resulted in a more nuanced 
understanding of the political, social and economic context in which the collusive tendering in 
the South African industry occurred. This gave my case study analysis greater depth. However, 




explores how I conducted data analysis of the information I had gathered through the various 
methods I have discussed in the chapter. 
 
3.3.9 Data analysis 
 
Data analysis has been described as “breaking a phenomenon into its constituent parts and 
viewing these parts in relationship to some whole” (Ragin & Amoroso 2010:55). The analysis 
of data from qualitative research is not a value-neutral exercise; “decontextualisation and 
recontextualisation” are employed (Malterud 2001:486). Decontextualisation enables “parts of 
the subject matter to be lifted out and investigated more closely, together with other elements 
across the material that tells about similar issues” (Malterud 2001:486); while 
recontextualisation ensures that “the patterns still agree with the context from which they were 
collected, and is important to prevent reductionism and to maintain the connections between 
the field and the informants’ accounts of reality” (Malterud 2001:486). As mentioned earlier, I 
opted for a complete transcription of the interview data. As I transcribed the interviews, I 
compared and contrasted the new data from the previous transcripts, using the constant 
comparative method. The constant comparative method enabled me to make notes of 
interesting insights that I could use to increase the validity and reliability of my research. For 
example, any discrepancy from the interview participants on an issue was jotted down in my 
reflective diary and followed up. The coding and interpretation process was done manually. 
Coding is defined as “applying labels to particular extracts from the interviews in order to be 
able to identify them as belonging to various descriptive or analytical categories” (Layder 
2005:52). Coding is highly subjective and as such, the aim of the exercise was to organise the 
data collected during the interview process in the “most meaningful way” (Dey 2007:92). The 
interview transcripts were anonymised and stored in folders on my laptop. To ensure the 





The Research Ethics Committee (REC) at the University of Cape Town (UCT) seeks to ensure 
that all research gathering data about human participants undergoes an ethics clearance process 




Health Act 61 of 2003). Section 12(2)(c) of the Constitution states that researching humans 
without informed consent is prohibited. According to the National Health Act 61 of 2003, 
health is defined as well-being, and health research encompasses “surveys, interviews, focus 
groups or ethnographic observations”. The preamble of the UCT Researchers Ethics Code 
outlines that UCT’s objective in research involving human participants is guided by principles 
of accountability, integrity, “social sensitivity and responsibility with respect for the dignity 
and self-esteem of the individual and for basic human rights”.6 As my interaction with human 
participants for the research was through interviews, I sought direction from the UCT 
Researchers Ethics Code to safeguard the well-being of research participants and obtained 
informed consent; and I took measures to protect participants from unintended harm and 
potential loss of anonymity. The rest of the section explores these ethical issues further. 
 
To adhere to the UCT Researchers Ethics Code when I conducted the interviews, I followed 
Glynis Breakwell’s (2012:370) suggestion that interviews should begin with an introduction in 
which the participant is given adequate information to enable them to give informed consent. 
Such an introduction should, however, not “compromise the validity of the participants’ 
subsequent answers to questions” (Breakwell 2012:370). I ensured that I introduced the 
interview and fully briefed research participants on the nature of the research and purpose of 
the interview in order for the participants to give informed consent. I also explained that the 
interview could be stopped at any time. 
 
Confidentially is an important ethical imperative. Before each interview, I informed the 
participants of my commitment to maintaining their confidentiality at all times. I also made 
full disclosure to participants on how data from the interviews would be used and who would 
have access to the data. To ensure the protection and anonymity of the interview participant, I 
removed information that would identify the interview participants from the dissertation. 
 
Herbert Kelman (1972) noted that an ethical dilemma results from the fact that research 
participants who are a source of data in the social sciences tend to have unequal power relations 
to the researchers. As such, Edwards and Mauthner (2002:27) point out that instead of 
“ignoring or blurring power positions, ethical practice needs to pay attention to them”. On the 
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other hand, Thorne (1980:294) argued that the powerful groups in society are less vulnerable 
and as such require less protection as mandated by informed consent. Rainwater and Pittman 
(1967:365) make the argument that social scientists are obligated to make available information 
that enhances accountability of powerful public figures whose privileged positions enable them 
not to take responsibility. However appealing Rainwater and Pittman’s argument may be, in 
the context of this research, as already pointed out, interview participants, particularly from the 
South African construction industry, are especially vulnerable as some of the companies are 
facing civil charges. As such, it is important that participating in this research does not cause 
them harm. On the other hand, Lee and Renzetti (1990:512) rightly asserted that “it is possible 
for any topic, depending upon the context, to be a sensitive one”. Therefore, I l used the same 




This chapter explored the methods used to investigate the case study that will be used to answer 
the research question. The challenges of researching power and authority were outlined. The 
chapter also discussed the governmentality analytical framework used in the dissertation to 
examine how the different authorities in the case study enacted and articulated authority and 
how this shapes and influences hybrid structures. 
 
The case study approach was chosen because it was best placed to answer the research question. 
Notwithstanding the difficulty with this approach, specifically its unsuitability to be 
generalised, the case study was still the appropriate choice because it enabled me to gain an 
understanding of the nature of collusive tendering in the private sector. 
 
This research project relied on interviews which have the main advantage of being relatively 
flexible. However, interviews have some challenges such as ensuring that participants provide 
accurate information as well as an accurate interpretation of the interview by the researcher. 
As a safeguard, I incorporated techniques such as triangulation and reflexivity to ensure that 
the interview process was valid and reliable. 
 
The next chapter will give detailed background information that will be built upon by 




collusion in the South African construction industry to build football stadiums ahead of the 
2010 FIFA World Cup. To give context to the case study, the chapter examines corruption in 






CHAPTER 4: UNDERSTANDING COLLUSION IN THE CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY IN LIGHT OF CORRUPTION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides context to the themes outlined in the subsequent empirical chapters to 
answer the research question: How is authority enacted in hybrid governance processes? The 
chapter is divided into four sections. First, the chapter discusses the case study used to conduct 
this research on collusive tendering in the South African construction industry to build the 2010 
FIFA World Cup stadiums. The second section examines the South African political economy, 
providing the background to the government policies discussed in the empirical chapters. The 
third section outlines the challenges of corruption in contemporary South Africa, characterised 
by blurring of interests between state actors and big business. This blurring of interests is 
explored further in the following chapters because it shapes both the hybridisation process and 
formation of hybrid governance structures. The fourth section concludes the section and 
outlines the subsequent empirical chapters. 
 
4.2 Case study: collusion in the South African construction industry to build 2010 
FIFA World Cup football stadiums 
 
On 10 February 2009, the Competition Commission commenced investigations into allegations 
of collusion between the top construction companies in building the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
stadiums in South Africa. The Competition Commission is an investigative and enforcement 
body created by the Competition Act 89 of 1998 as one of the three independent regulatory 
agencies to enforce the Act. The other two are the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) and the 
Competition Appeal Court. The purpose of the Competition Commission is to investigate 
restrictive business practices that undermine competition in the South African economy. 
 
Anti-competitive practices take various forms and this dissertation investigates one of the 
forms: collusive tendering. Hunter and Simons (1963:17) define collusive tendering as 
“restrictive trading practices whereby ‘competing’ firms seek to eliminate any element of price 
competition through prior agreement on the tender price to be offered”. In this case study, 
collusive tendering was practiced using cover bids or cover pricing. A cover price is: 
 
a price that is provided by a firm that wishes to win a tender to a firm that does not 




higher price: or alternatively a price that is provided by a firm that does not wish to 
win a that tender in order that the firm that wishes to win the tender may submit a 
lower price. (Competition Tribunal 2013b: para 1.9) 
 
Collusive tendering is prohibited under South African legislation in terms of section 4(1)(b)(iii) 
of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. The Competition Commission investigations’ into the 
construction industry were initiated because of the high increases in the price of steel.7 
Investigation findings pointed to collusion as a reason for price increases and, subsequently, 
the Competition Commission launched an investigation into the wider infrastructural 
development programmes connected to the 2010 FIFA World Cup (Ibid). The reasoning behind 
this decision was that steel is a major component in infrastructure development. With the 
government committing R30 billion to infrastructure development for the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup it was important to scrutinise the sector (Department of Sport and Recreation 2010:10). 
 
The investigations revealed that collusion was pervasive within the sector and applied to many 
projects; the investigation disclosed 300 instances of collusion (Competition Tribunal 2013a). 
For example, Murray & Roberts, one of the top four construction firms in South Africa, was 
implicated in 17 collusion projects between 2001 and 2007 (Competition Tribunal 2013b). In 
2006, Murray & Roberts was part of a Road Contractors Meeting with other top firms where 
they agreed to allocate tenders for road contractors among themselves (Ibid:para 5.1). Again, 
in 2007, Murray & Roberts colluded with WBHO and Group Five in the Gautrain Project 
(Ibid:para 5.2). In 2005, Murray & Roberts’s subsidiary, Wade Walker, was part of the Wade 
List Meeting with Group Five’s subsidiary, Group Five Energy, where 43 electrical and 
instrumentation services tenders were identified and divided among themselves (Ibid:para 6.1). 
Although the 2010 FIFA World Cup infrastructural development project had various 
components, that included the upgrading of transportation infrastructure, security and 
immigration, for practical purposes, this case study will examine only one aspect of the 
infrastructure development for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, which is the building of the football 
stadiums. The majority of the government’s 2010 FIFA World Cup budget went to the 
construction and upkeep of football stadiums (Department of Sport and Recreation 2010:172). 
As Table 4.1 below shows, the cost of building and upgrading the stadiums ended up being 
more expensive than originally budgeted for. The initial budget allocated towards stadiums was 
                                                                




R8,4 billion but the effectual costs were approximately R15,9 billion, almost double the initial 
budget (Department of Sport and Recreation 2010:43–45). 
 
Table 4.1: Building costs of stadiums 
 
Stadium Cost estimate (2006) Winning tender Final costs (2010) 
Free State 80 000 000 245 000 000 253 000 000 
Green Point 1 600 000 000 3 700 000 000 4 500 000 000 
Loftus Versfeld 40 000 000 98 000 000 115 000 000 
Mbombela 650 000 000 952 700 000 960 000 000 
Moses Mabhida 1 800 000 000 1 900 000 000 3 100 000 000 
Nelson Mandela 750 000 000 1 200 000 000 1 850 000 000 
Peter Mokaba 650 000 000 870 000 000 1 100 000 000 
Soccer City 1600 000 000 1500 000 000 3700 000 000 
Ellis Park 40 000 000 229 000 000 254 000 000 
Total cost in Rands 7 290 000 000 10 841 700 000 15 982 000 000 
    
 
Source: Data from Building and Wood Workers International (2010:44); Department 






















































Source: Image from BBC Sports8 
 
As the figure from the BBC Sports illustrates, the five new stadiums were Green Point, 
Mbombela, Moses Mabhida, Nelson Mandela Bay and Peter Mokaba. There were five 
upgraded stadiums: Ellis Park, Soccer City, Free State, Loftus Versfeld, and Royal Bafokeng. 
 
4.2.1 Collusive tendering - an entrenched practice within the South African 
construction industry 
 
The investigations into the collusive tendering in the South African construction industry 
revealed a complex system of corruption within the industry. As the below diagram shows, 
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Figure 4.2:  Diagram showing the collusive arrangements in the stadium building for 






















Green Point was built by WBHO and Murray & Roberts. 
WBHO and Stefanutti Stocks disclosed colluding for this 
contract. 
Mbombela was built by Basil Read and Bouygues. 
Investigations revealed WBHO, Murray & Roberts, Basil 
Read, Group Five and Concor colluded for this contract. 
Moses Mabhida was built by Group Five and Pandev. 
Investigations revealed WBHO, Murray & Roberts, Basil 
Read, Group Five and Concor colluded for this contract. 
Nelson Mandela Bay was built by Grinaker-LTA and 
Interbeton. Investigations revealed WBHO, Murray & 
Roberts, Basil Read, Group Five and Concor colluded for 
this contract. 
Peter Mokaba was built by WBHO. Concor and G 
Liviero disclosed colluding for this contract. 
Soccer City was built by Grinaker. Grinaker and 






On 1 February 2011, after extensive investigations, the Competition Commission issued an 
invitation to the construction firms in South Africa who had violated section 4(1)(b)(iii) of the 




Commission 2011:4). The settlement process involved the Competition Commission and a 
guilty construction firm entering into a consent agreement based on the firm meeting three 
criteria. First, the construction firm had to cooperate and make a truthful disclosure to the 
Competition Commission. Second, henceforth, the construction firm had to commit to abiding 
by and complying with the requirements of the Competition Act 89 of 1989. Last, the 
construction firm had to agree to pay the administrative penalty fee as prescribed by the 
Competition Commission. 
 
The eventual consent agreements can be divided into two categories of cases: disclosed and 
non-disclosed cases. The disclosed cases involved a firm making a disclosure about the projects 
with which it had been involved that contravened the Competition Act 89 of 1989. The non-
disclosed cases were the cases that, through the investigative process, implicated the 
construction firms, but the firms had not disclosed the projects to the Competition Commission. 
The non-disclosed projects arguably go against the notion of the settlement process as the firms 
had failed to make truthful disclosure on the projects in which they were involved, and that 
violated the Competition Act 89 of 1989. In response to this tension, the Competition 
Commission’s Advocate Unterhalter, explained that in the case of non-disclosed projects, the 
Competition Commission had: 
 
sought explanations from the parties concerned and … it was satisfied that what had 
happened was that there was no deliberate non-disclosure, but simply that firms had 
sought to find out what had happened. But many of these projects relate to 
circumstances that happened many years ago where the persons that they sought and 
of whom they had made inquiries were sometimes not available, and they couldn’t get 
the information.9  
 
In the Tribunal hearing, to confirm the various consent agreements, the implicated firms made 
the excuse that they were not able to confirm some of the projects because the individuals 
involved in the collusive tendering had left the firms, mostly through retirement and 
resignations.10 In other words, the people responsible are no longer around. Therefore, it is not 
possible to give a comprehensive account of what transpired. As alluded to by some of the 
Competition Tribunal Judges, this explanation was a convenient excuse for the construction 
firms to deflect responsibilities. To understand how large-scale collusion within the 
construction industry to build the 2010 FIFA World Cup was possible, the next section 
discusses the historical reasons that has influenced the political economy of South Africa, 
                                                                





which is marked by big state-supported companies dominating key industries. One of the 
important reasons why collusion at this scale was possible is because the South African 
construction industry is dominated by a few large construction firms that have the resources 
and capacity to implement state policies. As the following chapters highlight, an analysis of 
how the construction industry implemented the post-apartheid government policies, designed 
to create a more equitable economy, provides insights into the characteristics of hybridisation. 
 
4.3 A historical overview of South Africa’s political economy 
 
According to the World Bank (2018) South Africa is one of the biggest economies in Africa, 
along with Nigeria and Angola. In Southern Africa, “its economy dominates the region” 
(Carmody 2002:256). The South African economy is complex; on one hand, it is highly 
developed, with a minority of the population enjoying first world transport, financial and 
banking services. Yet, on the other hand, as noted by Wise (2004) most of the population does 
not enjoy development. Two main factors have had an impact on the South African economy. 
First, the discovery of diamonds and gold in the late 1860s and 1880s respectively shaped the 
South African economy and influenced the sociopolitical spheres in a manner that is still 
evident today. Wise (2004:8) points out that the South African mining sector was the bedrock 
of the country’s economy and informed the groundwork for government economic policy. In a 
bid to mitigate the adverse effects of building the economy around the mining sector, the 
government sought to build up capacity in the local farming and manufacturing sectors (Ibid). 
This resulted in the creation of huge state-owned monopolies in key industries of the economy. 
 
Second, colonial and apartheid systems of government influenced and shaped the South 
African economy. The economy was created to further the interests of the minority rule, 
resulting in socio-economic inequality along racial lines, with a disproportionate number of 
black South Africans classified as “chronically poor” (Aliber 2003:487). A myriad of laws 
placed restrictions on the ability of black South Africans and women to participate effectively 
in the formal economy. Furthermore, the apartheid government sought to implement economic 
policies that would weather the effects of isolation from the global economy. Therefore, sectors 
that were important to the economy such as mining, energy, and agriculture received huge state 
support. As Banda et al. noted (2015:9) this resulted in an economy that was dominated by 




economy has continued into the current democratic dispensation. Therefore, “[a]lthough the 
South African economy was largely opened to the global market in the past twenty years, any 
benefits that could have resulted from liberalisation have been muted by the fact that the actual 
structure of markets has not changed significantly” (Banda et al. 2015:9). It is against this 
background that the African National Congress (ANC)-led democratic government has sought 
to transform the South African economy to benefit all South Africans. 
 
4.3.1 A context to the battle for economic control: the rise of neoliberalism 
 
During the fight against apartheid, the ANC lacked a coherent economic policy. The extent of 
the ANC’s economic policy during this period was “a mixture of dirigisme and socialist reform 
of the economy via nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industries. However, the 
exact manner and policies by which the ANC was to pursue this were never formally 
enunciated” (Williams & Taylor 2000:24). The reason behind the vague socialist rhetoric was 
that it “gave the ANC leadership considerable ideological leeway successfully to stitch together 
a loosely defined coalition of interest groups that included workers and aspirant entrepreneurs, 
Christians and Communists, and the unemployed and middle class, around a shared objective 
of dismantling apartheid” (Murray 1994:18). However, during the transition from apartheid to 
democratic rule in South Africa, the ANC’s economic policy shifted from a vague socialist 
orientation to a neoliberal free market approach. Neoliberalism is a doctrine popularised by 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1970s and 1980s that rejected the welfare state. 
The key tenets of neoliberalism are government austerity and the importance of the free market 
in fostering economic growth. Peck et al. (2009:50) assert that the rise of neoliberalism is due 
to a combination of the effects of the welfare state and the reduction of profitability in labour-
intensive industries that were key for Western capitalism. Duménil et al. (2004) argue that 
neoliberalism is an extension of capitalism, to the extent that it seeks to further the interests of 
capitalism. Furthermore, as Peck et al. (2009:50) note, neoliberalism was international in scope 
and not limited to tensions found in Western capitalism. Indeed, the debt crisis of the 1980s 
meant “neoliberal programs of restructuring were extended selectively across the global South 
through the efforts of US-influenced multilateral agencies to subject peripheral and semi-





Several factors have been expounded for the embrace of a neoliberal economic approach by 
the ANC-led government. First, Williams and Taylor (2000:26) point out that the legitimacy 
of socialist economic policies had been undermined by the collapse of the Soviet Union 
economy in the 1990s. Second, Landsberg (1994) asserts that the ANC was inundated and 
influenced by neoliberal propaganda from the United States and other Western countries. 
Williams and Taylor (2000:26) notes, big business’ “‘charm offensive’ on the ANC elite in 
general, and Mandela in particular” was key in getting the ANC to adopt neoliberal policies. In 
support of Williams and Taylors observations, back in 1994 Landsberg (1994:290) stated: “It 
is interesting to note, for example, that Mandela’s evolving position on fiscal responsibility was 
a direct response to pressures from foreign investors and governments”. The result was that by 
the end of the 1990s, neoliberal economic doctrine informed the economic policy of the South 
African government (see Saul 2001:436; Habib & Padayachee 2000:252). 
 
In 1996, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) economic policy document 
encapsulated the official neoliberal economic approach that the South African state would 
pursue (RSA, Department of Finance 1996). Drawing from neoliberalism, GEAR policies 
advocate for economic growth, reduction of government spending and the privatisation of state 
entities. This has implications for governance arrangements in South Africa, as non-state actors 
have stepped up to fulfil state duties. This dissertation makes the argument that these 
governance arrangements are hybrid in nature. To gain insights into the workings of these 
hybrid governance arrangements, the interactions between the different governance actors with 
simultaneously blurring and contradictory interests is explored in the following chapters. The 
GEAR was an important policy shift, replacing the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) implemented in 1994. The RDP was a policy document created by the ANC 
and its alliance partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (ANC 1994). The objective of the RDP was to create 
a more equitable economy with the state having “a leading and enabling role in guiding the 
economy and the market toward reconstruction and development” (ANC 1994:para 4.2.3) 
Under the RDP, the state was envisaged as having “a significant role for public sector 
investment to complement the role of the private sector and community participation in 
stimulating reconstruction and development” (ANC 1994:para 4.2.4). However, as noted by 
Williams and Taylor (2000) the RDP faced criticism for being vague and impractical without 




that the socialist-leaning economic policies had been discarded and South Africa would pursue 
a neoliberal economic approach. 
 
GEAR argued for increased economic growth as the vehicle to achieving a more equitable 
economy. Therefore, a competitive “stable environment for confidence” was needed to attract 
investments (RSA, Department of Finance 1996:2). Measures to attain the stability and 
competitiveness required by investors included “flexibility within the collective bargaining 
system” (RSA, Department of Finance 1996:2). Although the leftist-leaning alliance partners, 
COSATU and SACP, were critical of GEAR, a compromise was reached in order to protect 
the alliance, as the ANC was clear that the main tenets of GEAR were “non-negotiable” 
(Williams & Taylor 2000:33; see Peet 2002:75). In return, the then president Mbeki sought to 
pacify the alliance partners through reiterating the importance of RDP. Speaking at an 
investment event in 1999 he stated that “[t]he RDP programme, as a broad policy framework, 
remains relevant … I also believe that the policy (Gear) remains correct and that the next 
government will continue to be bound by it”.11 The next section examines an example of 
neoliberal practice adopted by non-state actors in the South African private sector, relevant to 
this research. 
 
4.3.2 Neoliberal practices in South Africa 
 
The emphasis of government austerity under neo-liberalism led to the state subcontracting 
service provision (rowing) to non-state actors while retaining the authority to set policy 
(steering) (Osborne & Gaebler 1993:25). Under this arrangement, non-state actors took on the 
responsibility of providing services that the state traditionally provided. The implementation 
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programmes is a mechanism through which non-
state actors take on state duties. CSR has been defined as “a phenomenon whereby commercial 
entities deploy social and environmental policies that go beyond their formal legal duties and 
potentially beyond their goal of maximizing profits for shareholders” (Shamir 2010:532). 
Hönke’s (2012:68–69) research has found that, where companies engage in CSR programmes 
in fragile states, despite the rhetoric of commitment to democratic principles, the empirical 
reality on the ground suggests that the main objective of the programmes is to secure stability. 
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A popular example in literature of the state subcontracting to non-state actors is in the field of 
crime control. Garland (1996) argues that the United Kingdom government pursued a strategy 
of responsibilisation through working in partnership with various non-state actors, encouraging 
them to take an active role in crime control. The various types of responsibilisation strategies 
that include CSR programmes gave rise to the regulatory state. The regulatory state is defined 
as “a shift in the style of governance away from the direct provision of public services, 
associated with the welfare state, and towards oversight of provision of public services by 
others” (Scott 2000:44). Garland (1996:454) and others argue that responsibilisation strategies, 
when successfully implemented, can extend the power of the regulatory state. This is because, 
as Rose and Miller (1992:189) highlights, retaining the power to steer policy strengthens state 
power because the state is able to implement “programmes of government by influencing, 
allying with or co-opting resources that they do not directly control – banks, financial 
institutions, enterprises, trade unions, professions, bureaucracies, families and individuals”. In 
other words, the state is governing at a distance (Garland 1996). The CSR initiatives undertaken 
by the South African construction industry are examined in Chapter seven. Chapter seven 
explores how the CSR initiatives shaped the relationship between the construction industry and 
the South African government and impacted the process of hybridisation. The point of 
departure of this dissertation is that an examination of corruption in the construction industry, 
as firms implemented state policies, provides insight into the nature of the relationship between 
the state and the construction industry and how the relationship shapes hybrid governance 
structures. To give context for this assertion the next section discusses the role of corruption in 
shaping the political economy of South Africa.  
 
4.3 Corruption in contemporary South Africa 
 
The period of white minority rule in South Africa ran from the 1870s to 1994, with corruption 
taking many different forms. Indeed, corruption was a key facilitator to the colonial and 
apartheid system of government. Hyslop (2005:789) makes the point that a period of 
heightened political corruption was during the creation of the Afrikaner state by the National 
Party (NP) was marked by patronage politics to establish a strong Afrikaner role in the South 
African economy. As Lodge (1998:164) noted, a system of governance such as apartheid, 
which is organised around advancing the social, economic and political interests of one racial 




was fuelled by the apartheid state’s attempts to mitigate the effects of sanctions against its 
government. Government departments such as defence and secret services were particularly 
vulnerable to corruption and ran covert illicit operations that included smuggling weapons and 
oil (see Ellis 1996:181; Goga 2014:65) resulting in the blurring of licit and illicit activity in 
both the public and the private sector. According to Van Vuuren (2017), such operations 
occurred through a complex network of individuals who shared similar commercial and 
political interests. Secret funds and the use of front companies was utilised; the private sector 
played a key role in enabling the state to access the global economy.  Ken Owen, the former 
editor of the Sunday Times astutely stated in respect of the NP: 
 
Behind the racial ideology lay a naked greed which, combined with the centralisation 
of power, secrecy and short tribal lines of communication, generated pervasive and 
growing corruption. The procurement of food for the prisons department or medical 
supplies for hospitals or strategic stocks to beat sanctions, became the path to fortune 
for people who would now be called ‘tenderpreneurs’. (Owen 2002, quoted in Boraine 
2012:51). 
 
Similar, Mangcu (2014:189) argues that patronage politics is well entrenched in the political 
psyche of South Africa; the notion of the ‘the chief’ can be traced: 
 
from Jan van Riebeeck right through to all those vainglorious 19th century colonial 
governors. The history of the 20th century is littered with these big men, and they were 
all men – Paul Kruger, Louis Botha, Jan Smuts, D F Malan, Hendrik Verwoerd, John 
Vorster, P W Botha and F W de Klerk. 
 
This legacy of corruption has endured, albeit, in different forms. However, the political 
transition from apartheid to democracy created a unique set of conditions establishing 
systematic corruption. The ANC was formed in 1912 to fight for the rights and freedom of all 
Africans. Allegations of corruption and abuse of power have affected the legitimacy of the 
ANC, and a narrative of a political party in crisis has emerged (Johnson 2015). For Johnson 
(2015:50) the current state of affairs was inevitable because of “the nature of African 
nationalism”. Johnson argues that when African nationalism triumphs there is always a “period 
of rapid appropriation by the new elite which took the seats of political power and set about a 
headlong process of primary accumulation” (Johnson 2015:50).  
 
The democratic dispensation has created new challenges for the ANC. The resource-intensive 
election process has created an environment in which corruption can flourish; the ANC has 
been accused of raising funds through “politically motivated contracting” and accepting funds 




reveal that the ANC accepted funds from figures such as the former President of Indonesia, 
Suharto and the former president of Nigeria, Sani Abacha; the former allegedly donated 
$60million and the latter $10 million. These two figures were dictators who ran corrupt regimes 
responsible for gross human rights violations (Ibid). Furthermore, funding political campaigns 
has blurred lines between politics and the business sector. An example of this is the 
establishment of the Progressive Business Forum (PBF) in 2006, where membership fees was 
paid to the ANC. This Forum is essentially a place where the business community can have 
access to senior government ministers. According to (Nicolson 2018) tickets to attend a dinner 
held by the PBF in November 2018, range between R500 000 to R1 million. Chancellor House 
is a conglomerate of South African companies that have investments in different areas, 
including mining and energy, that was allegedly set up as a “funding vehicle” for the ANC 
(Boraine 2012:101). The existence of Chancellor House not only exemplifies the blurring 
between politics and business in South Africa but has other more pressuring implications. Plaut 
and Holden (2012:211) raise an important question concerning the notion of democracy 
because “any companies that are willing to share their stakes with the ANC are arguably 
provided with an unfair advantage in the competition for state contracts”. 
 
Rose-Ackerman (1999:211) noted that individuals who 
 
give funds to elected officials might expect returns whether it be from preference when 
seeking contracts and state tenders, or in terms of favourable policy outcomes. When 
the interests of such wealthy groups conflict with those of the general public, this 
undermines democratic values and outcomes. 
 
The complex and fluid relationship between the ANC and the business sector is also 
perpetuated by the somewhat controversial policy referred to as the “comrades in arms” model 
(Plaut & Holden 2012:199). This model involves the ANC deploying some of its members into 
the business world with needed support to secure state contracts (Ibid). These businessmen are 
then obligated to offer financial assistance to the ANC through “generous donations” (Ibid). 
Similarly, as Davis (2010) points out, the ANC has a policy of deploying comrades into 
influential public office positions; party loyalty is the requirement for these appointment. Davis 
(2010) states that that deployment of loyal party members to strategic areas is “unique to 
political parties (like the ANC) steeped in the Leninist tradition of democratic centralism. This 




even if it means acting outside the Constitution and the Law”.12 The policy document entitled 
the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) by the ANC (2007) gives insight into the ideology 
of the ANC. The NDR shows that the ANC seeks to be the centre of power in the state with 
party officials leading in state institutions, civil society, educational institutions, business and 
media. This ideology is highly susceptible to perpetuating corruption in both the private and 
public sectors. 
 
Similarly, a widely held practice of appointing prominent ANC individuals as board members 
in the corporate sector further illustrates the blurring between the private and public sectors. 
For example, a prominent name in the arms scandal, the now deceased Joe Modise, had been 
the first Minister of Defence, in the Mandela government. Mr Modise was a key figure in the 
ANC who had been a founding member of the Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the 
ANC. Feinstein (2007) points out that after his retirement from government, he went on to sit 
on several boards of companies in the arms industry. 
 
4.3.1 Defining corruption cases post-apartheid South Africa 
 
Numerous corruption incidents have implicated the ANC, three cases stand out because of the 
huge sums involved and the political ramifications to the legitimacy of the ANC-led 
government; the infamous arms deal, the Nkandla scandal and the state capture scandal. The 
arms deal was a defining scandal that brought a face to corruption in the new democratic South 
Africa. The scandal implicated senior ANC officials who misappropriate billions of Rands in 
the acquisition of military equipment for the South African Department of Defence. As noted 
by Feinstein (2007) there have been allegations that the arms deal financed the ANC campaign 
for the 1999 elections. 
 
 Nkandla scandal 
 
The Nkandla scandal was an important corruption case during the Zuma presidency concerning 
the upgrading of his private homestead in the rural town of Nkandla. The controversial Zuma 
administration was marked by factional politics centred around loyalty to a personality. The 
fact that former president Zuma was able to be elected as president in 2009 amidst allegations 
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of 783 corruption charges, although, the case was dropped by the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA), provides important insights into public perceptions on corruption in South 
Africa. Bruce (2014:50) argues that the popularity of Zuma, despite allegations of his 
involvement in systemic corruption suggests that “many South Africans are willing to excuse 
or overlook acts of corruption”. This has adverse effects on the fight against corruption and 
reveals that despite policy rhetoric about the importance of addressing corruption, there also 
exists “[t]olerance for corruption” (Bruce 2014:50). Notwithstanding, this “[t]olerance for 
corruption” highlighted by Bruce (2014:50), the controversial Nkandla upgrade of former 
President Zuma’s homestead cost the taxpayer R200 million, causing a massive public outcry.13 
I would argue that this expensive upgrade exemplifies leadership that is out of touch with the 
concerns of the public. This is especially the case when one examines the socio-economic status 
of the Nkandla community. Nkandla is a poor rural town in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, it 
is estimated that 99.5% of the population make a living “from a combination of government 
grants, migrant remittances, informal services, and simply eking out a living off the barren soil. 
The place gives a literal meaning to the phrase ‘dirt-poor’” (Mangcu 2014: 292). 
 
 State capture scandal 
 
The state capture scandal was a defining corruption case in the Zuma administration. The 2016 
Public Protector’s report on state capture in South Africa detailed a complex network of 
politically connected businessman who have captured key state institutions through corrupting 
politicians and public officials for private interests. The face of this state capture has been 
encapsulated in the business relationship between the Gupta family and the family of former 
president Zuma. According to the Public Protector (2016) the Gupta family held extensive 
powers, which included the appointments and removals of state ministers and directors of state 
institutions. 
 
Against this backdrop, the post-apartheid ANC-led government was tasked with creating an 
equitable economy redressing the effects of the policies under colonial and apartheid rule. The 
black economic empowerment (BEE) policies have been identified as an important vehicle to 
                                                                
13 De Vois, P. 2013. Nkandla: Everything that’s wrong with the Zuma government. Daily Maverick, 30 January 
2013. Available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2013-01-30-nkandla-everything-thats-wrong-




achieve economic transformation and create an equitable economy in the new democratic South 
Africa. Chapter six discuss how the implementation of BEE policies is undermined by corrupt 
practices between big business and politically-connected businessmen (the businessmen are 
former politicians who are spouses of senior state officials). The dissertation argues that 
corruption blurs the interests of the construction industry and politically connected 
businessmen, providing further understanding into hybrid processes. 
 4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the case study used to answer the research question for the 
dissertation. The political economy of South Africa was discussed to provide the rationale 
behind the ANC-led government’s policies that sought to achieve a more equitable economy.  
As the following chapters show, the implementation of these government policies reveal the 
nature of authority relations between the state and the construction industry within a hybrid 
governance setting. The chapter discussed corruption in contemporary South Africa and argued 
that corruption has been enduring both during the apartheid and post-apartheid era. It is 
understanding how corruption shapes authority relations between actors in the state and 













Mega-events tend to be state-centric because it is the state, which, through using public funds 
and resources, is positioned to undertake the huge investments associated with the event. The 
South African government had been campaigning to host the FIFA World Cup since the 
Mandela presidency. This chapter notes that for the South African government, successfully 
hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup was an important exercise in soft power. However, it should 
be pointed out that, although in the context of mega-events soft power is attributed to the state, 
soft power could be exercised by both state and non-state actors. This chapter focuses on the 
state as a point of departure in order to explore the strategies used by the South African 
government to gain support and legitimatise hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup.  The chapter 
builds on Albrecht’s (2018a) argument that analysing the subject’s strategies in the enactment 
and articulation of authority gives insights into the hybridisation process. For the purposes of 
this dissertation the exercise of authority is conceptualised as relational. The enactment of 
authority by the state refers to how the South African government achieved its primary 
objective of hosting a successful 2010 FIFA World Cup.  The chapter seeks to address the sub-
question of how the strategies used by the state to enact authority in the construction of the 
2010 FIFA World Cup stadiums shaped the process of hybridisation. The chapter argues that 
there are inconsistencies between state strategies in seeking to gain support for the FIFA World 
Cup, policies, and actual implementation of state policies. These inconsistencies bring further 
understanding into the process of hybridisation by showing how access and distribution of 
resources is determined in hybrid governance structures. Therefore, the chapter explores the 
practices and implementation of state strategies and policies ahead of the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup.  
5.2 The African World Cup 
 
We want, on behalf of our continent, to stage an event that will send ripples of 
confidence from the Cape to Cairo – an event that will create social and economic 
opportunities throughout Africa. We want to ensure that one day, historians will 




turned the tide on centuries of poverty and conflict. We want to show that Africa’s 
time has come.14  
 
This quotation by the former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, reveals that the South 
African government took the position to promote the 2010 FIFA World Cup as an African 
World Cup. The statement “[w]e want to show that Africa’s time has come” in the above 
quotation has moral undertones that arguably increased the stature of the 2010 World Cup from 
being just a South African event to an event for the entire African continent. In other words, 
the first FIFA World Cup in Africa was intended to show that Africans are capable of hosting 
a successful mega-event. As then Minister of Sport and Recreation, Mr Fikile Mbalula, stated: 
“There can be no argument that the successful presentation of this event was an ‘image coup’ 
for the entire continent and that one of the intangible legacies will be how global perceptions 
about South Africa and Africa have shifted” (Department of Sport and Recreation 2010:5). 
Although this message was attractive, the reality is that it fails to capture the nuances of the 
continent. An argument can be made that few African countries can rival the infrastructure that 
South Africa has to be able to host a mega-event; therefore, the idea that any African state can 
do the same is disingenuous. Furthermore, a series of xenophobic attacks on black immigrants 
from African countries before and after the event undermined the African World Cup narrative. 
Van der Westhuizen and Swart (2011:173) noted that xenophobic attacks in a township in the 
Johannesburg area, Alexandra, in May 2008 resulted in 60 deaths and the displacement of 
thousands of immigrants. Notwithstanding the challenges surrounding xenophobia in South 
Africa, the 2010 FIFA World Cup  was a successful exercise of soft power by South Africa not 
only on the international stage but also in Africa. As one of the experts I interviewed stated: 
 
[W]ith South Africa having this intention of being a pivotal state in the region and 
also a leader on the continent, the World Cup meant a lot. Because remember the only 
pivotal state is Nigeria in the West and South Africa and they are competing for 
dominance. So, once you host the World Cup then you have flexed the muscle to show 
that I am a big brother.15  
 
The African Union fully supported the 2010 FIFA World Cup and rallied countries across the 
continent to ensure a successful event and use it as a platform to promote peace and 
development (United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace 2010). The Southern 
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African Development Community (SADC), a regional economy community, sought to use the 
2010 FIFA World Cup to raise awareness of investment opportunities in the region.16 
  
5.2.1 The South African World Cup 
 
Korr and Close (2008) point out that for the black majority in South Africa, football is not just 
a game but a highly symbolic sport; a sport symbolic of the resistance movement during the 
apartheid era (see Alegi 2004). On Robben Island, the political prisoners used football “as a 
tool, to develop the skills essential to their role in post-apartheid South Africa” (Briedenhann 
2011:7). Ndlovu (2010:144) asserts that South Africa’s suspension from FIFA in 1961 was a 
significant victory in sports diplomacy for the anti-apartheid movement. This historical context 
“partly explains the ANC’s contemporary enthusiasm for the sport as cultural diplomacy in the 
democratic era” (Ndlovu 2010:146). Therefore, an element of the 2010 World Cup “was about 
South Africa categorically reclaiming its spot in the world of international sport which had 
served as such an important ally in the struggle against apartheid” (Nyar 2014:22). In other 
words, for the political elites in South Africa, the 2010 FIFA World Cup was a means “to 
announce its presence on the global space after years of isolation” and “project its leadership 
credentials” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011:280). It is against this backdrop that the ruling ANC-led 
government viewed hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup as a means to exercise soft power 
through hosting the biggest event in football and in the process validating “a key element of 
black South African culture”.17 
 
The idea of validation encompasses the notion that the successful hosting of the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup challenges the dominant narrative about South Africa lacking the capability to host 
a mega-event. As the 2010 FIFA World Cup Country Report (Department of Sport and 
Recreation 2010:8) noted: “After years of doubts over South Africa’s readiness and its ability 
to ensure security, the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™ will ultimately be viewed as a 
triumph for the country and FIFA”. Hammett’s (2011:70) study on the dominant narratives in 
British media concerning South Africa hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup found that the 
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narratives changed over the course of the World Cup. Initially, before the start of the World 
Cup, the British media portrayed a negative view of South Africa. Hammett (2011:70) argues 
that this view “undoubtedly perpetuated perceptions/images of South Africa(ns) rooted in the 
colonial hangover: as inferior, savage, dangerous and pre-modern/under-developed”. 
However, Hammett (2011:70) points out that the British media changed tone during the course 
of the tournament. By the end of the tournament, South Africa was portrayed in a positive light 
and applauded for hosting a successful World Cup (Ibid). The government sold the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup as important to fostering national unity. The following section discusses this 
further.  
 
5.2.2 The 2010 FIFA World Cup as a tool for national unity 
 
National unity was a political narrative used to explain the importance of the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup. As Chapter two outlined, the fostering of national unity is associated with hosting mega-
events (see Black 2007; Gratton & Preuss 2008). The rhetoric of national unity is useful 
especially in a highly polarised state like South Africa, marked by high levels of inequalities 
and tensions among the different racial groups. As the deputy minister of sport and recreation 
Mr Oosthuizen noted: 
 
Never before had the country, with its entire people, rallied together and united in 
their support of the national football team Bafana Bafana as during this World Cup. 
Never before were campaigns such as Football Friday and Fly the Flag so successful 
in uniting the entire nation in support of our National Football team and country. 
(Department of Sport and Recreation 2010:7) 
 
There has been limited research into the nature and duration of the national unity. As Heere et 
al. (2013:452) pointed out, the extent to which “a heightened sense of national identity provides 
positive (and moreover, lasting) outcomes for a nation” is not clear. There is anecdotal evidence 
to suggest that mega-events raise awareness of national identity, albeit that the national identity 
is temporary. For example, an increase in the national identity of German citizens was evident 
during the period of the 2006 German FIFA World Cup (see Chalip 2006; O’Brien & Chalip 
2007). There is consensus that the 2010 FIFA World Cup created a sense of national unity, 
albeit temporal. As an expert I spoke to asserted: “during the World Cup there is no doubt that 
even white people were now singing black songs and all that, but it’s temporary”.18 Another 
                                                                




reason given by the government for hosting the FIFA World Cup discussed below is economic 
development. 
5.3 The World Cup as a tool for economic development 
 
FIFA was founded in 1904 and has since grown into an international football organisation.19 
FIFA has its headquarters in Switzerland, where it is registered as a non-profit organisation 
(Pieth 2011). With 211 member states, it has been described as having more members than the 
United Nations (UN) (Jerabek, Ferreira de Andrade & Figueroa 2017:417). In addition to its 
relationships with member states, FIFA enjoys diplomatic relations with international bodies 
such as the UN and the European Union (EU), which Giulianotti and Robertson (2012:228) 
argue locates “football's international governance within the elite networks of world society”. 
 
The FIFA World Cup is a highly profitable billion-dollar enterprise as evident from its financial 
report. According to the 2010 FIFA Financial Report (2011:16) the 2010 World Cup event 
earned $3 890 million in revenue, with most of this revenue accredited to the sale of television 
and marketing rights, which earned FIFA $2 408 million and $1 072 million respectively. 
Nunes (2014) noted that an estimated 88% of FIFA’s revenue from the FIFA World Cup event 
is derived from selling its intellectual property. Therefore, the protection of intellectual 
property is a huge priority for FIFA. At the heart of FIFA’s profitability is sponsorship. FIFA’s 
sponsors are referred to as partners. FIFA’s partners fall into three categories: FIFA partners, 
FIFA World Cup sponsors and national supporters. Nunes (2014) highlighted the different 
rights enjoyed by FIFA partners, including using their brand in association with FIFA during 
the FIFA World Cup, marketing their brand via FIFA events and publications and getting 
preference in buying exclusive advertising rights. 
 
To become a FIFA sponsor requires high levels of investment, which explains why a few 
transnational corporations who have the financial capacity to make huge investments dominate 
FIFA sponsorship. The official partners for FIFA are Adidas (a transnational sportswear 
corporation); Coca-Cola (a transnational beverage corporation); Emirates (a large airline based 
in Dubai, United Arab Emirates); Hyundai (a multinational automotive manufacturing 
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company based in South Korea); Sony (a Japanese multinational electronic conglomerate) and 
Visa (a global payment technology company).20 In return for the sponsorship, FIFA ensures 
that the sponsors enjoy exclusivity protected via the Standard Cooperation Agreement. The 
Standard Cooperation Agreement (2017) is an agreement between FIFA and the Ministry of 
Sport, or the government body responsible for sport, and the football association of the host 
state. According to Article 1 of the Standard Cooperation Agreement, the objective of the 
agreement is to “determine, clarify and harmonise each party’s brief in seeking to ensure better 
cooperation and the partnership necessary for good governance and the optimum development 
of football within the bounds of the Statutes, regulations and principles of” FIFA (FIFA 
Standard Cooperation Agreement 2017: Art 1). According to the FIFA World Cup Country 
Report (Department of Sport and Recreation 2010) for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, FIFA had 
17 requirements that South Africa was mandated to comply with through national guarantees. 
In other words, the South African government had to provide FIFA with a set of guarantees as 
a pre-requisite for hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup. In order to give effect to these guarantees, 
the government had to enact special legislation as well as amend existing legislation that 
impeded fulfilling the FIFA requirements. National law such as the Merchandise Marks Act 17 
of 1941 and the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 20 of 2006 respectively were amended to 
enable FIFA to protect its sponsorship agreements and revenue-generating avenues. 
 
In the South African football industry, it was the football oligarchs that reaped huge financial 
benefits through the commercialisation of football, particularly during the period leading up to 
the 2010 FIFA World Cup. For example, the South Africa’s Premier Soccer League (PSL) sold 
broadcasting rights to MultiChoice Supersport for the cost of R1.6 billion in 2007 (Cornelissen 
2010:134). Another lucrative deal, also signed in 2007, was a R500 million sponsorship by a 
South African banking group and South African Breweries to the South Africa Football 
Association (SAFA) and the PSL (Ibid). This deal was met with a public outcry, especially 
when details surfaced that SAFA and the PSL executives were paid a R50 million commission 
(Mail & Guardian 2007). The then Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, stated that the R50 
million commission paid to the executive was “morally reprehensible and corrupt” as 
“individuals are elected onto the league’s various committees to serve the interests of the sport, 
not in the expectation of acquiring personal fortunes to the detriment of the organisation they 
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are representing.”21 It is against this background of economic dominance of FIFA’s partners 
and South African football oligarchs that the government sought to legitimate the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup as a means to achieve economic development. The chapter examines how the use 
of state resources within the context of a mega-event impacts the relationships and shapes the 
hybridisation process. 
 
Although national governments justify hosting mega-events based on economic development, 
it is difficult to measure and evaluate the economic impacts of such events. Preuss (2011:368) 
points out that a closer analysis of the different, and at times contradictory, figures presented 
to show the economic impact of the 2010 World Cup revealed that the authors used different 
methodologies. Despite the rhetoric around the positive economic impact of the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup, the National Treasury had been warned by consultants of the negative consequence 
of the inevitable huge spending resulting from hosting mega-events. The consultant economists 
are quoted as having stated “the best we can hope for is that 2010 does not hurt the economy” 
(Tomlinson 2009:96). However, a senior official at the National Treasury told me: 
 
It was an expensive undertaking but for a country like South Africa if you look at the 
size of this economy, I wouldn’t consider that expensive if you look in terms of 
affordability. The rationale could be most importantly economic competitiveness; it 
was one way to market the country. (Interview participant, Pretoria, 30 May 2017) 
 
The different perspectives on whether South African can afford to host a mega-event suggest 
that at one level the heart of the debate is the issue of prioritisation. Although, in technical 
terms, South Africa had resources to channel into a mega-event, the normative question that is 
not the focus of this research asks: Should the resources used for the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
have been channelled towards other areas such as social service delivery?  
 
The question about prioritisation about the 2010 FIFA World Cup emerged from the findings 
of empirical research conducted by Bassa and Jaggernath (2010), regarding the perceptions of 
residents located in a Durban suburb. Bassa and Jaggernath’s (2010:133) research revealed that 
70% agreed that the 2010 FIFA World Cup would have a positive legacy. However, the 
respondents also expressed concern that the high levels of government spending on the World 
Cup would negatively affect service delivery (Ibid). The policy document issued by the 
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Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) (RSA, GCIS 2008:7) stated:  
“The hosting of 2010 will be a catalyst for faster economic growth and the achievement of 
development goals”. However, this statement is inaccurate and fails to identify the realities of 
what the World Cup can and cannot achieve. As Pillay and Bass (2008:343) have highlighted, 
the 2010 World Cup could not solve “South Africa’s urban ‘ills’”. The World Cup “would 
create jobs, but not solve unemployment problems; … it would improve the public transport 
system, but not solve the public transport problem; … it would help accelerate service delivery 
in some of the urban townships, but only marginally” (Pillay Bass 2008:343). Indeed, the 
employment benefits of hosting a FIFA World Cup proved exaggerated. On one hand, the event 
generated significant employment, especially in construction-related work for building and 
upgrading the football stadiums and other infrastructural development programmes. However, 
because of the nature of the work, the employment was temporary and did not address the 
structural challenges that affect unemployment in the country. On the other hand, the 2010 
FIFA World Cup had an adverse effect on the informal economy. According to Steinbrink et 
al. (2011:23) in 2009, it is estimated that over 200 informal traders were removed from the 
surrounding areas near the Ellis Park Stadium for the government to comply with the FIFA 
requirements. Even informal stalls providing food for construction workers building the 
stadiums were not allowed (Ibid). Only FIFA-licensed traders were permitted to operate in the 
areas surrounding the football stadiums. 
 
Related to economic development, an important state narrative about a benefit of hosting the 
2010 FIFA World Cup was that it was an invaluable opportunity to promote the national brand 
and display the best of South Africa, boosting the tourism industry.22 Van der Zee and Go 
(2013:178–180) conducted empirical research (using a small sample of Dutch visitors who had 
visited South Africa for the 2010 FIFA World Cup) that revealed that the visitors’ perception 
of South Africa had been influenced positively and 90% would recommend South Africa as a 
holiday destination to friends and family. Drawing from Van der Zee and Go’s (2013) study, 
one could infer that the 2010 FIFA World Cup was able to fulfil the objective of changing the 
image of the country to boost tourism. However, a closer analysis of the impact of the 2010 
FIFA World Cup as a way to promote the tourism industry reveals that it is a complex 
relationship. As a former government official stated on the impact of the World Cup on tourism: 
                                                                
22 This is a common justification used by states for hosting the FIFA World Cup. Research in Qatar revealed that 
Qatar authorities’ bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup was motivated by the aim to promote the Qatar brand 




“first and foremost let me be honest with you; our expectations in terms of numbers were not 
really met”.23  There is a consensus that the forecasted number of visitors did not materialise 
and several reasons to explain the discrepancy have been put forward. The main factor was that 
South Africa is a long-haul destination for most European football fans (see Du Plessis & 
Maennig 2011:355; Bob & Potgieter 2013). Bob and Potgieter (2013:7) pointed out that the 
2010 FIFA World Cup was held in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, and the global 
recession made an impact on the number of visitors who could afford to travel to South Africa. 
Steyn, et al. (2009) asserted that the perception of South Africa as unsafe with high levels of 
crime also contributed to the low numbers of visitors. Furthermore, Du Plessis and Maenning 
(2011) argued that the optimistic figures by the government of high tourist numbers coming to 
South Africa because of the World Cup did not assist the tourism sector. In fact, these figures 
did a disservice to the tourism industry because they resulted in the industry becoming overly 
confident “as reflected in its pricing behaviour” (Du Plessis & Maenning 2011:360). The high 
prices contributed to the low levels of visitors as it became expensive to visit South Africa; for 
example, the average price for flights during the World Cup period was three times higher than 
usual (Ibid:360–362).  Despite the challenges outlined above, states tend to promote mega-
events such as the FIFA World Cup on the basis of achieving economic development. One of 
the reasons for states commitment to mega-events is that it is an important way of exercising 
soft power. To host a successful 2010 FIFA World Cup the South African government 
exercised authority in determining the distribution of resources, shedding light on power 
dynamics in hybrid governance structures.   
 
The last two sections have outlined strategies used by the South African government to gain 
support and legitimate hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Below I discuss several examples 
showing how practices to implement the primary state objectives of hosting a successful FIFA 
World Cup determined use and distribution of resources, in a way contradictory to other state 




                                                                




5.4. The politicking surrounding the construction of the Green Point stadium 
 
The building of the Green Point stadium in Cape Town was marked by controversy and 
highlighted the tensions between FIFA, the South African government, the City of Cape Town 
and the residents of Green Point. Green Point is an affluent area in the City of Cape Town and 
its residents opposed building a football stadium in Green Point because of concerns about the 
environment. According to the 2007 Strategic Planning Report of the Provincial Government 
of the Western Cape and the City of Cape Town (CTSP), the City of Cape Town had initially 
proposed the Newlands Rugby Stadium as the venue to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
matches. However, according to the CTSP (2007:7) report, in a joint Provincial Cabinet and 
City of Cape Town Management Committee meeting held on the 5th of September 2005, a 
decision was made that hosting the football “games at Athlone would bring more 
developmental benefits to the city”. Alegi (2007:319) states that the City supported the change 
of venue to Athlone based on the need to address the “apartheid legacy in sports: the woefully 
inadequate provision of sporting facilities in black communities and football’s resulting 
dependency on rugby grounds for marquee matches”. Athlone is a historically disadvantaged 
area, while Newlands is an upmarket suburb; therefore, investing in the upgrading of Athlone 
Stadium would be an effective way of contributing to the development of the area. However, 
FIFA delegates rejected the Athlone proposal. On a site visit to the Athlone Stadium in 2005, 
one delegate is alleged to have stated that “[a] billion television viewers don’t want to see 
shacks and poverty on this scale”.24  Furthermore, the FIFA delegation noted that Cape Town 
was underselling itself by proposing Green Point as a training venue instead of a semi-final site 
“as it was the prime location to profile South Africa and the African continent through the 
world’s biggest football event” (CTSP 2007:7). In contrast to the Athlone backdrop, the Green 
Point Stadium would be “nestled between the majestic backdrop of Table Mountain to the south 
and Robben Island in Table Bay to the north [which] would provide a magnificent televisual 
image of the city to billions of viewers” (Alegi 2008:402). It was after the site visit that the 
national government changed its view about the suitability of the Athlone Stadium. The local 
organising committee (LOC) responsible for the 2010 FIFA World Cup bid endorsed and 
supported the Green Point Stadium.  
 
                                                                
24 Mail & Guardian, 2007a. Green Point gamble. Available at https://mg.co.za/article/2007-01-12-green-point-





The LOC told the City that 
 
should they want the honour and benefit from the considerable advantages of hosting 
a semi-final, which would attract well over a billion TV spectators as well as 
thousands of international fans and their families, not to mention all the lead-up 
events, product launches, possible FIFA congress and high profile other events, they 
should consider expanding the Green Point Stadium. (CTSP 2007:8) 
 
5.4.1 Mega-events projects fail to benefit all segments of society  
 
Not only did the 2010 FIFA World Cup fail to benefit ordinary citizens, but some of its legacy 
projects entrench existing societal inequalities. In the hospitality field, opportunities for small–
medium businesses to benefit from the FIFA World Cup were limited because of some 
questionable FIFA-endorsed practices. As Darkey and Horn (2009:89) notes the Bed & 
Breakfast (B&B) establishments were not able to get as much business as was initially 
anticipated because of the high standards demanded by FIFA.  The activities of the official 
FIFA World Cup accommodation provider, Match Events, worked to the disadvantage of local 
businesses. Match Events Services (Pty) Ltd is a subsidiary of Match Hospitality, which is 
FIFA approved to provide hospitality packages during the FIFA World Cup. Although the 
ownership structure of Match Hospitality is undisclosed, research by Rose (2010:100) revealed 
that one of the confirmed shareholders is Infront Sports & Media, an international sports 
marketing company. The CEO of Infront Sports & Media is Philippe Blatter, the nephew of 
the embattled former FIFA president, Sepp Blatter, who resigned from FIFA in 2015 amidst 
allegations of bribery, corruption and money laundering. Match Events Services (Pty) Ltd 
makes a profit by block booking rooms and putting a 30% mark-up on the amount it pays the 
guest houses and hotel chains. This mark-up is described “as a ‘sales margin’” (Rose 
2010:104). The next section argues that the FIFA-related projects into which the South African 
government invested resources to host a successful football World Cup arguably has benefited 
the advantaged members of society. Although, this is not the main focus of the chapter, it is 
worth mentioning because it shows that although state policies are meant to benefit all citizens, 
because of societal power dynamics at play, the state policies might reinforce the unequal 
power structures in a society. This suggests that allocation of resources in hybrid governance 
structures reveals the different power dynamics at play. This point is examined further in the 





Pillay and Bass (2008:331) state mega-events are: 
 
‘spectacles’ that can best be understood as either instruments of hegemonic power or 
displays of urban ‘boosterism’ by economic elites wed to a particularly narrow-
minded pro-growth vision of the city. As such, these events are often seen as no more 
than public relations ventures far removed from the realities of urban problems and 
challenges. 
 
As Allen et al. (2013:2002) notes, the huge costs of hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup stadiums 
had a negative impact on the budgets of some of the host cities; the municipality of Port 
Elizabeth experienced a budget shortfall, which had a severe impact on service delivery. By 
the end of the 2010 World Cup, Mbombela municipality was bankrupt and had to get “a R200 
million loan from the Development Bank of South Africa to ‘keep afloat after the tournament’” 
(McKinley 2011:305). As the embattled Matsafeni leader from Mbombela stated: 
 
We live in poverty right next to a stadium that cost R1-billion … We fought for this 
land to be ours, and then they built their fancy stadium and let us watch them have 
clean water inside it and enjoy the comfort just next to us, while we are sitting under 
trees with our mud houses falling apart … Until today nothing has changed. (Kenneth 
Mkhonto, quoted in McKinley 2011:305) 
 
Similarly, a R20 billion railway project, the Gautrain project that linked Pretoria and the OR 
Tambo International Airport in Johannesburg, using a route that passes through the affluent 
business district of Sandton is an example of a 2010 World Cup legacy project that does not 
benefit the majority of South Africans. The market for the Gautrain is mostly the middle-class 
professionals, as the poor and working classes are excluded and lack access to the Gautrain 
because it is not affordable to them. Furthermore, the Gautrain stations are connected to affluent 
suburbs outside the township routes where most of the lower-earning South Africans reside. 
Many township residents commute to work using the ageing Metrorail services, which are 
poorly serviced and inefficient. An estimated 2.2 million people use the Metrorail daily25 in 
contrast to the number of Gautrain users, amounting to approximately 55 000 passengers 
daily.26 It is against this backdrop that the eventual budget of R20 billion for the Gautrain 
project (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2005) has been described as a visual symbol that 
“perpetuate[s] South African inequality”.27 In other words, the considerable low levels of 
                                                                
25 Metrorail. Available at http://www.metrorail.co.za/HistoryMore3.html, accessed 04 November 2018. 
26 Gautrain. 2018. Available at https://www.businesslive.co.za/redzone/pages/2018-01-15-gautrain-
management-agency-gma/, accessed 05 November 2018. 
27 Ogude, H., & Le Roux, L. Gautrain and Metrorail perpetuate South African inequalities. 29 July 2013. 
Available at https://www.urbanafrica.net/urban-voices/gautrain-and-metrorail-perpetuate-south-african-




Gautrain passengers in comparison to its high construction costs have led to the Gautrain being 
described as “an elitist project” (Van Der Westhuizen 2007:349). The next section analyses 
how the state strategies and the actual practices by both the state and non-state actors to 
implement state policy shed light on the hybridisation process.  
 
5.5 Discussion: the exercise of soft power and contradictory state policies: resource 
distribution at the centre of hybridisation 
 
Albrecht (2017:569) argues that “heterogenisation may occur in hybridisation, a relentless 
process that runs to the very core of how authority is manifested in the pursuit of resources”. 
Baker (2013:300) points out that hybridity is manifested through relational ties based on 
“transactions (transfers of resources) or interactions (relationships between personnel) and are 
repeatedly negotiated and revised” (see Baker 2011). This chapter argues that the argument put 
forward by Albrecht (2017) and Baker (2013) that negotiated heterogenisation occurring in 
hybridisation that has implications for accessing resources is not evident in the research finding. 
This is because an examination of actual practices and implementation of state policies reveals 
that access to resources was determined by the primary state objective of hosting a successful 
FIFA World. This contributes to hybridity literature by revealing that in a specific hybrid 
setting with heterogeneous policy objectives, ultimately implementation of policy is 
determined by the actor with resources who distributes them in a way that furthers their primary 
interest/objective despite paying lip service to the different interests of other actors in the hybrid 
governance structure.  
 
The rationale of hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup was exercising soft power through 
displaying the ability of the South African state to host a prestigious mega-event in order to 
counteract prevailing negative stereotypes and narratives of Africa and South Africa. The 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz’ (1980) study of Bali in the nineteenth century revealed a theatre 
state where court life was characterised by rituals, elaborate ceremonies and symbolism. Rituals 
“were not means to political ends: they were the ends themselves, they were what the state was 
for” (Geertz 1980:15). According to Geertz (1980:136) “dramas of the theatre state, mimetic 
of themselves, were, in the end, neither illusions nor lies, neither sleight of hand nor make-
believe. They were what there was”. In other words, the drama of the theatre state is not an 






illusion but the exercise of power by the state. Drawing from Geertz’s conceptualisation of 
theatre state, I argue that no expense was spared towards the South African government’s 
diplomatic efforts to stage an elaborate 2010 FIFA World Cup that involved building five brand 
new stadiums costing billions of Rands. In other words, the successful implementation of the 
2010 World Cup held huge symbolic value that had implications on the legitimacy, political 
capital, and stature of the South African state on the international stage. Responding to the 
question of whether the 2010 FIFA World Cup was a success, an expert I interviewed noted: 
“At a technical level it was a very high success, very few incidences of inefficiency, crime and 
all that, that’s one. At a symbolic level, it was a huge success”.28 To gain legitimacy to host the 
FIFA World Cup, the South African government utilised the narrative of the African World 
Cup. Couched in African Renaissance rhetoric, the government’s message was that Africa’s 
time had come to reveal its capabilities. This powerful imaginary of the African Renaissance 
was challenged by the xenophobic attacks on African immigrants before and after the event.  
 
As captured by the concept of hybridity, a diversity of actors with homogeneous and 
heterogeneous interests are involved in the successful implementation of mega-events. As such 
it can be argued that relations between different actors and access to resources during 
hybridisation is characterised by heterogenisation, as alluded to by Albrecht (2017) and Baker 
(2013). However, this dissertation reveals that resources went to actors that enabled the South 
Africa government to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. An important actor for a country seeking 
to host the FIFA World Cup is FIFA. As discussed earlier in the chapter, prior to granting a 
member state the right to host a FIFA World Cup, FIFA requires extensive legal protection to 
secure the financial benefits of its sponsors and partners. I argue that the fact that the South 
African government was prepared to enact national laws to fulfil FIFA’s requirements to secure 
the financial interests of FIFA and its sponsors/partners was because it had no choice if it 
wanted to win the bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Therefore, despite the government 
stating that the 2010 FIFA World Cup would be an impetus for economic development, the 
result of signing the Standard Cooperation Agreement was that mostly FIFA’s commercial 
partners would financially benefit. A case in point discussed earlier in the chapter is the 
business activity of a FIFA partner, Match Events Services (Pty) Ltd. In fact, making the best 
impression on FIFA was the main priority for the government, overriding other policy 
objectives as evidenced by the politicking around building the Green Point stadium. Initially, 
                                                                




the City of Cape Town with the backing of the national government had sought to upgrade a 
stadium in an underdeveloped suburb of Cape Town. However, at FIFA’s recommendation, the 
City of Cape Town changed its strategies under the direction of national government and 
approved the building of the stadium in Green Point. Therefore, although, the initial policy 
objective was to facilitate economic development through the 2010 FIFA World Cup, this 
objective was superseded by FIFA. An explanation for this change of policy is that the 
government was not leaving anything up to chance in its bid to win the right to host the 2010 
FIFA World Cup. Meaning that, when faced with two competing policy objectives, there was 
no need for negotiations, the deciding factor was which policy would led to a successful bid to 
host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. In other words, channelling resources to affluent Green Point 
instead of underdeveloped Athlone was a national government decision based on the need to 
ensure a successful bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. 
 
Critical hybridity acknowledges the realities of inequalities to the understanding of power 
dynamics in hybrid structures. An important criticism of mega-events discussed in Chapter 
two, is that the events mostly serve the interests of local communities (see Hiller 2000; Coakley 
& Souza 2013). In fact, some of the infrastructural development programmes from the 2010 
FIFA World Cup exacerbated and reinforced the societal inequalities “within South Africa, as 
areas with developed infrastructure received further investment at the expense of areas that 
remain underdeveloped and marginalised” (Schausteck de Almeida et al. 2015:276). An 
example of such an infrastructural development programme was the expensive Gautrain project 
aimed at servicing affluent suburbs around Gauteng that is not accessible to most South 
Africans, who use the dilapidated national railway system. The fact that at the end of the 2010 
FIFA World Cup some municipalities in the country where bankrupt and struggling to give 
service delivery further strengthens my argument. For the South African government, 
exercising soft power through hosting the FIFA World Cup was an end in itself that determined 
allocation of resources, albeit an element of misuse of resources might have contributed to 
bankruptcy of the municipalities. Barnes (2011:106) articulated the point I have been making 
in this chapter that : 
 
“FIFA swirled like a vortex through South Africa, sucking all attention and cash unto 
itself. This was carefully planned and meticulously enforced ... if it didn’t make 
money or noise for FIFA, it wasn’t allowed ... Meanwhile, South African taxpayers 
spent billions of dollars on infrastructural improvements and the beautiful new 







This chapter argues that contradictions between state policies and strategies are revealed by 
examining the practices and implementation of state policies connected to infrastructural 
development plans for the 2010 FIFA World Cup and the business activities of FIFA business 
partners. The chapter shows that the South African government employed different strategies 
to fulfil its objective of hosting the FIFA World Cup ranging from selling the event as a tool 
for economic development and using rhetoric of the ‘African’ World Cup to gain public 
support. However, the symbolism of the 2010 FIFA World Cup being an African event, 
showcasing that Africans are capable of hosting a prestigious mega-event, was undermined by 
xenophobic attacks on African immigrants during periods surrounding the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup. Similarly, government narratives that the World Cup would serve as an impetus for 
economic development proved to be inaccurate because it was FIFA and its commercial 
partners who were the main beneficiaries of the World Cup. Nonetheless, the chapter reveals 
that the South African government’s funding of the 2010 FIFA World Cup was fully invested 
in the process of hosting a successful FIFA World Cup because it was an important exercise in 
soft power. Therefore, the contradictions between state policies and strategies and the actual 
implementation of state policies by both state actors and non-state actors reveals that access 
and distribution of resources was determined by the primary objective of firstly winning the 
bid to hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup and secondly, successfully hosting the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup.  
 
The analysis provided in this chapter provides important insights into the relationship between 
FIFA and the hosting states that is characterised in literature as biased towards the interests of 
FIFA and its corporate partners. Although the relationship between FIFA and host states has 
its shortcomings, the fact that host states are prepared to undergo an extensive bidding process 
to win the right to host the FIFA World Cup suggest that the states view the relationship as 
beneficial.  
 
The contribution to hybridity literature made by this chapter is to highlight that access to 
resources is not necessarily a result of negotiations, as heterogenisation occurs during the 




main actor responsible for determining how the resources are utilised supersede heterogeneous 
interests. The next chapter examines the relationship between heterogenisation and 





CHAPTER 6: STATE POLICIES SHAPING THE RELATIONSHIP 





Mega-events are complex and expensive undertakings that require a myriad of state and non-
state actors working together to plan and implement the event. This chapter focuses on another 
aspect of the FIFA World Cup: the construction industry, which plays a key role in building 
the physical infrastructure needed to host a FIFA World Cup. The point of departure for this 
dissertation is that the relationship between the state and the construction industry is articulated 
by the concept of hybridity, and the workings of hybridity are best captured as an evolving 
process of hybridisation. The chapter seeks to answer the research question: How did state 
policies shape relations between the state and the construction industry during the process of 
hybridisation? 
 
The chapter is divided into five sections. In order to contextualise how state policies shaped 
relations between the government and the construction industry, the first section provides the 
historical background of the relationship between the South African government and the 
construction industry. The chapter discusses one of the main government policies in a bid to 
transform the construction industry, the BEE policies. The second section provides an analysis 
of the implementation of BEE policies in the construction industry. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, the dissertation uses the concept of corruption to gain understanding into the process 
of hybridisation. Therefore, the third section explores practices of corruption in the 
implementation of BEE policies in the construction industry. The fourth section discusses two 
points: first, who was the primary driver of hybridity in the relationship between the state and 
the construction industry and secondly, how did the contradictions that characterised the 
relationship between the state and the construction industry in the fulfilment of state policies 







6.2 The background to the South African construction industry 
 
According to a research paper by the World Bank, the construction industry is a key sector in 
the global economy with an estimated net worth of around $1.7 trillion (Kenny 2007). The 
construction industry is estimated to make up an average of 5–7% of the Gross Domestic 
Product of most countries (Ibid 2007:1). Construction has a central role in the development of 
a country through building infrastructure and creation of employment. Foster and Briceño-
Garmendia (2010) point out that infrastructure development has been linked to economic 
growth and human development. The construction industry in South Africa is divided into two 
main sectors: civil engineering and the building sector. The building sector is responsible for 
building new structures and making renovations to existing structures, while civil engineering 
involves the design and construction of buildings and infrastructure projects such as dams and 
bridges. The South African construction industry receives most of its work from the public 
sector (Windapo & Cattell 2013:75). The government’s infrastructure development programme 
has been key to the growth and development of the sector (Cottle 2014b). A report by PwC 
(2016:7) stated that the period during 2014/2015, the South African construction industry 
received public contracts that were worth an estimated R157 billion. This is more than half the 
government budget for the public sector, which amounted to R258 billion (Ibid). The 
government, through its spending powers, has sought to implement policies that address the 
structural challenges in the construction industry. As highlighted in Chapter four, the economy 
under apartheid rule was supported by protectionist policies and extensive state regulation. The 
result of these policies was a highly concentrated economy with big, state-supported companies 
that dominated the various key industries. The next section explores the historical background 
to the policy changes within the construction industry. 
 
6.2.1 The construction industry before and post-1994: state investment in large-scale 
infrastructure projects as the game changer? 
 
The South African construction industry underwent a transformation during the period of 
political unrest from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s. The apartheid government constrained 
the growth and profitability of the construction industry because the sanctions levelled against 
it by the international community had a negative impact on the industry. In other words, the 
South African construction industry went through a period of economic decline from the mid-




unprofitable. In order to address the challenges in the construction industry, the industry 
leadership sought alternative and new avenues of finding work. One such avenue of securing 
work was a shift in policy by the industry in the late 1980s; the South African construction 
industry placed emphasis on the need to provide adequate housing in townships (Cottle 2014a). 
This was arguably a strategic policy position. Cottle (2014a)  argues that this shift within the 
construction industry was because the industry realised that apartheid rule was coming to an 
end and “[t]his was a new way of capturing and promoting capital accumulation in a country 
where infrastructure was highly racialised and inequitable” (Cottle 2014a:21; see Mathonsi & 
Thwala 2012). Therefore, the construction industry shifted “focus from a predominantly first-
world oriented construction environment to a developing-world construction environment that 
focuses on the basic needs of the population and its economic circumstance” (Mathonsi & 
Thwala 2012:3584). Indeed, this shift in policy enabled the construction industry to form a 
beneficial working relationship with the new ANC-led government when the country 
transitioned to democratic rule in 1994. The new government prioritised social infrastructure 
in order to benefit groups excluded under apartheid rule. 
 
The Green paper, titled Creating an enabling environment for reconstruction, growth and 
development in the construction industry, Notice 89 of 1998 (No. 18615) noted that the 
government has a role to play in addressing the structural challenges in the South African 
construction industry associated with the decline of demand in the previous decades 
(Department of Public Works 1998). Cottle (2014a) notes that the ANC-led government was 
important for the revival of the South African construction industry. He pointed out that a series 
of policies such as the RDP and the establishment of the Construction Industry Development 
Board (CIDB) facilitated the growth and profitability of the industry. The CIDB was 
established by the Construction Industry Development Board Act 38 of 2000. This Act 
mandated the CIDB “to implement an integrated strategy for the reconstruction, growth and 
development of the construction industry”. The preamble to the CIDB Act 38 of 2000 reiterates 
that the post-apartheid government seeks to create a construction industry “that promotes 
stability, fosters economic growth and international competitiveness, creates sustainable 
employment and addresses historic imbalances”. The CIDB is part of the Department of Public 
Works. The Minister of the Department of Public Works appoints the board members of the 
CIDB responsible for providing leadership to fulfil the mandate of the CIDB. The CIDB board 




The RDP (ANC 1994: para 2.3.8) was the identified government policy to implement a public 
works programme that “coordinate with and link to other job creation and labour-intensive 
construction initiatives” in the early years of democratic rule in South Africa. The RDP (ANC 
1994: para 2.3.9) sought to “give priority to job creation and training, target the most 
marginalised sectors of society, and where possible encourage and support self-employment  
through small and medium enterprise creation to ensure sustainability of skills”. Furthermore, 
under the RDP (ANC 1994: para 2.3.5), the public works programme was linked to “building 
the economy and meeting basic needs in redressing apartheid-created infrastructural 
disparities”. The ambitious RDP sought to use the public works programme as a platform to 
redress not only physical infrastructure but also the socio-economic structures entrenched 
during apartheid rule. Therefore, because of the RDP’s mandate to build a more equitable 
society through investing in needed infrastructure, the state essentially “became the 
construction sector’s biggest single client” (Cottle 2014b:139). The change in policy direction 
from RDP in 1994 to GEAR in 1996 outlined in Chapter four did not change government policy 
on infrastructure development. The government not only played a key role in both the growth 
and profitability of the construction industry but also put in place BEE policies to redress the 
historical imbalances in the South African construction industry dominated by a few large 
firms. The next section explores the BEE policies further.  
 
6.3 The implementation of BEE in the construction industry 
 
During the transition from apartheid to democratic rule, the ANC-led government and the 
business community were under pressure to redress economic inequalities that had marked the 
apartheid system. The post-apartheid government has attempted to leverage its spending 
powers to transform the construction industry through the implementation of BEE policy. 
Adherence to BEE policies is a key requirement for eligibility for public contracts. Before I 
discuss the effectiveness of BEE policy, it is important to outline the grading system of the 








6.3.1 The grading system in the South African construction industry and the  
implementation of BEE policies 
 
The South African construction industry is divided into nine grades, which categorise firms 
according to their financial capacity (see Table 6.1 below). 
 










Source: Construction Industry Development Board Annual Report 2015/2016 (2016:20) 
 




















The data in Table 6.2 above show a substantial discrepancy between black-owned companies 
that dominate the lower grades of one to three with ownership percentages averaging 
approximately 93.8%. The highest grade, grade nine, shows a low percentage level of black 
ownership at 23.88%. 
 







Source: Windapo & Cattell (2011:ii). 
 
The data in Table 6.3 reveals that 84% of public sector contracts are awarded to the general 
building sector’s contractors in Grades 7, 8 and 9; and civil engineering sector contractors in 
the same grade bracket get 88% of public sector contracts. This means that the most valuable 
contracts in the public sector are awarded to large contractors. This characteristic of the 
construction industry undermines government BEE policies towards advancing companies 
from Historically Disadvantaged Individual (HDI) groups. The 2001 Preferential Procurement 
Regulations (RSA 2001) defined an HDI as 
 
a South African citizen who, due to the apartheid policy that had been in place, had 
no franchise in national elections prior to the introduction of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1983 (Act 110 of 1983) or the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993); and/or who is a female; and/or who has a 
disability, provided that a person who obtained South African citizenship on or after 
the coming into effect of the interim Constitution, is deemed not to be an HDI. 
 
BEE policies are undermined by the nature of the public contracts that are often large-scale 
projects of high value “which cannot be sub-divided, and which often require a high level of 
business management and technical capability, as well as financial solvency, which skills are 
more frequently found amongst large-scale contractors” (Wandapo & Cattell 2011:ii). Large 
scale projects cannot be sub-divided to be given to smaller contractors in Grade 6 and lower. 




requirements needed to tender for public contracts.29 The findings from interviews with experts 
revealed that black-owned SMMEs lack the capacity to work on huge infrastructure 
development projects. Some of the capacity challenges include lack of relevant experience. The 
mechanical engineer I interviewed informed me: 
 
The only thing that I might want to put out across is that, yes you might find that you have certain tenders 
that look at jobs and they give a prequalification of certain number of years of experience of an institute, 
which still today when you look at the BEE policy you might find even the lifespan of the BEE policy 
does not even qualify within that policy framework of that whole thing.30  
 
The challenges surrounding access to finance was highlighted during the interviews as being 
particularly challenging for black-owned SMMEs in the construction industry. An owner of a 
small construction firm told me:  
 
construction is a money game and you find that the black contractors do not have the money so the white 
contractor will come to the black contractor who has no money and will call the shots. He will pull the 
strings cos he will come in with the capital, the know how, and will give the black contractor terms.31 
 
Table 6.3 (above) highlights that over 80% of the government’s infrastructure budget is on 
projects worth over R130 million and contractors in Grade 7 and larger are eligible to tender 
for these projects. These figures show that contractors in Grade 6 and lower access less than 
20% of the overall government infrastructure budget. This means that the large construction 
companies are the main beneficiaries of large-scale government infrastructure development 
projects. Similarly, as Table 6.4 below reveals, the large construction companies made massive 
profits from the increase in work resulting from South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup. Building and Wood Workers International (2010) calculated the profits made by the 









                                                                
29 Interview participant, CEO of development consultancy, Johannesburg, 31 May 2017. 
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Source: Building and Wood Workers International (2010:9) 
 
6.3.2 BEE policy, a compromise to the elite business class? 
 
The adoption of the BEE policies has been controversial, with challenges pertaining to 
nepotism, clientelism, and corruption. Corruption in the implementation of BEE policies is 
evident in both the private and public sectors. Corruption in the public sector derives from the 
misuse of the requirement to consider BEE policies in making decisions to allocate government 
contracts. According to Heywood (2013) corruption in the public procurement system 
tendering processes has been estimated to cost the government between R25 billion and R30 
billion annually. Furthermore, Ofori (2012b) notes that public procurement corruption can lead 
to skewed public investment policies, as spending is determined by personal interests as 
opposed to the public interest. Corruption in public sector contracts is particularly egregious 
because the public pays the bills and the state is deprived of finances that could potentially be 
channelled into public services. As Corruption Watch (2013) highlighted, in South Africa the 
most disadvantaged members of society rely on public services and cannot afford to seek 
alternative private services, thus, this group is disproportionally impacted by public sector 
corruption. 
 
Corruption in the BEE policy implementation in the private sector has been characterised by 
political elites acquiring a stake in ownership in previously white-dominated industries. It has 
been argued that the BEE policies are a result of negotiations between ANC political elites and 
the business community to have “a non-racial state structured on liberal democratic principles 
that would reinforce their elite status” (Beall et al. 2005:684). Moletsi Mbeki (2009) is among 




the ANC elites and white dominated capital. For Boraine (2014) the agreement is comparable 
to the 1950s deal between the National Party and Anglo America, when the National Party had 
threatened to nationalise the mines and Anglo America responded by giving the General 
Mining Corporation to Gencore, the Afrikaner mining company. The economist Stephen Gelb 
(2005:369) who was instrumental in developing ANC’s economic policies in the mid-1990s  
described the relationship between ANC and the business as being underpinned by an “implicit 
bargain” which consisted of the “ANC committing to macroeconomic stability and 
international openness, and business agreeing to participate in ‘capital reform’ to modify the 
racial structure of asset ownership, which would come to be called ‘black economic 
empowerment’”. This relationship is built around mutual interests that require both parties to 
make concessions in a fluid manner. In the South African context, it is evident that political 
and business actors share mutual interests that make it possible for the state to successfully co-
opt the business sector to support a seemingly populist policy. Building on this section that has 
highlighted the important role of the top construction firms in implementing government 
infrastructure development projects, the next section examines the practices of the top 
construction firms in implementing state policies. 
 
6.4 Corruption in the South African Construction Industry 
 
Transparency International (2005) has noted that the construction industry is particularly 
vulnerable to corruption. The South African construction industry is extremely competitive; 
the intense competition combined by the cyclical nature of the industry facilitates an 
environment of high levels of corruption. Oyewobi et al. (2014) and Joubert et al. (2005) put 
forward several factors that explain the competitive nature of the industry. First, the entry of 
foreign-owned construction companies increased competition in the industry. Second, the 
implementation of BEE policies resulted in the proliferation of construction companies created 
by groups that were previously excluded from participating in the industry. Third, the use of 
third parties much as agents and subcontractors is a key factor for the prevalence of corruption 
in the industry. Research conducted by Ernst & Young (2012:3) found that the common use of 
joint ventures in some jurisdictions with local partners needed to fulfil legal requirements 
facilitated corruption. The process of acquiring necessary documentation to start construction 
work can be lengthy and vulnerable to abuse (Ibid). Lastly, the large-scale nature of the 
contracts can make the decision makers vulnerable to corruption (Ibid). As Goldstock 




political and legal ‘inputs’ to get their projects approved, started and completed, it is hardly 
surprising to find that developers and contractors are large contributors to political campaigns”. 
 
A study by Bowen et al. (2007) into ethical behaviour in the South African construction 
industry show that actors at different levels in the industry engage in questionable practices. 
First, the construction industry professionals believed that clients made unreasonable demands 
in relation to saving on projects and project fees, which led to poor practices and unprofessional 
behaviour (Ibid 2007:639). Second, contractors commonly engaged in inflating prices of 
material as well as using cheap material that compromised the quality of the finished work to 
cut costs. Third, the relationship between contractors and subcontractors was revealed to be 
unequal with contractors taking advantage of subcontractors by either failing to pay 
subcontractors or giving subcontractors late incomplete payments (Ibid). Corruption has far-
reaching effects that have an impact on wider societal levels: for example, cutting corners to 
save on costs can result in sub-standard work that may result in the eventual collapse of the 
building, resulting in loss of lives (see Chandrashekhar 2009:113; Bowen et al. 2012:886). 
Furthermore, as noted by Bowen et al. (2012:886) corruption in public sector contracts results 
in inflated costs that are passed on to citizens and the government will have less money 
available to spend on service delivery in the public sector. The result is that public sector 
corruption can lead to skewed public investment policies as spending is determined by personal 
interests as opposed to the public interest. The next section discusses the role of corruption in 
the implementation of the BEE policies in the construction industry. As already outlined in 
previous chapters, corruption has an important role in shaping relations within hybrid 
governance structures, therefore, examining how it is used to implement BEE policies enables 
me to answer the research question of the dissertation.  
 
6.4.1 Corruption and implementing BEE policies in the construction industry 
 
There are different types of corrupt practices in implementing BEE policies and a prevalent 
practice is fronting. Fronting occurs when a company fraudulently misrepresents itself as being 
under the management or ownership of individuals defined by law as HDI and eligible to fulfil 
BEE criteria. Bowen et al. (2012:898) asserted that fronting is the use of sham companies and 
fraudulently classifying personnel as compliant with BEE. For the purposes of this chapter, I 
focus on corruption that occurred ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup shaping relationships 




development contracts stemming from hosting a mega-event such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
presented increased opportunities for public and private sector actors to engage in tender 
corruption. Statements from the interview participants reveal the pervasive nature of corruption 
in the construction industry. A national union coordinator told me “within the construction 
industry corruption is forever sisiwami. It’s forever, it’s a nonstop, especially when you go to 
the tendering”.32  Similarly, a development consultant stated that 
 
there is no tender or construct that goes out of the public sector that an official in any 
of the government departments doesn’t have an interest in. The bigger the more so. 
All the contracts that come out of the public sector are basically rigged one way or 
another. There is no innocent tender that goes out. So that’s my view and that’s my 
experience from what I have seen even us as participating.33  
 
Awarding of contracts to build the 2010 FIFA World Cup stadiums was characterised by 
corruption and conflicts of interest with politically connected BEE companies getting lucrative 
deals as partners of the top construction firms. For example, the tender to build the Nelson 
Mandela Bay Stadium was highly controversial and highlighted a key challenge facing the 
implementation of BEE policies. Investigations by Botha and Ntsaluba (2010:54) revealed that 
the tender contract went to a joint venture partnership between Grinaker-LTA and Interbeton, 
with Ibhayi Construction being a key subcontractor to this venture with an alleged 30% 
ownership stake in the project. Three wealthy politically connected businessmen are part of the 
ownership structure at Ibhayi Construction; one of the owners is Enoch Godongwana, who has 
held two cabinet posts, first, as former Deputy Minister of Economic Development; and second, 
as former Deputy Minister of Public Enterprises (Ibid). 
 
Similarly, the tender for the Moses Mabhida Stadium was given to a joint venture between 
Group 5, WHBO and Pandev. The Group 5 BEE partners included two companies. 
Investigations by Sole (2010:191) revealed that the first company has as a shareholder 
politician-turned-businessman Tokyo Sexwale, the former Premier of Gauteng and former 
Minister of Human Settlement. The second company is part-owned by Bulelani Ngcuka, who 
is the husband of former Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. A senior official in the 
Young Communist League (YCL) of South Africa complained to me that the extent to which 
the state can hold the key construction industry players accountable is questionable because of 
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the involvement of politically connected individuals,34  blurring the distinction between the 
state and the private sector.  
 
An example of the blurred distinction between public and private sectors is shown by the 
business dealings of the construction firm, Murray & Roberts. In 2016, Murray & Roberts 
entered into an agreement with Firefly Investments, part of the Southern Palace Group, to sell 
a section of its infrastructure and building divisions for R314 million (Murray & Roberts 
2016b). The Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) is a shareholder in Murray & 
Roberts, with a 15.24% stake (Murray & Roberts 2016a). The GEPF owns 25% of Firefly 
Investments through the Public Investment Corporation (Ibid). The GEPF is an important 
investor of public sector funds, being the biggest pension fund in Africa with assets worth 
approximately R1.6 trillion.35 As such, GEPF is an important shareholder in Murray & Roberts 
and has a role to play to hold the executives accountable for engaging in behaviour that 
undermines public interest. The complex relationship between key state institutions that invest 
public servants’ pensions and the construction industry reiterates the point that there is a 
blurring between private and public sectors, and it is difficult to determine where corruption 
begins and where it ends. Below is an example of a questionable BEE transaction concerning 
the management of the Soccer City stadium in Johannesburg. 
 
6.4.1 A questionable BEE transaction 
 
The contract between the City of Johannesburg and National Stadium SA (NSSA) to manage 
the Soccer City stadium is an important example of the abuse of the BEE policy. The 
investigative journalist Rob Rose (2010:23–25), found that NSSA, a company established in 
2009, had won the bid to manage the Soccer City stadium, with the contract stipulating that the 
City of Johannesburg would give NSSA all its earnings from the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The 
reasons given for the City of Johannesburg subcontracting the management of the stadium have 
some merits. As the then CEO of NSSA, Mr Grobbelaar stated the City lacks the expertise to 
run a profit-generating stadium and “[i]t could turn out to be a huge political embarrassment if 
a R3 billion stadium ends up not being used. So, part of the criteria for the tender was to create 
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a legacy for the stadium” (quoted in Rose 2010:29). However, the problem with the City of 
Johannesburg awarding the contract to NSSA is based on NSSA’s highly questionable BEE 
status. As Rob Rose’s (2010:39) investigations discovered, NSSA’s major shareholder, Global 
Event Management, gave 26% of its shares to Gladwin Khangale, who was an employee and 
former security guard at NSSA. This case highlights the flaws inherent in the South African 
BEE policies, because the fact that the City of Johannesburg can award a tender to a company 
whose BEE status is based on a questionable BEE share transfer deal undermines the “spirit 
and principles of BEE” (Rose 2010:42). The next section discusses a darker side of tender 
corruption within the construction industry that blurs the distinction between politics, public 
and the business sectors. 
 
6.4.2 Legacy of murder of Mbombela Stadium: the dark side of tender corruption 
 
The murders associated with the building of the Mbombela Stadium in the city of Nelspruit, 
the capital of Mpumalanga province, situated in the Eastern part of South Africa, highlights a 
dark side to tender corruption. In 2010, the Sunday Times journalists, investigating the political 
assassinations in Mpumalanga, found that between the period of 1998 and 2010 at least 12 local 
politicians and officials had been murdered without any arrests being made by the police 
(Molele & Wa Afrika 2010). There were allegations that there was a hit list of individuals who 
had threatened access to tender contracts for the 2010 World Cup (Mail & Guardian 2010). It 
was alleged that some investigative journalists who covered tender corruption were also on this 
hit list (Ibid). Furthermore, a killer for hire had “accused an influential ANC leader in 
Mpumalanga of offering him R100 000 and a cushy government job if he poisoned government 
officials who were blocking access to tenders linked to the 2010 FIFA World Cup”.36 
 
One of the key figures who was murdered was Jimmy Mohlala, a senior administrator at the 
Mbombela municipality and a member of the ANC.37 Mr Mohlala was the whistle-blower 
about the tender corruption surrounding the Mbombela stadium that implicated senior ANC 
officials in that city (Mail & Guardian 2009). When he was shot, he was subject to a 
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murdered-2010-South-Africa-Fifa-World-Cup-whistle-blower-Jimmy-Mohlala-says-husband-alive-today-hadn-





disciplinary process of the ANC because he had refused to step down after the Mbombela 
municipality had fired him (Mail & Guardian 2009). Similarly, Samuel Mpatlanyane, the 
communication and spokesperson of the Sports and Culture department in Mpumalanga, died 
from a gunshot fired while he was in bed, after he attempted to disclose the tender irregularities 
surrounding the building of the Mbombela stadium (Molele & Wa Afrika 2010).  
 
The Mbombala murders reveal blurring between different forms of corruption and institutions, 
revealing that the distinction between grand political corruption and bureaucratic corruption, 
although analytically useful, is an arbitrary distinction based on “the Weberian separation of 
politics from administration” (Andvig & Fjeldstad 2001:11). This was exemplified by the 
authorities involved in the Mbombela murders. The two main forms of authorities implicated 
in the Mbombela Stadium murders were the Mbombela municipality (an administrative body) 
and the ANC (a political party). The incident revealed that both forms of authorities are 
interlinked in a way that confirms the argument (Albrecht & Moe 2015) that there are no pure 
forms of authority. The murder of Mr Mohlala, a senior ANC politician and an employee at the 
Mbombela municipality, reveals nuances and complexities of corruption in a context in which 
politics and administration are blurred. It can be speculated that Mr Mohlala was murdered 
because his role as a whistle-blower implicated senior ANC officials in the city (Mail & 
Guardian 2009). It remains unclear why the ANC as a political party, which should be separate 
from the administration of the Mbombela municipality, would institute a disciplinary hearing 
against Mr Mohlala, because his role in the municipality should have been separated from his 
role as a member of the ANC. The assumption is that the disciplinary proceedings were 
influenced by the fact that some senior ANC officials were implicated in the Mbombela tender 
corruption (Mail & Guardian 2009). Therefore, the blurring of interests between administration 
officials at the Mbombela municipality and some of the ANC officials reveal that the Weberian 
separation of state administration and politics is not useful. This confirms Jarstad and Belloni’s 
(2012:1) argument that hybrid political systems incorporate different institution “which 
coexist, interact, and even clash”. The murdered Mr Mohlala had relationships with both the 
ANC and the Mbombela municipality (an ANC-governed municipality) that appeared 
interlinked and inseparable. The next section discusses how the relationship between the 
construction industry and the state, outlined in the previous sections, provide further insights 





6.5 Is the state or construction industry driving hybridisation  
 
As discussed in Chapter two, Baker (2013:299) articulates that it is useful to conceptualise 
hybridity as a process “driven by governments”. Baker’s (2013) research findings in Ethiopia 
suggest that although, traditionally, state policing tends to oppose sharing policing 
responsibilities with non-state actors, its decision to collaborate with non-state policing actors 
takes into consideration economic and political considerations. According to Baker (2011:27), 
the state, in the context of policing, economically dominates non-state policing actors, resulting 
in it having asymmetrical power relationships that enable it to drive the hybridisation process 
(see Baker 2013). Findings from Chapter five concurs with Baker to the extent that it 
acknowledges that, in a context where the state controls financial resources, it has asymmetrical 
power in relation to non-state actors when it comes to the distribution of resources. However, 
this does not mean that the state drives the process of hybridisation. Chapter two stated that 
scholars have advocated for an examination of hybridisation as a historical process that is 
empirically determined (see Colona and Jaffe 2016; Canclini 2005; Albrecht 2018b). Taking 
hybridisation as a historical process as a point of departure, the rest of this section explores how 
the historical relationships between the state and the construction industry sheds light on the 
question of who is the driver of hybridity.  
 
The relationship between the state and the construction industry is dynamic as both actors 
navigate the complexities of operating in a global economy and the specific South African 
political economy shaped by colonial and apartheid history. As outlined earlier in the chapter, 
the sanctions levelled against the apartheid government and the general political unrest in the 
country between the mid-1970s and the 1990s adversely affected the profitability of the 
construction industry. The response of the construction industry to address its decreasing 
profitability was a shift in policy. Cottle (2014a:21) points out that from the late 1980s, the 
construction industry’s shift in policy to advocating for the prioritisation of adequate housing 
in townships was well received by the apartheid housing ministry and between 1992 and 1993, 
approximately R4.5 billion was allocated towards housing schemes. Drawing from the work 
of Avant et al. (2010:12) principled authority formed the basis of the construction industry’s 
ability to influence the apartheid state to change its policies on infrastructure development. 
Although, arguably the change in policy was also a pragmatic political decision for both parties 





Under the post-apartheid government, the construction industry continued to benefit from the 
policy of investing in infrastructural development services to benefit all South Africans. A 
priority of the new democratic government was reversing the effects of the apartheid regime in 
the economy. Chapter four discussed that the apartheid system of government was based on 
creating a strong Afrikaner state, and that, as such, the political, social and economic spheres 
were governed by the rationale of advancing the interests of one racial group of people. The 
post-apartheid government delegated authority to the construction industry by giving it a 
central role to facilitate economic growth through infrastructure development, job creation and 
transformation of the economy. Using Avant et al.’s (2010) terminology, the big construction 
companies were able to enact expert and capacity-based authority by implementing the 
government’s policy objectives. According to the governance at-a-distance literature, the 
implementation of state policies by the construction industry inadvertently extended the powers 
of the state. Scholars have argued that the governance at-a-distance strategy, when successfully 
implemented, extends the power of the state by enabling it to have indirect control (see Rose 
& Miller 1992; Garland 1996). In other words, the state exercised indirect control and steered 
the industry to fulfil state objectives by giving the construction industry the mandate and power 
to fulfil state functions, such as infrastructure development.  
 
The state and the construction industry have a complex and fluid relationship not captured by 
the dichotomy between steering and rowing (Osborne & Gaebler 1993), as conceptualised in 
the governing at-a-distance literature, which fails to acknowledge the negotiations and shifting 
relationships that shape the relationship between the two actors. The shifting and evolving role 
of the construction industry from steering policy in the 1980s, to the current dispensation where 
the state takes the lead in steering policy that regulates the industry undermines the 
steering/rowing dichotomy to explain the relationship between the state and the construction 
industry. The relationship between the construction industry and the state is fluid and both 
actors steered and steer policies to address a complex political economy, before and after 
apartheid. A historical analysis of the relationship between the South African construction 
industry and the state reveals that both actors drove hybridity in a way that makes it difficult to 
identify the primary driver, even where it may be possible to identify the primary driver at 
different stages in the hybridisation process. The contribution to hybridity made by this study 




navigating complex fluid political, social and economic dynamics, it is possible for both actors 
to be the primary driver of hybridity, albeit at different points in the process of hybridisation. 
Which actor is the primary driver at a given point in the hybridisation relationship is an 
empirical question. The hybridisation process is characterised by contradictions. The chapter 
makes the argument that practices of corruption by both the state and the construction industry 
in the implementation of BEE policies reveal contradictions between state policy and 
implementation. The next sections examine how the contradictions that characterised the 
relationship between the state and the construction industry ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
infrastructural preparations furthers insights into hybridisation.  
 
6.5.1 Contradictions during the process of hybridisation: the relationship between the 
state and the construction industry 
 
An important criticism of hybridity is its broadness, which does not acknowledge the 
dynamics between the different actors in the hybrid governance structure. Furthermore, 
Albrecht (2018a:575) highlights that, in hybridity literature, there is a tendency to 
“overemphasise positive accommodation”, which fails to capture the tension between 
“positive accommodation and separation” – a characteristic of hybridisation. Similarly, Baker 
(2013:298) argues that hybridity consists of bringing together contradictory actors. For 
Albrecht (2017:570) the homogenisation and heterogenisation between different actors in the 
process of hybridisation “allows for a contradictory conclusion”. As highlighted in Chapter 
two and five, exploring the strategies and practices of the actors as they enact authority in 
hybrid settings reveals how tension between homogenization and heterogenisation is 
negotiated (see Albrecht & Moe 2015). Building on the notion that hybridisation is 
characterised by contradictions, the chapter contributes to hybridity literature by revealing 
that the contradictory elements in the process of hybridisation are overshadowed by the 
practices of corruption.  
 
Chapter four has outlined that, because of international pressure, the post-apartheid government 
adopted GEAR policies, which are underpinned by neoliberalism, departing from a more 
welfare-state approach to governance, adopted under RDP. The neo-liberal rationale is 
characterised by the promotion of limited government interference to facilitate an environment 




arguably promotes a more state-controlled economy. As argued in earlier sections the 
government, through its extensive investments in public infrastructure development, attempted 
to transform the construction industry by prescribing requirements for construction firms to 
qualify for public contracts. The result is arguably two competing governance mentalities 
simultaneously at work. The government justification for its redistributive BEE policies is the 
necessity to achieve equitable economic development. However, practices of corruption by the 
construction firms with its BEE partners undermined the effectiveness of BEE policies, 
resulting in the reinforcement of the existing economic power structures.  
 
The findings in the chapter reveal the important role of corruption in shaping and influencing 
the relationships between the state and the top firms in the construction industry. The 
implementation of BEE policies by the top firms in the construction industry can be described 
as grand corruption. Chapter two describes grand corruption as the manipulation of state 
institutions by high-level officials, blurring the public/private sector distinction (see Amundsen 
1999; Andvig & Fjeldstad 2001). This blurring between state/non-state, public/private has been 
labelled by Lund (2006) as the twilight zone. The twilight zone in a hybrid context, to use 
Bhabha’s (1994:4) phrasing, acknowledges differences “without an assumed or imposed 
hierarchy”. In other words, the relationship is not hierarchal, as the top construction firms and 
the politically connected individuals are interdependent to attain mutual interests. Furthermore, 
the blurring of interests between state and the construction industry is evidenced by the fact 
that the biggest government pension fund invests hugely in the construction industry. This 
blurring of interests creates hybrid orders that incorporate “liberal and illiberal norms, 
institutions, and actors which coexist, interact, and even clash” (Jarstad & Belloni 2012:1; see 
Johnson and Hutchison 2012). The liberal/illiberal norms include articulations of the free 
markets found in GEAR policies, redistributive practices captured by BEE policies, and 
patronage systems of governance as a result of grand corruption, practiced by the construction 
industry in implementing state policies.  
 
Describing the Nigerian context Adebanwi and Obadare (2011:191) argue that grand corruption 
“is best seen as an example of elite struggles for power and resources”. The research finding 
affirms Adebanwi and Obadare’s (2011) argument that systems of corruption reveal how elites 
organise themselves to access power and financial resources. The awarding of these contracts 




partnering with the top construction firms. As previously outlined, the tenders to build the 
Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium and the Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban were awarded to big 
construction companies, linked to BEE construction companies that were part-owned by former 
senior politicians in government and high-ranking individuals within the ANC party.  
 
My study of collusion in the construction of the 2010 FIFA World Cup stadiums suggests that, 
while hybrid structures are constituted by contradictory elements that are continuously being 
renegotiated during hybridisation, these contradictory elements may be overshadowed by the 
objective of corruption, achieved by former politicians turned businessmen (as a result of the 
government BEE policies) and their business partners, the construction firms, who have 
resources to implement state policies. These actors have benefited from BEE policies because 
of the structure of the South African construction industry, where only the top high-level grade 
construction firms have the necessary capacity in terms of access to finances and the needed 
technical skills to take on huge infrastructural development projects. The result is that only a 
few large construction companies are the main beneficiaries of the government’s infrastructure 
development projects.  
 
Although an argument can be made that because the objective of the construction industry is to 
achieve a profit and the state policies seek to ensure a more equitable construction industry, 
these two objectives seem contradictory, an analysis of these two objectives, through the 
implementation of BEE policies and through corrupt practices, reveal that these contradictions 
are in fact superficial. Indeed, the study reveals that, despite state rhetoric about the state’s 
commitment to the economic empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups, the primary 
beneficiaries of BEE belie the rhetoric. This study goes further than the current observations in 
hybridity literature, suggesting that contradictions during hybridisation is addressed through 
continuous negotiations, by arguing that, ultimately, the practice of corruption to secure the 
financial interests of former politicians turned businessmen and their business partners 
dominated in a way that undermine and overshadow the contradictions between the state and 
the construction industry. However, it is important to highlight that the relationship between 
the state and the construction industry is dynamic and complex. Chapter seven explores how 
the government used the law as a way of creating boundaries between the state and the 







The chapter has argued that the relationship between the state and the construction industry 
occurred in a hybrid setting that was dynamic and shaped by political, economic and societal 
changes occurring during the transition from apartheid to democratic rule. A historically aware 
approach in analysing the relationship between the South African government and the 
construction industry reveals that both actors steer policy creation, in a way that undermines 
Baker’s suggestion that hybridity and the hybridisation process is state driven.  
 
The chapter has noted the gap between BEE policy objectives and actual implementation, 
revealing that the hybridisation process is marked by complexities and contradictions. On one 
hand, the state and the construction industry sought to create a constructive partnership in order 
to address the inequalities created under the apartheid system of government through 
infrastructure development and transformation of the construction industry. On the other hand, 
an examination into the implementation of BEE policies reveals that corrupt practices have 
undermined the effectiveness of state policies. The result has been the reinforcement of the 
existing economic power structures, with politically connected BEE businesses and the top 
construction firms being the primarily beneficiaries of BEE policies. This contributes to 
hybridity literature by revealing that although hybridisation is characterised by contradictions 
between actors, corrupt practices by these actors to attain mutual interests of financial gain 
overshadow these contradictions. The next chapter discusses another characteristic of 
hybridisation, which is blurring, and examines the  relationship between blurring and creation  






CHAPTER 7: UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOUNDARY-
MAKING AND HYBRIDISATION 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter builds on the previous chapter that noted that the relationship between the state 
and the construction industry was blurred because of corruption practices in the implementation 
of BEE policies. The hybridity literature acknowledges blurring between different actors in 
hybrid governance structures but for the most part fails to specify exactly how this blurring 
manifests.38 The point of departure for this chapter is that blurring during hybridisation occurs 
simultaneously with boundary-making. The chapter draws on Kyed (2017:466) who argues that 
“[b]oundaries do not vanish as hybridisation occurs, nor vice versa”. According to Kyed 
(2017), boundary-making and hybridisation occur simultaneously resulting in a productive 
tension, with hybrid acts undermining boundaries. Therefore, exploring boundary-making 
during hybridisation gives further insights into the working of relationships between different 
actors inside hybrid governance structures.  
 
This chapter examines enactments of authority by the state and the construction industry in 
boundary-making during hybridisation and seeks to answer the research question: What are the 
state and construction firms’ responses to boundary-making during hybridisation? The chapter 
is divided into two sections. The first section discusses how state officials’ corrupt practices, 
when interacting with SMMEs, is an exercise in boundary-making, furthering understanding 
into the process of hybridisation. The second section explores how the response of the 
construction industry to the state’s enactment of boundary-making through enacting legislation 
provides insights into the relationship between boundary-making and hybridisation.  
 
7.2 The exercise of corruption by state officials 
 
The dissertation has made the point that corruption played a key role in the implementation of 
state policies on the tendering process for the building of football stadiums ahead of the 2010 
                                                                




FIFA World Cup event. The previous chapter discussed how grand corruption in the 
implementation of BEE policies shaped the relationship between the top construction firms and 
politically connected BEE businesses.  Interviews conducted for this dissertation revealed that 
previously disadvantaged contractors engaged in corruption for practical reasons, such as lack 
of financial and technical capacity. As an owner of an architectural firm commented on the 
ineffectiveness of BEE policies: 
 
You can’t just say we have made the terms more favourable for black contractors, yet 
you are not funding them. So even if I got the work, I don’t have the money to execute 
so what do I do, I go look for a white contractor who has the money, I sell the project 
to him and he gives me a small percentage.39  
 
This section discusses another form of corruption, where lower-level state officials receive 
bribes during their interactions with SMMEs in the construction industry, referred to as 
bureaucratic corruption. The empirical findings reveal that, for the most part, SMMEs in the 
construction industry that have obtained government contracts engage in corruption to secure 
work and to further the financial security of their business. As a national union coordinator 
explained to me, SMMEs engage in corruption for the following reasons: 
 
One, the officials within the municipality or the government, they are the ones who 
determine when for you to be paid and when for you not to be paid. And how can you 
survive without payment having brought material from service providers and then you 
have to pay your labour, and then you have to maintain your fleet. How would you 
survive, unless you have to corrupt others so that your check will be signed? You have 
to corrupt others for your tender documentation to be approved.40  
 
During an interview, an auditor I spoke to reiterated this point, saying that state officials 
fuel corruption in public sector contracts by manipulating payments due to contractors. 
This is because: 
 
usually government companies have certain times where they are supposed to pay 
their suppliers. You can actually see that a certain supplier is being preferred. I mean 
they are paying that supplier regularly. I mean even when, not even at certain intervals, 
sometimes they are supposed to pay after 30 days.41  
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40 Interview participant, national union coordinator, Johannesburg, 20 June 2017). 




However, among SMMEs operating in the private sector, corruption is also prevalent, albeit 
that it manifests differently. In the private sector, corruption is about securing the contracts. As 
the CEO of a development consultancy revealed in an interview regarding SMMEs: 
 
to be included in certain contracts, they have got to give kickbacks to other people. 
For them to be included in a particular contract and for continuously being retained in 
particular contracts they have to keep the machinery oiled so there is in the private 
sector it’s there. In the private sector, there is quite a lot of that, there is quite a lot of 
that, there is a lot of kickbacks to people who own contracts.42 
 
The next section provides a discussion of the empirical findings to gain insights into the process 
of hybridisation. 
 
7.2.1 Boundary-making: a tool for state officials to implement corruption 
 
Drawing from Olivier de Sardan’s (1999) work on the nature of corruption in Africa, an 
argument can be made that the rationale governing the relationship between the state officials 
and SMMEs in the construction industry discussed in the above section is based on the logics 
of negotiation and the logics of predatory authority. The logics of negotiation views corruption 
as tool to facilitate bargaining in everyday social transactions. The logics of negotiation 
explains how SMMEs in the construction industry bargain with state officials to ensure timely 
payment of their services, which is important for the survival of their businesses because late 
payments result in liquidity challenges. The result of the bargaining between the two actors is 
bribery payment transactions. 
 
Olivier de Sardan (1999:41-42) noted that the logics of predatory authority refers to individuals 
in authority who engage in “various types of extortion, to the detriment of their ‘subjects’”; an 
example, being a police officer demanding bribes in order to perform their duties. An argument 
can be made that paying bribes to state officials is acknowledging state authority, albeit that 
state officials facilitating corruption undermine the legitimacy of state authority. Indeed, the 
official state position through its numerous pieces of legislation, policies and regulations that 
seek to eliminate corruption clearly does not support the actions of corrupt state officials. This 
finding concurs with Persson et al.’s (2010:11-12) empirical research findings from East Africa 
that reveal that corruption is a collective action problem because bribes are paid to state officials 
                                                                




not because it is morally accepted but because it is a widely practiced norm in business 
transactions with the state.  
 
The practice of corruption by low-level public officials and SMMEs construction firms reveals 
two forms of relationships between the state and the construction firms. First, a formal 
relationship with the state via the contract to provide the state with a service and second, an 
informal relationship with the public officials (representative of the state) created through 
payment of bribes to get their payments on time for services rendered to the state. Kyed (2017) 
argues that there is a tension created during hybridisation as hybrid acts undermine boundaries. 
According to Kyed (2017:466) the tension is productive because “these hybrid acts challenge 
the boundaries that are articulated at given moments by certain actors, new boundaries or 
prevailing distinctions are (re)enacted, which then gives way to new forms of hybridisation”. 
The research findings reveal that corruption blurs the boundaries between state/SMMEs in the 
construction industry, however boundary-making is also evident during hybridisation as 
highlighted by Kyed (2017). The boundary-making is evident during hybridisation because the 
state (through its institutions and representatives) have specific tasks that only it can fulfil in a 
way that is unchallenged, enabling the corruption to occur. In this case, the task is that it 
requires state officials to ensure timely payments to the SMMEs. In other words, this boundary 
making goes unchallenged by both actors to the extent that it achieves mutual objectives, state 
officials receive payment of bribes and the SMMEs construction firms receive timely payment 
for executing their part of the contract with the state. This finding reveals that an analysis of 
the practice of corruption during hybridisation goes further than what Kyed (2017) suggests, 
highlighting that the boundaries observable in the process of hybridisation enable the actors, 
party to a corrupt relationship, to attain a mutual financial benefit and are therefore not 
challenged.  
 
The next section discusses how the state used the law as a way of enacting boundaries after the 
uncovering of collusive tendering by the top construction firms to construct the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup stadiums. To give context to the discussion, the section below examines the 
different conceptualisations of collective tendering captured by the South African media, the 
primary source of information on the collusion for public information. A thematic analysis of 
media coverage of collusive tendering in the South African construction industry was an 




revealed different conceptualisation of collusive tendering. The different and contradictory 
conceptualisations of collusive tendering articulated by the media arguably gave impetus to the 
South African government to enact new legislation addressing some of the concerns 
highlighted in the debates captured by the media. 
 
7.3 The corruption/collusion debates captured in the South African media 
 
The different conceptualisations of collusion in the construction industry ahead of the 2010 
FIFA World Cup revealed both the contradictory and blurring mentalities that shape the 
labelling of crimes.  
 
 Collusion justified as a means of meeting expectations 
 
The influential journalist Peter Bruce for the Business Day (a newspaper that supports a neo-
liberal approach to the economy) covered the issue of collusive tendering extensively. Bruce 
argued that the construction industry was “faced with an almost impossible challenge” to 
complete five new stadiums in a short period of time in addition to the other large-scale 
infrastructural projects linked to the 2010 FIFA World Cup.43 For Bruce (2013) collusion 
enabled deadlines to be met for South Africa to host a successful FIFA World Cup. Ndlovu-
Gatsheni (2011) noted that government officials viewed questioning on whether the stadiums 
would be finished in time as lacking confidence in the ability of the ANC-led government to 
host a prestigious mega-event successfully. In other words, the argument was that the 
construction firms had no choice but to collude in order to complete the stadiums in time for 
the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Therefore, in this context collusive tendering was justified on public 
interest grounds. This viewpoint on collusive-tendering was widely rejected by the different 
newspapers that covered the story. 
 
 Collusion; another form of corruption 
 
The dominant theme in the media narrative was the notion that collusion is another form of 
corruption. This theme was highly controversial and brought to light other issues such as the 
                                                                




role of race and socio-economic status in the conceptualisation of crime. Roger Jardine, the 
former CEO of the top construction firm, Aveng Group, was quoted in the media to have stated:  
“I believe collusion is just a nice word for corruption, which is becoming part of the fabric of 
our society”.44 Similarly, an article in the Sunday Times by Kuseni Dlamini, the former head 
of Anglo American SA and Old Mutual SA & Emerging Markets noted: 
 
The private sector likes to portray itself as an epitome of good governance and anti-
corruption, but we have always known that it takes two to tango. Corruption by 
politicians and civil servants has been inextricably intertwined with rogue elements in 
the private sector.45 
 
Thulas Nxesi, the former Minister of Public Works, stated in an article printed in the media: 
 
When Bobby Motaung and other black businessmen were charged with tender 
irregularities involving Mbombela Stadium in Mpumalanga, they were detained and 
paraded in front of cameras for the world to see. But with the big corporates involved, 
we have yet to see any evidence of such publicity stunts … There is a racial dimension 
to this if you factor in our colonial and apartheid past. In our public psyche, we have 




The debate regarding whether or not collusion should be dealt with as a form of corruption 
under criminal law instead of being addressed as a regulatory offence was another theme 
captured in the media narratives. The ANCYL provincial secretary, Bheki Mtolo, in a published 
interview captured this sentiment by stating: “Government officials are arrested when they are 
involved in corruption, but private sector bosses, who are looting our government coffers, get 
away with murder”.47 The South African legislative framework on collusive tendering seek to 
serve different and competing interests. The result is a complex legal framework that 
encompasses both homogeneous and heterogeneous conceptualisations of collusive tendering. 
 
7.3.1 The different conceptualisations of collusive tendering under the law 
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Collusive tendering falls under the jurisdiction of different state institutions. Under South 
African law, collusive tendering is a violation of competition law.48 In the 1990s, the post-
apartheid government created a comprehensive competition law regime, modelled after that of 
the US and EU. Arguing for the use of competition law, a competition lawyer told me: 
“Competition law is a highly technical area and it applies to big corporates; it doesn’t apply to 
individuals”.49 Collusive tendering is also potentially a criminal offence and there are three 
avenues through which collusive tendering can be addressed within the criminal justice system. 
First, under common law collusive tendering can be viewed as fraud.50 Although fraud takes a 
variety of forms, at the basic level it consists of some form of deception and misrepresentation 
for personal and financial gain. Secondly, I would argue that engaging in corruption during the 
tender process is a criminal offence under the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act 12 
of 2004 (POCA), which is punishable for up to 10 years. The CIDB highlighted that collusion 
“is one of the most sophisticated forms of corruption in the construction industry”.51 Thirdly, 
an expert whom I interviewed noted that collusive tendering can be conceptualised as organised 
crime.52 For example, an organised crime expert told me: 
 
Organised crime in the form of corruption, I think it should be but the organised crime itself really needs 
to have a definition which receives universal acceptance. At the moment that has not yet happened. It is 
very very loosely defined but in my view collusive tendering is corruption and depending on who is 
responsible for it, it would qualify as organised crime.53  
 
 
Although legislation in South Africa does not expressly define the constituents of organised 
crime, the group of construction firms that took part in the collusive tendering are consistent 
with the definition of “organised criminal group” outlined in Article 2(a) of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) (UNTOC 2000), to which South 
Africa is party. Article 2(a) of the UNTOC defines an organised criminal group as 
 
                                                                
48 In this case study, the collusive tendering in the construction industry was addressed as a violation of 
competition law under the jurisdiction of the Competition Commission, an independent regulatory agency 
created by the Competition Act to enforce competition law. Collusive tendering violates section 4(1)(b)(iii) of 
the Competition Act. 
49 Interview participant, competition lawyer, Johannesburg, 30 June 2017. 
50 Interview participant, former deputy national commissioner in South African Police Service, Johannesburg, 8 
June 2017. 
51 City Press 2011. Construction Industry Development Board press statement. 6 March 2011. 
52 Interview participants, organised crime expert, Cape Town, August 2016; director of a civil society 
organisation, Cape Town, 16 August 2016; former deputy national commissioner in South African Police 
Service, Johannesburg, 8 June 2017. 




a group of three or more persons that was not randomly formed; existing for a period 
of time; acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by 
at least four years’ incarceration; in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial 
or other material benefit” (UNTOC 2000). 
 
Benjamin and De Wet (2013) noted that the collusion in the South African construction 
industry was a “[l]ong-standing and hugely profitable organised co-operation between major 
construction companies”.54 These construction firms met up secretly with the express purpose 
of committing fraud through rigging the tender process to derive both financial and material 
benefit. This section has noted that under the South African legal framework, collusive 
tendering is both a regulatory offence and a criminal offence if conceptualised as corruption, 
white-collar crime and organised crime. In light of the contentious debates in the media about 
what constitutes collusive tendering the government has sought to address some of the gaps in 
legislation by enacting new legislation that expressly criminalises collusive tendering. 
 
7.3.2 The criminalisation of collusive tendering 
 
After discovering the collusive tendering in the construction industry and subsequent extensive 
media coverage of the case, the government made a policy decision to change the Competition 
Act and criminalise collusive tendering. The enactment of section 73A of the Competition 
Amendment Act 1 of 2009, which came into effect in May 2016, imposed criminal liability on 
directors and individuals in management whose firms are found guilty of participating in 
collusive tendering. The Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 was highly contentious for 
two main reasons. The first was the constitutionality of the amendment; and the second reason 
was the extent to which criminalising collusive tendering undermines the work of the 
Competition Commission (Lopes et al. 2013:3). On the issue of constitutionality; under the 
South African Constitution, a person has the fundamental right not to give self-incriminating 
evidence (Lopes et al. 2013:4).  
 
Section 49A(3) of the Competition Act, as inserted by the Competition Amendment Act 39 of 
2000, states: 
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No self-incriminating answer given, or statement made to a person exercising any 
power in terms of this section is admissible as evidence against the person who gave 
the answer or made the statement in criminal proceedings, except in criminal 
proceedings for perjury or in which that person is tried for an offence contemplated 
in section 72 or section 73(2)(d), and then only to the extent that the answer or 
statement is relevant to prove the offence charged. 
 
Lopes et al. (2013:4) highlighted that under the Competition Act of 1998, evidence gathered 
from being brought before the Competition Authorities cannot be used in criminal proceedings. 
Therefore, individuals involved in cartels cannot be tried for the criminal offence of fraud using 
the evidence from the Competition Commission. Furthermore, to add to the complexity, the 
competition authorities cannot grant immunity from criminal prosecution to individuals who 
take part in cartel activity, as only the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) has the discretion 
to pursue criminal prosecutions in South Africa (Ibid:12). The second criticism against 
criminalisation of collusive tendering was based on the fact that the Competition Commission 
authorities rely on cooperation from the colluding parties to get information and uncover the 
cartels. As an official from the Competition Commission stated in a newspaper interview: “Had 
it not been for the fast track process the commission initiated, the conduct would not have come 
to light. The logic behind the process was to offer people lesser fines for truthful disclosures, 
but the real discount had been the fact that people confessed”.55 Furthermore, David 
Unterhalter, a lawyer for the Competition Commission, noted that addressing the collusion in 
the construction industry through litigation was not a practical alternative because 140 cases 
had been uncovered and “one case with one or more infringements can take four to five 
years”.56 This section has revealed the different conceptualisations of collusive tendering and 
explored how the state addressed the debates in the media about the blurring between 
collusion/corruption through enacting new legislation, criminalising collusive tendering. The 
next section discusses how this gives insights into the hybridisation process.  
 
7.4 Boundary-making: law as a tool for the state  
 
This chapter draws from Mitchell (1991:78), highlighted in Chapter two, who suggests that 
boundaries can be studied by examining the political process that seeks to make a distinction 
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between state and the society. Lund (2006:689) argued that the ability to make distinctions is a 
characteristic of the state, which he described as “the essence of public authority”. It should be 
noted that non-state actors also exercise boundary making. The point of departure of this 
chapter is that the law has been used for articulations of state authority and the responses by 
the construction industry to this articulation provides insights into the relationship between 
boundary making and hybridisation. 
 
Law has been conceptualised in diverse ways in literature, for example, Marxist social theorists 
such as Ralph Miliband (1977) have argued that law is an ideological instrument used by the 
ruling elite to protect their material interest. According to Comaroff and Comaroff (2007:134) 
in postcolonial nations the law is central to articulations of power and interactions between 
states and citizens. This chapter argues that the South African government’s act of enacting 
legislation criminalising collusive tendering was a boundary-making exercise by the state, 
separating itself from the controversies surrounding BEE businesses owned by politically 
connected individuals working in partnership with top construction firms. This response 
revealed that in the face of public pressure, although political and business elites work in close 
partnerships, the politicians will take a tough stance against business elites to gain legitimacy.  
 
Discussions about hybrid political structures inadvertently reinforces the binaries, which the 
concept of hybridity seeks to overcome (see Heathershaw 2013; Albrecht & Moe 2015; 
Hameiri Jones 2017). This chapter explores the binaries at play in conceptualising collusive 
tendering in hybrid structures: criminal versus regulatory offences. In the case study, the South 
African authorities viewed collusive tendering as a violation of competition law under the 
jurisdiction of a regulatory body, the Competition Commission. The debate in the literature on 
the regulation of collusion (which is commonly referred to as white-collar crime) is divided 
between the punishment versus the compliance model. The punishment model advocates for a 
punitive approach through the criminal justice system, while the compliance model seeks to 
avoid law enforcement in favour of a regulatory body that works in partnership with 
corporations to enforce compliance with legislation. The research findings confirmed Snider’s 
(2000) observations that making distinctions between regulatory offence and criminal offence 
perpetuates false stereotyping about who is a criminal. The research findings reveal that the 
collusive tendering in the South African construction industry to build football stadiums ahead 




of public sector contracts, highlighting the blurring between the public/private sectors as well 
as public/private sector corruption. This blurring reveals the contradictions between the 
different legal instruments encompassing homogeneous and heterogeneous understandings of 
collusion in a way best described by the concept of hybridity. Therefore, the exercise of state 
authority, by amending the 1998 Competition Act to impose criminal liability on individuals 
in management positions of firms engaging in collusion, was  important to show the state’s 
impartiality when dealing with big business. This is despite strong evidence suggesting that 
enacting legislation criminalising collusion would undermine the work of another state 
institution, the Competition Commission, which is dependent on the cooperation of colluding 
parties to fulfil its mandate. However, Alvesalo and Tombs (2002:31) noted that using the 
criminal justice system to address white-collar crime is counterproductive because it gives the 
appearance that both big, powerful corporates and socially disadvantaged criminals stand on 
equal footing before the law, which ignores the existing biases of the criminal justice system. 
Indeed, Alvesalo and Tombs’s (2002) observation is important, as highlighted by the response 
of the top construction firms to the amended legislation.  
 
Pieterse (2001:239) makes the point that “the meanings of boundaries are by no means 
constant”. For Kyed (2017:471) “[b]oundaries are not natural, but actively produced, 
confirmed, disconfirmed, negotiated and redefined in everyday interactions” (see Lund 
2006:689). I have argued earlier that the act of enacting legislation criminalising collusive 
tendering was a boundary-making exercise by the state, separating itself from the construction 
industry and corporate South Africa to show its commitment to promoting public interest. The 
construction firms’ response, through a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiative, was 
to create a trust fund (with conditions that protected the firms involved in collusion from being 
held accountable), which challenged this boundary-making exercise by the state. In October 
2016, the top seven construction companies – WBHO, Aveng, Murray & Roberts, Group Five, 
Basil Read, Raubex and Stefanutti Stocks entered into an agreement with the government to 
develop and transform the construction industry. The agreement was that the companies would 
create a fund that would amount to R1.5 billion over a 12-year period. PwC (2016:17–18) noted 
that the purpose of the fund is to train individuals from disadvantaged communities through 
providing bursaries, strengthening the capacity of the government to fulfil its service delivery 
obligations and providing mentoring for black-owned construction companies. The 




African National Roads Agency (SANRAL) should withdraw its civil claim against the 
construction companies that engaged in collusive tendering to build the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
stadiums. This requirement was met, because SANRAL withdrew its civil case against the 
construction firms in November 2016. The second condition was that any penalties from the 
civil lawsuits launched by government entities and parastatals would be deducted from the trust 
fund. These conditions for the trust fund suggest that the construction firms involved in 
collusion had found a convenient way of avoiding civil lawsuits that would potentially prove 
to be very expensive. In other words, this trust fund effectively kills two birds with one stone, 
as the companies are able to garner more public contracts by showing that they are taking the 
government policies of transformation of the industry seriously, while simultaneously finding 
a way to avoid costly litigation from civil lawsuits. This suggests that the rationale behind the 
creation of the trust fund by the construction industry was risk management. This finding is 
supported by Hönke’s (2012:68–69) research on CSR community development programmes 
that reveal that, despite the rhetoric by multinational companies engaging in participatory 
community development in fragile states expressing commitment to democracy and self-
determination, the power relations on the ground undermine these principles. This is because, 
for practical purposes, the multinational companies pursue governing strategies that enable 
them to achieve stability (Ibid).  
 
The silence of the government to the trust fund conditions suggest that the government accepted 
the undermining of its boundary-making exercise in order to protect its working relationship 
with the top construction firms. This reveals that state policy aimed at being ‘tough’ on the top 
construction firms might suffer from limited enforcement. Indeed, it remains to be seen whether 
the state will prosecute directors of top construction firms found to be engaged in collusive 
tendering. This is because, as discussed in Chapter four, it is widely accepted that it is difficult 
to secure convictions of this form of criminality. This finding reiterates the argument made 
earlier that although boundaries do disappear during hybridisation there are diverse factors that 
might influence whether hybrid acts challenging boundary making are implemented or not. 
This chapter has revealed that, on one hand, in the context where boundary making practices 
results in the different actors attaining mutual interests, the boundary making is not challenged, 
however, on the other hand, boundary making is challenged if it disadvantages an actor in the 
hybrid structure. In other words, it is not inevitable that boundary making during hybridisation 




the contexts in which boundary making is not challenged in the process of hybridisation. This 
finding contributes to hybridity literature by showing that it is important to rethink the tension 
between boundary making and hybrid acts during hybridisation because the two processes do 
not necessarily have to be opposed, they could serve to fulfil a similar objective. The next 
section examines the effect of hybridisation on the hybrid governance structure. 
 
7.5 After hybridization: the creation of a new hybrid structure 
 
Chapter two noted that scholars from different fields of study differ on whether or not 
hybridisation results in the creation of a new structure. For Colona and Jaffe (2016:176), 
hybridisation results in the creation of “a new or emergent political formation that is neither 
state nor non-state”. Similarly, Bhabha stated in an interview with Jonathan Rutherford 
(1990:211) that the “process of cultural hybridity gives rise to something different, something 
new and unrecognisable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation”. For Young 
(1995:21) the process of unconscious hybridity resulted in the creation of a new form of culture. 
However, Albrecht (2018a:574) provides a different viewpoint by arguing that sources of 
authority constituting hybridisation are interconnected but “do not merge into an even or stable 
(permanent) hybrid order”.  
 
The findings from Chapters five, six and seven reveal that the blurring between the state and 
the construction industry within a hybrid setting did not result in a new structure. The findings 
reveal that although a new permanent hybrid structure is not formed, a temporary hybrid 
structure (whose constituents are difficult to separate as noted by Albrecht & Moe 2015) is, 
however, created. The temporary hybrid structure is disbanded after the objective of its creation 
has been met. For example, the partnerships between the top construction firms and the 
politically-connected BEE firms were temporary to achieve a specific objective; once stadium 
construction was completed, the partnerships were disbanded. The same actors might decide to 
partner again for a different project. An examination of the construction firms and their BEE 
business partners suggests that the same group of firms where involved in collusive 
arrangements to work on different projects; forming partnerships and disbanding the 
partnerships upon the completion of the project. This contribution goes beyond the assertion 
that hybridity results in integration by revealing that the integration is not necessarily 




distinction between permanent and temporary hybrid governance structures, which is important 
in contemporary governance, characterised by a myriad state and non-state actors interacting 
in different contexts at the local, national and international levels to implement various projects 
that tend to be time-sensitive. Moreover, it can be asserted that this contribution reveals that 
the notion of permanent hybrid structures is not analytically useful in the African context, as it 
fails to capture the reality of hybrid structures as contested, negotiated and constantly evolving 




To conclude, the chapter argues that the process of hybridisation encompasses both boundary 
making and hybrid acts undermining the boundary-making practices. Therefore, examining 
boundary-making practices provides insights into hybridisation. The act of enacting legislation 
was a boundary-making exercise by the government to distance itself from the construction 
industry as well as gain legitimacy by condoning the collusion/corruption in the construction 
industry. The chapter argues that the government exercised its authority by enacting legislation 
imposing criminal liability on individuals in management whose firms violate the Competition 
Act via engaging in collusive tendering. The different legal instruments encompassed 
homogeneous and heterogeneous conceptualisations of collusive tendering; therefore, the new 
legislation clarified the state’s position on collusion in a way that suggests that the state is not 
biased towards big business.  
 
The research has shown that the distinction between state and the construction industry is 
characterised by boundary-making practices that facilitate corruption, which benefit both 
parties. This was revealed by the relationship between state officials and SMMEs in the 
construction industry reliant on bribery payments to ensure that the SMMEs with state contracts 
receive timely payment for their services. On one hand this boundary making goes 
unchallenged by both actors to the extent that it achieves mutual objectives, however, on the 
other hand, the boundary-making practice is challenged when it goes against the interest of one 
actor, as demonstrated by the response of the construction industry to the amended legislation, 
criminalising collusive tendering. The creation of a trust fund with conditions that arguably 
undermined the objectives of the amended legislation was not questioned by the state. The fact 




boundary making in a hybrid context is not necessarily challenged. Whether it is challenged or 
not is an empirical question. The findings show that the result of the process of hybridisation 
is the creation of a temporary governance structure that is disbanded after the objective of the 





CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In this dissertation I have argued that the concept of hybridity provides for a move beyond a 
state-centric understanding of governance in the Global South. The concept of hybridity has 
faced two criticisms: firstly, it has been criticised for inadvertently reinforcing a binary 
worldview it seeks to overcome and secondly, for being broad in a way that undermines its 
analytical rigour. To address these criticisms the dissertation has responded to the call by 
scholars who argue that hybridity should be analysed as a process (see Albrecht 2018b; Colona 
and Jaffe 2016; Albrecht & Moe 2015). For Colona and Jaffe (2016:182) an analytical approach 
that views hybridity as a process enables a nuanced exploration of the evolving and changing 
dynamics in hybrid structures. Albrecht (2018a:575) argued that the process of hybridisation is 
characterised by tension with “positive accommodation and separation” that is empirically 
determined. Therefore, Albrecht (2018a) suggested that to understand how contestations within 
the process of hybridisation transpires, examining the strategies and practices of the different 
actors in hybrid structures as they enact authority is useful (see Albrecht & Moe 2015). I drew 
on the governmentality framework, which advocates for moving beyond a binary worldview 
by focusing on rationalities, strategies and practices of power “at their point of application” 
(Death 2013:774) to analyse how authority relationships shape the process of hybridisation. 
The main research findings analysed in the empirical chapters and the theoretical contribution 
to hybridity literature are discussed below. 
 
8.2 Resource distribution in a contested process of hybridisation  
 
Chapter five answered the research question: How did the strategies used by the South African 
state to enact authority during the construction of stadiums for the 2010 FIFA World Cup shape 
the process of hybridisation? Drawing from Albrecht (2017), who suggested that 
heterogenisation during the process of hybridisation is central to the manifestations of authority 
and has implications on the access to resources, Chapter five focused on the strategies, policies 
and practices of the state in allocating resources ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup event. 
Building from Geertz’s (1980) conceptualisation of the theatre state, the chapter argues that for 




exercise of soft power and an end in itself. It was part of the government’s diplomatic efforts 
to counter negative stereotypes about the country on an international stage. The diplomatic 
efforts included narratives around African Renaissance (displaying the capabilities of Africa 
by hosting the first mega-event in Africa) although this narrative was undermined by 
xenophobic attacks on African immigrants before and after the event. The findings in Chapter 
five revealed that the allocation of resources was primarily determined by the state objective of 
exercising soft power through hosting a successful 2010 FIFA World Cup and not a result of 
heterogenisation stemming from negotiations during hybridisation. 
 
Of course, there are heterogeneous actors with different objectives and interests competing for 
resources in a mega-event context. However, the finding in this chapter noted that the state (the 
actor with the mandate to host a FIFA World Cup) used and distributed state resources in a way 
that fulfilled its objective of hosting a successful FIFA World Cup while paying lip service to 
the different interests of other stakeholders. The chapter discussed that the South African 
government was prepared to meet FIFA’s extensive legal requirements captured by the 
Standard Cooperation Agreement because this was a necessity if the country wanted to qualify 
to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The Standard Cooperation Agreement protected the 
financial interests of FIFA’s partners; therefore signing the agreement meant that government 
policy to use the FIFA World Cup as an impetus for economic development benefiting all South 
Africans was undermined, as the main beneficiaries of the FIFA World Cup were FIFA’s 
partners. Similarly, the decision to build the Green Point stadium in an affluent residential area 
went against the initial government policy of building a stadium in an underdeveloped area of 
Cape Town. The Green Point stadium was built arguably to impress FIFA delegations. 
Therefore, an argument can be put forward that when the South African national government 
was faced with two competing policy objectives, resources where channelled into the policy 
that would support a successful bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup.  
 
The findings have shown that the contradictions between state policies and implementation of 
the policies bring further understanding into allocation of resources in hybrid structures. The 
contribution to hybridity literature made by this chapter is that access to resources is not 
necessarily determined by heterogenisation during the process of hybridisation, centred on 
articulations of authority as suggested by Albrecht (2017). This is because there are contexts in 




way that enables their primary objective to be met and, in the process, override heterogeneous 
interests, despite paying lip service to other interests and objectives. 
 
8.3 Hybridisation and the relationship between the state and the construction industry 
  
Chapter six raised the question: How did state policies shape relations between the state and 
the construction industry during the process of hybridisation? Chapter six argues that the 
hybrid relationship between the state and the construction industry provides insights into the 
process of hybridisation. Chapter six made two contributions to hybridity literature. The first 
contribution lies in revealing which actor drives the hybridisation process and the second in 
showing how contradictions shaped hybridisation. Baker (2013:299) argued that it is useful to 
conceptualise the hybridisation process as “driven by governments”. This is because Baker’s 
(2013) research findings on policing in Ethiopia raised the point that despite state policing 
being traditionally opposed to sharing policing responsibilities with non-state actors, the state, 
which held asymmetrical power, makes decisions to partner with non-state policing actors for 
economic and political reasons.  The findings from Chapter five concur with Baker (2013) to 
the extent that the state has asymmetrical power, in the sense that it had authority over 
allocation of state resources, however, it is important to point out that having authority over 
distribution of resources does not equate to driving the process of hybridisation.  
 
Chapter six builds on the observation of scholars such as Canclini (2005) and Albrecht (2018b) 
who highlighted that hybridisation is a historical process. This chapter explored the historical 
relationship between the state and the South African construction industry. The finding in 
Chapter six revealed that the relationship between the state and the construction industry is not 
captured by the governance at a distance literature postulated by scholars such as Rose and 
Miller (1992) and Garland (1996), who suggest that the state extends its power by delegating 
its responsibilities. The governance at a distance literature is based on the dichotomy between 
the state ‘steering’ policy and the construction industry ‘rowing’ to implement state policies. 
Indeed, the relationship between the construction industry and the state is characterised by both 
actors steering and rowing, making it difficult to determine the primary driver of hybridity, 
although it is possible to identify empirically the primary driver at different stages in the 




Baker’s (2013) suggestion that the state is the primary driver of hybridity, by arguing that the 
primary driver at different stages in the hybridisation process is an empirical question.  
 
Addressing the criticism that the concept of hybridity is overly broad and lacking in analytical 
rigour, Albrecht (2018a:575) suggested a conceptualisation of the process of hybridisation 
being marked by tension between “positive accommodation and separation”. Similarly, for 
Baker (2013:298) hybridity consists of bringing contradictory actors together. Building on the 
work of Albrecht (2018a & 2018b) and (Baker 2013) Chapter six focused on the contradictory 
elements that shaped the relationship between the state and the construction industry. The post-
apartheid government had a policy objective to transform the construction industry to address 
inequalities created by the past colonial and apartheid governments and the BEE policies were 
a vehicle to achieve this policy objective. The findings reveal that while the state and the 
construction firms have arguably different and contradictory objectives (the former seeking to 
implement redistributive policies and the latter seeking maximum profit) the practices of 
corruption in the implementation of BEE policies reveal that these contradictory objectives are 
superficial. The owners of BEE construction firms are politically connected individuals, sought 
after by the top construction firms to form business alliances to ensure obtaining lucrative 
public contracts. This finding goes further than the current observations in hybridity literature 
suggesting that contradictory and similar interests undergo continuous negotiations during 
hybridisation. The finding suggests that practices of corruption to secure the financial interests 
of former politicians/spouses of senior state officials who own BEE businesses and the top 
construction firms dominated in a way that overshadowed the contradictions between the state 
and the construction industry.  
 
8.4 Boundary-making during the process of hybridisation 
 
Chapter seven discussed the research question: What are the state and construction firms’ 
responses to boundary-making during hybridisation? Boundary-making in Chapter seven was 
evident through two ways; first, the exercise of corruption by state officials and SMMEs in the 
construction industry via payment of bribes to state officials to ensure timely payments to 
SMMEs and secondly, through the state enactment of legislation criminalising collusive 




Africa, the findings in Chapter seven reveal that the relationship between the state (public 
officials) is based on the logics of negotiation and the logics of predatory authority. Chapter 
seven built on Chapter six to reveal another facet of the impact of corruption on the process of 
hybridisation. The research findings do not dispute that corruption blurs the boundaries 
between state/SMMEs in the construction industry, as suggested in Chapter six. The findings 
show that boundary-making is an important element in enabling the corruption to occur. This 
is because the authority vested in the state officials make it possible for them to ensure timely 
payments due to the SMMEs. This finding provides a different perspective from Kyed’s (2017) 
assertion that boundary-making during hybridisation is challenged by hybrid acts by showing 
that in the context where actors undergoing hybridisation attain mutual benefit from the 
exercise of boundary-making, it is not challenged.  
 
Findings from Chapter seven concurred with scholars such as Pieterse (2001) and Kyed (2017) 
who highlighted that boundaries are not constant but undergo continuous negotiations. Chapter 
seven highlighted that, after collusive tendering by the top construction firms to construct the 
2010 FIFA World Cup stadiums went public, the government amended the Competition Act to 
impose criminal liability on directors and individuals in management whose firms are found 
guilty of collusive tendering. The amendment to the legislation by the government was a 
boundary-making exercise to gain legitimacy by separating itself from politically connected 
corporates violating the law. The response of the construction industry to the legislative 
amendment was to create a trust fund with the objective to implement state policies; however, 
the conditions attached to the trust fund  challenged the boundary-making exercise of the state. 
The fact that the state did not question the conditions of the trust fund can be attributed to the 
importance it attached to protecting its partnership with the construction industry; this 
strengthens my argument that boundary-making in hybridisation is not always challenged.  
 
Chapter seven also discussed that the process of hybridisation does not necessarily result in the 
creation of a new hybrid governance structure, as suggested by scholars such as Colona and 
Jaffe (2016) and Young (1995:21). The findings from Chapters five, six and seven confirm and 
build upon Albrecht’s (2018a:574) argument that different sources of authority constituting 
hybridisation are interconnected but “do not merge into an even or stable (permanent) hybrid 




an objective (attaining financial gain) through corrupt practices are temporal and disband once 
the objective of their formation has been met.  
 
8.5 Suggestions for further research 
 
The theme in Chapters five, six and seven is that the workings of hybridisation are context 
specific and empirically determined. Therefore in Chapter five, I argued that it is difficult to 
prescribe how resources are allocated because in the case study the state was a dominate actor 
(regarding control of resources) and was able to determine how resources were allocated in a 
way that furthered its primary objective to host a successful FIFA World Cup. Post-conflict 
and peacebuilding literature tend to examine how international actors with state-centric policy 
objectives seek to distribute resources to build strong state institutions, such as the police, and 
fail to acknowledge the complex national dynamics between state and non-state policing actors. 
It would be useful for future researchers to explore factors that determine why the dominate 
national/local actor(s) (who is not an international actor) with control over resources  is not 
able to allocate resources in a way that furthers its main objective. Findings from Chapter six 
revealed that the corrupt practices in the implementation of BEE policies undermined 
contradictions between the state and the construction industry; further research could examine 
other practices that result in overshadowing contradictory elements in a hybrid governance 
structure. It would also be useful to explore a case study in which the corruption objective failed 
to overshadow contradictions within hybrid governance structures to determine what factors 
attributed to this failure: for example, is it the size of the project? Further research in the 
relationship between boundary-making practices and boundary-crossing practices during 
hybridisation is needed. Chapter seven has shown that boundary-making is not challenged 
when it results in the attainment of similar objectives of the actors in the hybrid structure. The 
question is what are the other contexts in which boundary-making during hybridisation is not 
challenged? 
 
8.6 Concluding remarks 
 
This research examined hybridity literature to identify the gaps in and criticism of the concept 




construction industry. Conceptualising the relationships within the case study as processes 
allowed me to capture the complexities inherent in hybrid structures. An examination of the 
different strategies and practices used by the state to enact its authority in the case study 
revealed that the distribution of resources was determined by the state objective of exercising 
soft power by hosting a successful 2010 FIFA World Cup event. The findings reveal that the 
blurring between the state and the construction industry is cemented by corruption in a way 
that undermines the contradictions within the process of hybridisation. The blurring between 
the construction industry occurs simultaneously with boundary-making practices by both 
parties during the process of hybridisation. However, the findings suggest that boundary-
making practices during hybridisation is challenged or left unchallenged under different 
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